MOBLEY (DIANE), ET AL. VS. NO GRAVES COUNTY KENTUCKY , ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001074-MR
DIANE MOBLEY, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MEGAN MORRIS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. STARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00319
GRAVES COUNTY, KENTUCKY; GRAVES COUNTY
FISCAL COURT; TONY SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COUNTY JUDGE
EXECUTIVE; ROMEY HOLMES, CHARLES REEVES,
AND JEFFREY HOWARD, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONERS
OF THE FISCAL COURT; AND DANNY TRAVIS,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS GRAVES COUNTY ROAD FOREMAN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND COMBS, JUDGES.
COMBS, JUDGE: The Estate of Megan Morris, by and through her personal
representative, Diane Mobley (the Estate), and Diane Mobley, individually, appeal
the order of the Graves Circuit Court granting summary judgment to Graves
County; the Graves County Fiscal Court; each member of the Fiscal Court,
including the county judge executive, individually and in his official capacity; and
Danny Travis, the road foreman, individually and in his official capacity. After
our review, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
In June 2007, Megan was one of seven teenagers riding in a car. She
was a passenger. It was dark and raining, and the driver failed an attempt to
negotiate a sharp curve. The car struck a tree; Megan died from her injuries. Her
estate filed a lawsuit against the defendants, the Graves County officials listed
above, and alleged that they were negligent in not providing warning signs at the
curve, thus causing Megan’s death. In May 2009, the Graves Circuit Court granted
summary judgment to the defendants. The Estate1 now appeals.
Summary judgment is a device utilized by the courts to expedite
litigation. Ross v. Powell, 206 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Ky. 2006). It is applied
stringently because it “takes the case away from the trier of fact before the
evidence is actually heard.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807
S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991). In Kentucky, the movant must prove that no genuine
issue of material fact exists; the movant likely “should not succeed unless his right
to judgment is shown with such clarity that there is no room left for controversy.”
Id.
1
We are using the term “The Estate” collectively to refer to the appellants -- both Diane Mobley
as personal representative of Megan’s estate, and Diane Mobley in her individual capacity.
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The trial court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving
party, who must present “at least some affirmative evidence showing the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” City of Florence v. Chipman, 38 S.W.3d 387,
390 (Ky. 2001). On appeal, our standard of review is “whether the trial court
correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that
the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft,
916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). Because summary judgments do not
involve fact finding, our review is de novo. Pinkston v. Audubon Area Community
Services, Inc., 210 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Ky. App. 2006).
In the case before us, the order granting summary judgment held that
the defendants were entitled to immunity and that there was no genuine issue as to
any material fact. We agree in part and disagree in part.
In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court has applied the
broad concept of immunity without distinguishing between the different types of
immunity involved. We are persuaded that it is necessary to examine the nuances
and categories of immunity applicable to this case and how they relate to it.
First, sovereign immunity embraces the notion that one may not sue
the government unless “the state has given its consent or otherwise waived its
immunity” by statutory provision. Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Ky.
2001). The concept is “a bedrock component” in our governmental structure.
Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d
790, 799 (Ky. 2009). Counties are protected by sovereign immunity. Lexington-3-
Fayette Urban County Gov’t v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Ky. 2004). When
sovereign immunity extends to public officials who are sued in their individual
capacities, it is known as qualified official immunity. Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d
at 518.
The trial court’s order also mentioned governmental immunity. Our
Supreme Court has recognized that courts often interchange the terms sovereign
immunity and governmental immunity, but they are actually two different
principles. Id. at 519. Governmental immunity applies to government agencies. It
arose from sovereign immunity and serves to balance the underlying public policy
upholding sovereign immunity versus the right of injured citizens to be remedied.
Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage Inc., 286 S.W.3d
at 800. Applicability of governmental immunity depends on the function of the
entity being sued and its parent body. Comair, Inc., v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91 (Ky. 2009). Since Graves County and the
Fiscal Court are not agencies, governmental immunity is not involved. Thus,
sovereign immunity applies.
The Estate has not cited a statute that authorizes claims against a
county government concerning road management, and we have not discovered one
in the course of our research. Therefore, summary judgment for Graves County,
the Fiscal Court, and its officers in their official capacities was proper. We affirm
on this issue.
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However, we must also examine whether summary judgment for the
officials individually was appropriate. As noted earlier, officials sued in their
individual capacities may be entitled to a qualified official immunity. Yanero v.
Davis, 65 S.W.3d at 522. More limited than sovereign or governmental immunity,
qualified official immunity applies to:
the negligent performance by a public officer or
employee of (1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those
involving the exercise of discretion and judgment or
personal deliberation, decision, and judgment; (2) in
good faith; and (3) within the scope of the employee’s
authority. . . . Conversely, an officer or employee is
afforded no immunity from tort liability for the negligent
performance of a ministerial act, i.e., one that requires
only obedience to the orders of others, or when the
officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and imperative,
involving merely the execution of a specific act arising
from fixed and designated facts.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
The Estate contends that the trial court did not properly apply this
analysis. Although the trial court discussed ministerial and discretionary duties in
its order, it simply concluded that the duties at issue were discretionary without
undertaking any analysis of the duties under the Yanero model of discretionary
versus ministerial functions. It neglected to apply the Yanero test to all named
defendants based on the analysis pertinent to each category, failing to differentiate
among the defendants as governmental entities, governmental representatives, and
individuals. Thus, we are persuaded that summary judgment for the defendants
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individually was premature since issues of fact remained and needed to be
explored in order to determine the proper application of the law.
Although we are remanding because of the trial court’s incomplete
immunity analysis, we shall also address the Estate’s second argument: that the
trial court granted summary judgment before all pertinent discovery concluded.
The scope of permissible discovery as a prelude to entry of summary judgment has
been a concern inherent in the issue of when summary judgment can be granted.
As pointed out above, governmental officers and employees are
potentially liable for negligence in carrying out ministerial acts or in performing
discretionary acts in a manner lacking good faith or beyond the scope of their
authority. The Estate contends that the Fiscal Court officials had the ministerial
duty to implement certain safety guidelines or procedures but that the Estate did
not have adequate opportunity to conduct proper discovery regarding the duties
before summary judgment was granted.
We agree that as a threshold matter, summary judgment should not be
granted unless “a party has been given ample opportunity to complete discovery.”
Pendleton Bros. Vending, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky Fin. & Admin.
Cabinet, 758 S.W.2d 24, 29 (Ky. 1988) (citing Hartford Ins. Group v. Citizens
Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 579 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. App. 1979)). This reasoning has
recently been reiterated by our Supreme Court, cautioning “trial courts not to take
up these motions prematurely.” Blankenship v. Collier, 302 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky.
2010).
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The Estate contends that the defendants had a mandatory ministerial
duty to implement the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways (MUTCD) as a matter of policy in determining placement of road signs.
Kentucky Revised Statute[s] (KRS) 189.337(2) requires the Department of
Highways to “promulgate and adopt a manual of standards” for control of traffic
devices.2 It applies to all state, county, and incorporated city roads.
In conjunction with implementing this statute, the Department of
Highways has issued a Kentucky Administrative Regulation, 603 KAR 5:050.
Section 1 of the regulation directs that “[t]he standards and specifications set forth
in the [MUTCD] shall apply to all traffic control devices . . . in Kentucky.”
(Emphasis added.) Maintenance and control of county roads are the responsibility
of the county engineer. KRS 179.070. If a county does not employ an engineer, it
may hire a county road supervisor to carry out the duties of a county engineer.
KRS 179.020(1). The General Assembly has determined that one must meet
specific qualifications in order to be a county road supervisor. KRS 179.020(2).
As the Estate correctly acknowledges, promulgation of rules (creating
a policy) is discretionary. However, enforcement of the rules, once in place, is
ministerial. Williams v. Kentucky Dept. of Education, 113 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Ky.
2003). The Department of Highways has promulgated the rule that counties must
implement the MUTCD in their road maintenance policies. Therefore,
2
KRS 189.337(1) includes road signs in the definition of “official traffic control devices.”
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implementation of the MUTCD by local officials is ministerial – removing the
protection of qualified immunity for the exercise of the duty.
The trial court found that placement of road signs is per se a
discretionary function, relying on Estate of Clark ex rel. Mitchell v. Daviess
County, 105 S.W.3d 841 (Ky. App. 2003), and Bolin v. Davis, 283 S.W.3d 752
(Ky. App. 2009). However, we are persuaded that both cases are highly
distinguishable from the case before us. In both cases cited, the local governments
had presented their road maintenance policies and had even shown proof that
additional precautions had been considered but rejected at the locations in
question. The decisions concerning the signs and guardrails were revealed to be
discretionary as a result of the deliberative decisions made with regard to
application of their policies. Contrary to the trial court’s interpretation, neither
Clark nor Bolin adopted a broad holding that road sign placement is a discretionary
act.
In this case, the defendants did not show that they had complied with
the mandate of the Department of Highways. In an interrogatory in February 2009,
the Estate requested the policy as to local roads. Instead of answering the
interrogatory, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in March,
which led to this appeal. The defendants also had not answered the Estate’s
interrogatories regarding their duties and qualifications. These are genuine issues
of material facts that were still pending when the trial court granted summary
judgment, which we hold to have been premature.
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In summary, we affirm entry of summary judgment as to Graves
County, its Fiscal Court, and its officers in their official capacity. We vacate the
order of summary judgment as to the officials in their individual capacities and
remand the case to the Graves Circuit Court for immunity analysis pertinent to
those named defendants.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
ACREE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
ACREE, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. In my
view of the law, placing signs and guardrails on county roads, or not placing them,
is a discretionary act undertaken by a fiscal court. Because the estate never made a
genuine issue either of the fiscal court’s good faith exercise of that discretion or of
its authority to exercise it, summary judgment was appropriate.
The majority determined that placing signs and guardrails on county
roads is a ministerial act. To quote the majority, because “[t]he standards and
specifications set forth in the [MUTCD] shall apply to all traffic control devices[,]
. . . counties must implement the MUTCD in their road maintenance policies.
Therefore, implementation of the MUTCD by local officials is ministerial –
removing the protection of qualified immunity for the exercise of the duty.”
(Emphasis supplied by majority). I believe this reasoning is flawed because no
duty related to the MUTCD was at issue here.
While I agree “the duty” imposed by 603 KAR 5:050 to follow the
MUTCD is ministerial, that duty (to conform traffic control devices to a national
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standard) arises only after a fiscal court exercises its discretion in determining that
a traffic control device should be installed. The fiscal court did not and could not
fail to undertake the ministerial act of assuring compliance with the MUTCD
because, as alleged in the complaint, there were no traffic control devices to make
uniform with that manual.
Before addressing the fiscal court’s discretionary acts regarding
county roads, a closer look at the MUTCD is appropriate.
The MUTCD is “the national standard for all traffic control devices
installed on any street, highway, or bicycle trail open to public travel[.]” 23 C.F.R.
§ 655.603 (2010).3 As its title indicates, the sole purpose of the Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices is to make uniform all traffic control devices4
across the various jurisdictions within the United States, for reasons obvious to any
inter-jurisdictional traveler. However, “[t]his Manual describes the application of
traffic control devices, but shall not be a legal requirement for their installation.”
MUTCD Section 1A.09 (emphasis supplied). Kentucky’s own regulation is
consistent, stating that the MUTCD applies to traffic control devices that are
“installed on any publicly used” roadway. 603 KAR 5:050 Section 1. Use of the
3
The MUTCD is readily accessible; 603 KAR 5:050, Section 2 requires that “The Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices and all amendments and supplements shall be maintained both
at the cabinet Web site, www.transportation.ky.gov, and in hard copy at the Transportation
Cabinet.”
4
A traffic control device is “a sign, signal, marking, or other device used to regulate, warn, or
guide traffic, placed on, over, or adjacent to a street, highway, pedestrian facility, or shared-use
path by authority of a public agency having jurisdiction.” MUTCD, Section 1A.13, [§] 87.
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past tense certainly presumes a previous decision by the proper authority to install
a traffic control device. Once again, the MUTCD itself says as much.
Traffic control devices, advertisements, announcements,
and other signs or messages within the highway right-ofway shall be placed only as authorized by a public
authority or the official having jurisdiction, for the
purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.
MUTCD Section 1A.08 (Emphasis supplied). Contrary to the majority’s
conclusion, neither the MUTCD nor the regulation incorporating it creates a duty
requiring installation of a traffic control device at any particular location.
Kentucky law is clear that a fiscal court’s acts regarding improvement
of county roads are discretionary. Madison Fiscal Court v. Edester, 301 Ky. 1,
190 S.W.2d 695, 696 (1945) (“[I]t is within the discretion of the fiscal court to
determine the road or roads which shall be improved and the time and method of
such improvements.”); see KRS 67.080(2)(b)(“fiscal court shall . . . , [a]s needed,
cause the construction, operation, and maintenance of all county . . . structures,
grounds, roads and other property”; emphasis supplied). In exercising its
discretion, the fiscal court should properly consider a variety of factors. Here are
three examples of such factors.
First, the MUTCD itself warns that “Regulatory and warning signs
[including speed limit postings and “curve ahead” warnings, respectively,] should
be used conservatively because these signs, if used to excess, tend to lose their
effectiveness.” MUTCD, Section 2A.04 Excessive Use of Signs; MUTCD,
Section 2B.13 Speed Limit Sign (speed limit sign is a regulatory sign); MUTCD,
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Section 2C.06 Horizontal Alignment Signs (“curve ahead” signs, known as
horizontal alignment signs, are warning signs). The MUTCD thus urges discretion
when considering whether to install a traffic control device at all.
Second, “Signs should be used only where justified by engineering
judgment or studies[.]” MUTCD, Section 2A.03, Standardization of Application.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that any study indicated the need for signs
or a guardrail. Additionally, discovery revealed there were never any accidents
and never any complaints about this stretch of county road prior to the accident in
question.
Third, because there is a cost attributable to the installation of signs
and guardrails, discretion in the allocation of taxpayer/road-fund dollars is
required. Kentucky has long held that such expenditures are discretionary acts.
The fiscal court of every county is, in effect, a legislative
board, invested with the power by law of making
appropriations in cases where the needs of the county
require it; and while they may neglect their duties, or
omit to improve the roads, or to make other
appropriations necessary for that purpose, it is beyond the
power of a judicial tribunal to interfere and determine
what improvements should be made, and the extent of the
expenditure necessary for that purpose.
Madison Fiscal Court v. Edester, 301 Ky. 1, 190 S.W.2d 695, 696 (1945) (quoting
Highbaugh v. Hardin County, 17 Ky.L.Rptr. 1313, 34 S.W. 706, 707 (Ky. 1896)).
Such discretion, of course, is not without limitation. One
“qualification” of qualified immunity is that the discretionary act be one within the
official’s authority. In the eleven months from the filing of the complaint until the
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entry of summary judgment, the estate never made an issue of the fiscal court’s
authority and, in fact, conceded it.
The only other qualification is that the official will not be immune
from prosecution if he fails to act in good faith, including his willful failure to act
at all. As our former Court of Appeals said,
These officials are invested with the necessary discretion
as to the manner of discharging the duties of their offices.
But this discretion is not one that can set at naught the
duty. Their discretion consists in the manner how, not in
the matter of whether, the highway shall be kept in fit
condition for public use, in so far as the means given to
their hands by the law will suffice. . . . We are of the
opinion that under the statutes above quoted [Ky.Stat. §
1834, predecessor to KRS 67.080 cited supra] the duty of
keeping the public highways of a county in repair is
primarily imposed upon the members of the fiscal court
sitting as the governmental tribunal of the county. The
responsibility, if any, for a willful failure to discharge
this duty, would rest upon the members individually, and
not the county.
Commonwealth v. Boyle County Fiscal Court, 24 Ky.L.Rptr. 234, 68 S.W. 116,
118 (Ky. 1902) (Emphasis supplied). The estate never alleged a willful failure to
discharge any duty, only a negligent failure.
Furthermore, examination of the complaint reveals that the estate
never alleged that any defendant failed to act in good faith. By the time the
members of the fiscal court filed their motion for summary judgment, they had
sufficiently shown prima facie that “The decision of the Defendants in this action
was made in good faith and well within the discretionary authority of the official
capacity.” (Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7). Nothing in the pleadings or
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discovery contradicts that showing. “Once the officer or employee has shown
prima facie that the act was performed within the scope of his/her discretionary
authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish by direct or circumstantial
evidence that the discretionary act was not performed in good faith.” Yanero v.
Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 523 (Ky. 2001). The estate never met that burden. In fact,
the estate’s focus in response to the motion for summary judgment was to request
additional time for discovery “[t]o fully investigate the acts complained of by
Plaintiffs in this matter and whether those acts were ‘ministerial’ or
“discretionary.’” (Response to Summary Judgment Motion, p. [2]).
I am firmly convinced that the act of placing or failing to place signs
or a guardrail on county roads is a discretionary act on the part of the fiscal court,
not a ministerial one. During the eleven months of this case’s pendency before the
circuit court, the estate never made a genuine issue of the fiscal court’s good faith
or authority. For these reasons, the case was ripe for summary judgment.
Therefore, I would affirm the circuit court.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Edwin A. Jones
Nicholas D. Kafer
Paducah, Kentucky
Richie Kemp
Mayfield, Kentucky
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