BERRY (JAMES HENRY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 17, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000951-MR
JAMES HENRY BERRY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE A. C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 87-CR-000192
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; CLAYTON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: James Henry Berry appeals from the Jefferson Circuit
Court’s denial of his fourth collateral motion for a new trial pursuant to Kentucky
Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. We affirm.
In 1987, James Berry was tried and convicted of murder and of being
a persistent felony offender (“PFO”), in the first degree. Berry was sentenced to
life for the murder conviction, which was enhanced to two hundred years pursuant
to the PFO charge. On direct appeal, the PFO conviction was vacated with
directions that Berry be resentenced to life imprisonment. See Berry v. Com., 782
S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1990). The Supreme Court also held that it was not error to fail
to disclose an oral statement of a witness in discovery as oral statements did not
fall within the meaning or intent of Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
7.24.
In 1995, Berry filed a combined CR 60.02 and RCr 11.42 motion,
primarily arguing that his indictment and trial on murder as a Class A felony
violated a number of his protections under the United States and Kentucky
constitutions. Berry further argued that to resentence him under the Kentucky
Supreme Court’s mandate would be a denial of his constitutional rights. The
Jefferson Circuit Court denied this motion and this Court affirmed. See
unpublished opinion, Berry v. Com., (No. 1995-CA-000403-MR)(Ky. App. Sep. 6,
1996).
In 1999, Berry filed a second CR 60.02 motion, asserting that
because his offense was not a Class A felony and was not treated as a capital
offense, the maximum sentence he could receive was twenty years for a Class B
felony. The Jefferson Circuit Court denied this motion, and this Court affirmed the
denial. See unpublished opinion, Berry v. Com., (No. 2000-CA-001121-MR)(Ky.
App. June 1, 2001).
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In 2006, Berry filed a third CR 60.02 motion, requesting a new
sentencing hearing. Again, the Jefferson Circuit Court denied this motion, and this
Court affirmed that decision. See unpublished opinion, Berry v. Com., (No. 2007CA-001094-MR)(Ky. App. Mar. 7, 2008) (with discretionary review denied on
Sept. 10, 2008, noting that it was controlled by the law of the case and the holding
in Gross v. Com., 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983)).
On December 30, 2008, Berry filed this fourth collateral CR 60.02
motion seeking a new trial based upon the case of Chestnut v. Com., 250 S.W.3d
288 (Ky. 2008), which reversed the legal precedent from his direct appeal that
limited discovery to written or recorded statements. The Jefferson Circuit Court
summarily denied this motion. Berry then filed this appeal of the circuit court’s
decision.
The issue, therefore, on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
denying Berry’s CR 60.02 motion for a new trial based upon the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chestnut, supra. Berry asserts that he should be granted a new trial
based on the recent Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Chestnut, which reversed
the legal precedent from his direct appeal that limited discovery to written or
recorded statements.
In light of the aforementioned arguments, we now turn to our
established jurisprudence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion under an abuse of
discretion standard. White v. Com., 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000); Brown v.
Com., 932 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Ky. 1996). The test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles. Com. v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
Therefore, we affirm the lower court’s decision unless there is a showing of some
“flagrant miscarriage of justice.” Gross v. Com., 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983).
DISCUSSION
After a thorough examination of the entire record and trial transcripts
we affirm the decision of the Jefferson Circuit Court that denied Berry’s motion for
relief. This is not a case involving a “flagrant miscarriage of justice.” There was
enough convincing evidence aside from the testimony of Beverly Parham that
allowed the jury to return a guilty verdict. A second witness identified Berry and
Berry’s hands showed traces of gunshot residue a few short hours after the
shooting occurred. We are convinced that Berry received a fair trial and his
sentence should not be set aside. Berry has received significant direct and
collateral review since his conviction over twenty years ago. There was certainly
not a “flagrant miscarriage of justice” warranting a new trial.
Berry argues in his brief that the recent change in law in Chestnut
should retroactively apply to his particular case. Berry is seeking remediation of a
legal decision that was correct under the case law in existence at the time of his
trial. This is an improper use of a CR 60.02 motion. A change in the law simply is
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not grounds for CR 60.02 relief except in “aggravated cases where there are strong
equities.” Reed v. Reed, 484 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Ky. 1972). That is not the case
here.
In Chestnut, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had committed
reversible error in failing to grant a mistrial when it allowed the introduction of
testimony made by a witness at trial that was not disclosed to the defendant prior to
trial as required by RCr 7.24(1) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct.
1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Berry asserts that similarly, during his trial, counsel
made very specific objections to the statements made by the witness; however, the
statements were admitted and considered by the jury. Further, Berry alleges that
the change in witness testimony was never disclosed to the defense prior to trial,
resulting in a violation of the Commonwealth’s duty to provide open file
discovery. RCr 7.24.
The proscription against “applying new rules retroactively once a
judgment is final on direct review makes sense, given the interest in finality of
judgments.” Leonard v. Com., 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). To permit a
retroactive application of the Chestnut decision in Berry’s case would wholly
vitiate the finality of judgments in that each change in the law would allow or
require relitigation of the facts and the law of every case.
In the present action, the Supreme Court has already heard Berry’s
argument in Berry, 782 S.W.2d 625. The Court specifically denied his request for
relief from his judgment on this issue. This is the law of the case, and the circuit
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court in no way abused its discretion in denying Berry’s CR 60.02 motion on the
same issue.
Thus, Berry is not entitled to CR 60.02 relief and the circuit court did
not err in denying Berry’s motion requesting that his conviction be set aside and
remanded for a new trial. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mark G. Hall
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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