KEELING (DARRELL RAY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001075-MR
AND
NO. 2009-CA-001076-MR
DARRELL RAY KEELING
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 08-CR-00267 AND 08-CR-00365
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; LAMBERT, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE: Darrell Ray Keeling brings Appeal No. 2009-CA001075-MR and Appeal No. 2009-CA-001076-MR from a May 26, 2009, order of
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
the McCracken Circuit Court ordering forfeiture of personal property seized at the
time of Keeling’s arrest. We affirm.
Keeling was served with an arrest warrant in a hotel room in
McCracken County. The warrant stemmed from several credit card and check
theft related offenses that occurred in Hardin County, Kentucky.2 Incident to the
arrest, Keeling was found to be in possession of marijuana and cocaine. Police
officers also found several recently purchased items in the hotel room including a
lawn mower, a compressor, an electric torch, and several other tools. Keeling
admitted to an officer that the tools and equipment were purchased with checks and
credit cards stolen from Hardin County. The tools and equipment were seized at
the time of Keeling’s arrest.
Eventually, Keeling was indicted by a McCracken County Grand Jury
upon possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, tampering with
physical evidence, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, four
counts of theft by deception over $300, and with being a persistent felony offender
in the first degree. The McCracken County Grand Jury also returned a second
indictment charging Keeling with six counts of theft by deception over $300 and
one count of being a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the first degree. Pursuant
to a plea agreement, Keeling pleaded guilty to all counts contained in both
indictments except PFO in the first degree; this charge was amended to PFO in the
second degree. Prior to sentencing, Keeling filed a motion for return of property
2
Darrell Ray Keeling was indicted by a Hardin County Grand Jury upon numerous felony counts
involving theft of credit cards and checks.
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seized. The court ultimately sentenced Keeling to a total of ten years’
imprisonment. Thereafter, Keeling renewed his motion for return of the property.
Following a hearing on the motion, the circuit court denied Keeling’s motion for
return of the property and entered an order forfeiting the seized personal property
(forfeiture order). These appeals follow.
APPEAL NO. 2009-CA-001075-MR
AND APPEAL NO. 2009-CA-001076-MR
Keeling contends the circuit court “lacked jurisdiction” to order
forfeiture of his personal property. As the forfeited property was purchased with
credit cards stolen from Hardin County, Keeling maintains that the forfeited
property has no connection to any crimes committed in McCracken County.
Keeling believes that only Hardin County has jurisdiction to order “forfeiture of
the property” and that the McCracken Circuit Court lacked such jurisdiction. We
disagree.
In the case at hand, the facts are undisputed that the McCracken
Circuit Court properly exercised in personam jurisdiction over Keeling. In a
forfeiture action arising from a criminal prosecution, it is only required that the
court have in personam jurisdiction over defendant. 37 C.J.S. Jurisdiction and
Venue § 53 (2008). As the McCracken Circuit Court possessed in personam
jurisdiction over Keeling, we hold that the McCracken Circuit Court, likewise,
-3-
possessed jurisdiction to order forfeiture of Keeling’s personal property under KRS
514.130. Thus, we view Keeling’s argument regarding jurisdiction.
Keeling alternatively argues that forfeiture was improper due to lack
of evidence that the property was obtained in violation of KRS Chapter 514. In
particular, Keeling argues:
Again, all parties and the trial court agreed that the
property at issue was subject to Appellant’s Hardin
Circuit Court case. If the property at issue had been
subject to the McCracken Circuit Court charges, the
McCracken Commonwealth Attorney would have been
able to offer proof as to which of each item of property
was obtained in violation of KRS [C]hapter 514, if any of
it was so obtained. This did not occur.
If any of the property at issue was obtained in
violation of KRS [C]hapter 514 according to the Hardin
Circuit Court case, no such proof was introduced. No
evidence from the Hardin County case was ever
introduced showing what items, if any, were bought by
the fraudulent use of credit cards and if such items
matched the property at issue. Moreover, even if the
items were bought by the fraudulent use of credit cards
such an offense is a violation of KRS Chapter 434 and
property so obtained is not subject to forfeiture under
KRS 514.130(1). There was simply no evidence that
upon a conviction of an offense under KRS [C]hapter
514 the property at issue was obtained in violation of
KRS [C]hapter 514.
-4-
The forfeiture statute at issue is KRS 514.130.3 Under KRS
514.130(1), personal property is subject to forfeiture if defendant is convicted of an
offense under KRS Chapter 514 and the property was utilized in connection with
an offense under KRS Chapter 514.
In this case, a police officer testified that Keeling admitted that the
property seized from his hotel room had been purchased with stolen credit cards
and/or checks. In fact, several partially destroyed credit cards were found in
Keeling’s hotel room, and the credit cards did not belong to Keeling. Additionally,
Keeling was convicted of numerous theft offenses under KRS Chapter 514 in both
McCracken County and Hardin County. As such, we conclude that Keeling’s
personal property was subject to seizure under KRS 514.130 and the circuit court
did not err by ordering forfeiture of same.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the McCracken Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
3
The relevant portions of KRS 514.130 reads:
(1) Upon the conviction of any person for the violation of any
offense in this chapter all property held in violation of this chapter,
and any personal property, including but not limited to vehicles or
aircraft, used in the commission or furtherance of an offense under
this chapter or in the transportation of stolen property shall be
forfeited as provided in KRS 500.090 by court order and sold,
destroyed or otherwise disposed of in accordance with KRS
500.090.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brandon Neil Jewell
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
M. Brandon Roberts
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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