CROSSLAND (MARK) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 3, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000977-MR
MARK CROSSLAND
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT J. HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00467
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; SHAKE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Mark Crossland was convicted of one count of violating a
domestic violence order and one count of intimidating a participant in the legal
process. He alleges that the following errors occurred during his trial: (1) he was
substantially prejudiced when the trial court permitted the introduction of evidence
of prior crimes and bad acts in violation of KRE 404, KRE 401, and KRE 403; (2)
he was substantially prejudiced when the Commonwealth “vouched” for a
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Senior Judge Ann O’Malley Shake sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
witness’s credibility; and (3) that the trial judge erroneously failed to recuse
himself from presiding over the trial. We conclude that Crossland’s allegations are
without merit and affirm.
Crossland was married to Iris Kelly. After their separation, Kelly’s
home burned after which a domestic violence order was entered preventing
Crossland form contacting or harassing Kelly. Following an investigation by
Detective Frank Gresham, a Kentucky State Police arson/explosives investigator,
Crossland was charged with arson, burglary, firearm charges, and animal cruelty
relating to the fire at Kelly’s home. After Crossland allegedly threatened Kelly to
influence her testimony regarding the fire at her home or to prevent her from
testifying, he was indicted for the offenses that are the subject of this appeal.
The instant case was scheduled for trial on May 9, 2007. However,
Crossland moved for a continuance arguing that although he was convicted of the
firearm charges on October 24, 2006, the arson and burglary charges remained
pending and he would be prejudiced if the trial in the present case was concluded
prior to the trial on those charges. The trial court granted the motion and
scheduled the trial to commence on April 16, 2008.
Prior to the trial date, Crossland filed a motion for the trial judge to
recuse himself from presiding over the trial asserting that the trial judge had
presided over two prior criminal trials involving Crossland and had made
statements indicating that he could not be impartial. Crossland incorporated a
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complaint he filed with the Judicial Conduct Commission against the trial judge.
The trial judge held a hearing on the matter and denied the motion to recuse.
Subsequently, Crossland filed a motion requesting that the trial court
suppress Gresham’s testimony as irrelevant under KRE 401 because his testimony
related to the arson, burglary and firearms charges for which he had already been
convicted and not the violation of a DVO and intimidation charges. Further, he
argued that KRE 403 prohibited admission of Gresham’s testimony because it was
highly prejudicial and inflammatory because it would lead the jury to consider
collateral issues and could be used to infer Crossland’s criminal propensity.
At a hearing on the motion to suppress, the Commonwealth argued
that Gresham’s testimony was relevant to demonstrate the legal process in which
Kelly was the primary witness. The trial court ruled that the Commonwealth could
present Gresham’s testimony for the limited purpose of demonstrating that Kelly
was a witness in the case charging Crossland with arson and burglary of her home.
It specifically restricted the Commonwealth from introducing evidence regarding
the outcome of Crossland’s trial on the charges.
At trial, Gresham testified that on December 1, 2005, he investigated
an arson fire at Kelly’s home and that Crossland was charged with arson, burglary,
animal cruelty, and firearm charges as a result of the 2005 fire. He identified Kelly
as an important witness in the case against Crossland.
Kelly testified that on August 18, 2006, she was working in a factory
in Calvert City when she received a call at 2:27 p.m. The number shown was
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either “unknown or unavailable.” She testified that she was “one hundred percent
positive” Crossland was the caller and that he yelled “you thought you had me,
didn’t you ...? Well, I’ve got something for you.” Feeling threatened by
Crossland’s words, Kelly contacted her divorce attorney, the McCracken County
Sheriff and Gresham.
The trial testimony also included former Bailiff Russ Bohanon who
testified that on August 18, 2006, he escorted Crossland to the McCracken County
Courthouse to be arraigned on the charges related to the 2005 fire and that
Crossland became agitated and boisterous. After he was arraigned, Bohanon
escorted Crossland to the jail and he testified that during the trip, Crossland was
cursing which seemed to be directed at one person.
McCracken County Jailer Bill Adams testified that in 2006, inmates
were permitted to make phone calls either by purchasing a phone card or by
making a collect call. Adams traced the call made at 1:36 p.m. on August 18,
2006, as being made from Pod 4, where Crossland was housed.
Crossland challenges the admission of evidence relating to the charges
resulting from the 2005 fire under KRE 404, KRE 401, and KRE 403. KRE
404(b) prohibits the admission of prior criminal conduct or bad acts to prove that
the defendant acted in the same way on a particular occasion. However, the rule
also provides exceptions. Prior bad acts are admissible:
(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or
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(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence
essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could
not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on
the offering party.
KRE 404(b).
In Norton v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Ky.App. 1994),
this Court cited with approval United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83 (4th Cir.
1980), where the theory that the prior bad acts can be “interwoven” into the present
crime was explained:
“[W]here evidence is admissible to provide this ‘full
presentation’ of the offense ‘[t]here is no reason to
fragmentize the event under inquiry’ by suppressing parts
of the ‘res gestae’.” As further pointed out by Lawson,
the case law from which the language utilized in KRS
404(b)(2) is extracted suggests “that the rule is intended
to be flexible enough to permit the prosecution to present
a complete, unfragmented, unartificial picture of the
crime committed by the defendant, including necessary
context, background and perspective.” See also,
Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 112 (1990),
citing both Lawson and Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
366 S.W.2d 902 (1962), in which it was stated:
[T]he rule [is] that all evidence which is pertinent to the
issue and tends to prove the crime charged against the
accused is admissible, although it may also approve or
tend to prove the commission of other crimes by him or
to establish collateral facts.
We conclude that because the evidence regarding Crossland’s prior charges were
essential to the Commonwealth’s case, it was properly admitted.
KRS 524.040 sets forth the elements of the offense of intimidating a
participant in the legal process and provides in part:
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(1) A person is guilty of intimidating a participant in the
legal process when, by use of physical force or a threat
directed to a person he believes to be a participant in the
legal process, he or she:
(a) Influences, or attempts to influence, the
testimony, vote, decision, or opinion of that
person;
(b) Induces, or attempts to induce, that
person to avoid legal process summoning
him or her to testify;...
A participant in the legal process includes a witness. KRS 524.010(3).
Because evidence of the charges resulting from the 2005 fire were necessary to
establish the elements of the current offense and were so inextricably intertwined
with evidence essential to the case, they were relevant and admissible under KRE
404(b).
Crossland argues that even if evidence of the charges arising from the
2005 fire was admissible under KRE 404(b), the Commonwealth exceeded the
bounds of the rule and, as a consequence, introduced irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence in violation of KRE 401 and KRE 403.
KRE 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
We have discussed the relevancy of the charges resulting from the 2005 fire and
reaffirm that the charges were relevant to the charge of intimidating a participant
in a legal proceeding.
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KRE 403 limits the introduction of relevant evidence when “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” An appellate court cannot
reverse a trial court's ruling under KRE 403 unless there has been an abuse of
discretion. Simpson v. Commonwealth, 889 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Ky. 1994).
Crossland argues that Gresham’s testimony was unduly prejudicial
and the information given the jury regarding the death of Kelly’s dog in the fire
was likewise unduly prejudicial. However, it is not a defendant’s prerogative to
dictate the evidence submitted to the jury by the Commonwealth simply because it
is harmful to his defense. The Commonwealth is permitted to prove every element
of its offense and the defendant “may not stipulate away the parts of the case that
he does not want the jury to see.” Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 103
(Ky. 1998). “In order for a jury to be able to size up a case fairly and wisely it
must be allowed to gain a reasonable perspective, and that can best be done by
permitting it to see an unadulterated picture. Id. (internal quotations and citations
omitted). We have reviewed the record and conclude there was no error.
Crossland also contends that the prosecution vouched for the
credibility of Kelly in the opening statement. However, he admits the issue was
not preserved for review, thus, it is subject to review only under the palpable error
rule. RCr 10.26. An appellate court may consider an unpreserved, palpable error
which affected the defendant's “substantial rights” and resulted in “manifest
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injustice.” Id. In determining whether an error is palpable, “an appellate court
must consider whether on the whole case there is a substantial possibility that the
result could have been any different.” Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 646 S.W.2d
43, 45 (Ky. 1983).
Crossland argues that in its opening statement, the Commonwealth
impermissibly “vouched” for Kelly’s credibility when it stated that Kelly “had all
her ducks in a row.” A prosecutor is not permitted to express his personal opinion
as to the character of a witness. Moore v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 426, 438
(Ky. 1982). However, even if convinced that the prosecutor’s use of the phrase
“ducks in a row” vouched for Kelly’s credibility, we only address the merits of the
alleged error if it rises to the level of palpable error. Given the totality of the
evidence, there was no substantial possibility that the result of the trial would have
been different absent the prosecutor’s remarks. Therefore, we conclude there was
no palpable error. RCr 10.26.
Crossland’s final argument is that the trial court erroneously denied
his motion to recuse under KRS 26A.015(2)(e) on the basis that the trial judge’s
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” A motion for recusal should be
made immediately upon discovery of the facts upon which the disqualification
rests. Kohler v. Commonwealth, 492 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1973); Bailey v. Bailey, 474
S.W.2d 389, 391 (Ky. 1971). “Otherwise, it will be waived.” Bussell v.
Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Ky. 1994).
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Crossland alleged in his motion that because the trial judge presided
over his two most recent criminal trials and made statements indicating that he
could not be fair, the trial judge was required to recuse from presiding over his
trial. Additionally, Crossland attached a complaint filed against the trial judge
with the Judicial Conduct Commission wherein he alleged that during a July 26,
2006, competency hearing and his February 2, 2007, sentencing hearing, the trial
judge made disparaging remarks directed at Crossland.
Despite his belief that the trial judge had demonstrated partiality in
2006 and early 2007, Crossland did not seek recusal in February 2008. Nothing
new was presented on February 28, 2008, that was not already known to Crossland
over one year earlier. Under the circumstances, his motion was untimely. Id.
Moreover, the Kentucky Supreme Court has described the burden of
proof required for recusal of a trial judge as an onerous one. “There must be a
showing of facts of a character calculated seriously to impair the judge's
impartiality and sway his judgment. The mere belief that the judge will not afford
a fair and impartial trial is not sufficient grounds for recusal.” Stopher v.
Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 794-795 (Ky. 2001)(internal citations and
quotations omitted).
Crossland alleged that the trial court made statements indicating the
judge’s partiality which the trial judge disputed, yet, Crossland failed to present
any evidence to support his allegations. Consequently, he failed to meet the
onerous burden imposed and the motion was properly denied.
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the McCracken Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Defender
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Jason B. Moore
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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