THOMAS PUGH, INDIVIDUALLY, AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO POLICE OFFICER VS. RANDOLPH (LATONYA), ET AL.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 10, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000755-MR
THOMAS PUGH, INDIVIDUALLY,
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY
METRO POLICE OFFICER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY WILLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 08-CI-000204, 08-CI-000251, AND 08-CI-000533
LaTONYA RANDOLPH,
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF DEMETRA BOYD; JUNENEAN
HUSTON, AS PARENT, NEXT
FRIEND AND ON BEHALF OF
DEMETRICK BOYD, JR., A MINOR;
TOSCA BELL, AS PARENT, NEXT
FRIEND AND ON BEHALF OF
LYNN-ASIA BELL, A MINOR;
TOSCA BELL, AS PARENT, NEXT
FRIEND AND ON BEHALF OF KEI-VONTEZ
BELL, A MINOR; TOSCA BELL, AS
PARENT, NEXT FRIEND AND ON
BEHALF OF CORTEZ MOORE, A
MINOR; LYNN TILLMAN AND
DARNELL BOYD, AS PARENTS AND
NEXT FRIENDS AND ON BEHALF
OF DEMETRIUS BOYD, A MINOR;
DEMETRICK BOYD; AND
AIRECA SMITH, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS PARENT AND NEXT
FRIEND OF LOUIS SIMMONS III,
A MINOR
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, MOORE, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Thomas Pugh, individually and in his official capacity as a
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Police Officer, has filed an interlocutory appeal
from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s order determining that Pugh was not entitled to
the defense of qualified official immunity. After a careful review of the record, we
reverse the circuit court’s determination that he was not entitled to the qualified
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immunity defense because that determination was prematurely made. We remand
for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the evening in question, Pugh was working as an on-duty
Louisville Metro Police Officer when, according to his affidavit, he heard police
dispatch call out a purse snatching over the radio. He responded to the call by
going to the “Fourth Street Live” area of Louisville. Pugh attested that the victim
appeared “frantic” when she flagged him down, that she then approached Pugh,
told him she was “just glad to be alive,” and stated she “just got robbed.” The
victim began to describe the perpetrator when a red vehicle drove by and she told
Pugh “that’s him, that’s him, that’s the car that he got into.” Pugh asked her if she
was certain, and she said “yeah that’s the one because it has the damage on the side
of it.” Pugh later learned the driver of the red car was Donta Jones.
Pugh then followed the red car and stopped it. Pugh attested that he
climbed out of his car and as he reached the rear bumper of the red car, the red car
“took off.” Pugh then turned on the lights and siren on his police car and pursued
the red car through Louisville. In his affidavit, Pugh alleged that at one
intersection, the red car “started picking up speed,” and then, at another
intersection, the red car failed to stop at a red traffic light, and collided with
another vehicle. The other vehicle was driven by Demetrick Boyd, Sr. Pugh’s
vehicle was not involved in the collision. According to the complaint filed in the
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circuit court, as a result of the collision, tragically, Demetra1 Boyd was killed.
Additionally, Demetrick Boyd, Sr.; Demetrick Boyd, Jr.; Lynn-Asia Bell; Keivontez Bell; Cortez Moore; Demetrius Boyd; and Louis Simmons, III, were
injured. It appears that Demetrick Boyd, Sr., was the only adult in the vehicle, as
the other seven people in the vehicle with him were children, including the
decedent.
Demetrick Boyd, Sr., as well as the passengers in his vehicle, or the
parents of those minor passengers, as their representatives, filed actions2 in the
circuit court. They claimed, inter alia, that Pugh, both in his official and
individual capacities, acted negligently in driving his police vehicle and in
pursuing Donta Jones and that the Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government
and its police department were negligent in failing to properly train Pugh regarding
techniques, policies and procedures concerning police pursuits and stops.
Pugh filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary
judgment, claiming that he was entitled to the defense of qualified official
immunity and that his actions were not the proximate cause of any of the plaintiffs’
injuries or the resulting claims. Pugh attached his affidavit to the motion. The
affidavit incorporated by reference a transcribed oral statement Pugh gave at the
police department concerning the events leading up to the collision. This statement
was given within hours of the collision.
1
In the pleadings filed in the circuit court, Demetra’s name is sometimes spelled “Demetria.”
She was the daughter of Demetrick Boyd, Sr., who was driving the other vehicle.
2
It appears that those actions were subsequently consolidated.
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The circuit court, relying on Jones v. Lathram, 150 S.W.3d 50 (Ky.
2004), found that Pugh’s act of driving a police cruiser in pursuit of Donta Jones
was not discretionary, but ministerial and, therefore, held that Pugh was not
entitled to qualified official immunity. The court then stated that “[w]hether
Officer Pugh was negligent in operating his police cruiser, with due regard being
given to all the facts and circumstances, is a question for resolution by the trier of
fact.” Consequently, the court denied Pugh’s motion for summary judgment.
Pugh now appeals, claiming as follows: (a) he is entitled to file this
interlocutory appeal; (b) he is entitled to have the claims against him dismissed
based upon qualified official immunity; (c) he is entitled to have the claims made
against him in his official capacity dismissed; (d) the Jones v. Lathram case that
the circuit court relied upon is inapposite; and (e) his pursuit of Donta Jones was
“legally authorized,” and it was consistent with the standard operating procedures
(S.O.P.s) of the Louisville Metro Police Department.
II. ANALYSIS
A. CLAIM REGARDING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
Pugh first contends that he is entitled to file this interlocutory appeal.
Pursuant to Breathitt County Board of Education v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 886
(Ky. 2009), “orders denying claims of immunity . . . should be subject to prompt
appellate review.” In Prater, the Kentucky Supreme Court explained its reasoning
for this holding:
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[I]mmunity entitles its possessor to be free from the
burdens of defending the action, not merely . . . from
liability. . . . Obviously such an entitlement cannot be
vindicated following a final judgment for by then the
party claiming immunity has already borne the costs and
burdens of defending the action. For this reason, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized in immunity
cases an exception to the federal final judgment rule
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), the
Court reiterated its position that “the denial of a
substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order
appealable before final judgment.” . . . We find the
Supreme Court’s reasoning persuasive, and thus agree
with the Court of Appeals that an order denying a
substantial claim of absolute immunity is immediately
appealable even in the absence of a final judgment.
Prater, 292 S.W.3d at 886-87 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Therefore, Pugh is entitled to bring this interlocutory appeal concerning the denial
of his claim of qualified official immunity.
B. CLAIM REGARDING DENIAL OF QUALIFIED OFFICIAL
IMMUNITY
Pugh next alleges that he is entitled to have the claims against him
dismissed based upon qualified official immunity. A recent case by the Kentucky
Supreme Court explained under what conditions a public official is entitled to
qualified immunity.
[W]hen an officer or employee of the state or county (or
one of its agencies) is sued in his or her individual
capacity, that officer or employee enjoys qualified
official immunity, which affords protection from
damages liability for good faith judgment calls made in a
legally uncertain environment. Application of the
defense, therefore, rests not on the status or title of the
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officer or employee, but on the [act or] function
performed.
Indeed, the analysis depends upon classifying the
particular acts or functions in question in one of two
ways: discretionary or ministerial. Qualified official
immunity applies only where the act performed by the
official or employee is one that is discretionary in nature.
Discretionary acts are, generally speaking, those
involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or
personal deliberation, decision, and judgment. It may
also be added that discretionary acts or functions are
those that necessarily require the exercise of reason in the
adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in
determining how or whether the act shall be done or the
course pursued. Discretion in the manner of the
performance of an act arises when the act may be
performed in one or two or more ways, either of which
would be lawful, and where it is left to the will or
judgment of the performer to determine in which way it
shall be performed. On the other hand, ministerial acts or
functions – for which there are no immunity – are those
that require only obedience to the orders of others, or
when the officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and
imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act
arising from fixed and designated facts.
In spite of these often quoted guidelines, determining the
nature of a particular act or function demands a more
probing analysis than may be apparent at first glance. In
reality, few acts are ever purely discretionary or purely
ministerial. Realizing this, our analysis looks for the
dominant nature of the act. For this reason, [the
Kentucky Supreme Court] has observed that an act is not
necessarily taken out of the class styled “ministerial”
because the officer performing it is vested with a
discretion respecting the means or method to be
employed. Similarly, that a necessity may exist for the
ascertainment of those [fixed and designated] facts does
not operate to convert the [ministerial] act into one
discretionary in its nature. Moreover, a proper analysis
must always be carefully discerning, so as to not equate
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the act at issue with that of a closely related but differing
act.
Haney v. Monsky, 311 S.W.3d 235, 240-41 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted; emphasis removed).
In denying Pugh’s claim of qualified official immunity, the circuit
court relied on the Jones case. In Jones, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
“the act of safely driving a police cruiser, even in an emergency, is not an act that
typically requires any deliberation or the exercise of judgment. Rather, driving a
police cruiser requires reactive decisions based on duty, training, and overall
consideration of public safety.” Jones, 150 S.W.3d at 53. Therefore, the Jones
Court found the act of safely driving a police cruiser in responding to an
emergency call from a fellow officer was a ministerial act and, thus, the officer in
that case was not entitled to qualified official immunity.
However, Jones is highly distinguishable from the present case. First,
Jones involved the officer’s adherence to standards for driving. In the present
case, the issue revolves around adherence to S.O.P.s for police pursuits and
whether Pugh’s actions under those S.O.P.s were purely ministerial, discretionary,
or a combination of the two.
Second, the underlying facts giving rise to the accidents in Jones and
the present case are highly distinguishable. In the present case, according to
Pugh’s affidavit, when the victim approached him at Fourth Street Live, the victim
told him she was “just glad to be alive” and she “just got robbed.” In its order
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denying Pugh’s claim of qualified official immunity, the circuit court stated that
Pugh had initiated the pursuit of the red car driven by Donta Jones “upon suspicion
of assault and theft.” Based upon what the victim had told him, Pugh attested that
he initiated a pursuit of the red car through downtown Louisville at approximately
11:00 at night. Pugh’s affidavit stated that during the pursuit, his police cruiser
traveled at speeds of forty to forty-five miles per hour, and the perpetrator’s car
initially traveled at speeds of forty to forty-five miles per hour, but reached a speed
of approximately sixty-five miles per hour before the collision. Additionally, Pugh
attested that part of the pursuit occurred through parking lots. Thus, this police
pursuit is distinguishable from the facts of Jones, where the police officer drove a
police vehicle to respond to a call for assistance from another officer. The officer
in Jones was not in pursuit of a perpetrator, as occurred in the present case. Jones
involved a head-on collision between the officer’s vehicle and a motorist, which
was a circumstance not present here because Pugh’s vehicle was not involved in
the accident at issue. Furthermore, the accident in the present case does not appear
to be a result of Pugh’s negligent driving. Consequently, Jones is distinguishable.
As previously mentioned, in Haney, the Court stated that
“discretionary acts or functions are those that necessarily require the exercise of
reason in the adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or
whether the act shall be done or the course pursued.” Haney, 311 S.W.3d at 240.
However, the Court also explained that “ministerial acts or functions – for which
there are no immunity – are those that require only obedience to the orders of
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others, or when the officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving
merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts.” Haney,
311 S.W.3d at 240.
Based on the evidence in the record, the Louisville Metro Police
Department has an S.O.P. concerning police pursuits. The S.O.P. includes
procedures for determining when an officer should not pursue a vehicle and when a
pursuit should be terminated. Those determinations were based on various factors,
including the dangers created by the pursuit and the seriousness of the offense.
In the present case, it is not proper at this juncture to determine
whether Pugh’s decision was primarily discretionary or ministerial, in order to
decide whether he is entitled to qualified official immunity. The circuit court
referred to the offense as “assault and theft,” but Pugh’s affidavit stated that the
victim told him she was “glad to be alive” and she had just been “robbed.”
According to the S.O.P., whether a pursuit should be initiated depends, in part, on
the seriousness of the perpetrator’s offense. Rather than deciding this matter under
Jones, further discovery should take place regarding Pugh’s adherence to the
S.O.P.s. Thus, we reverse the circuit court’s denial of Pugh’s claim of qualified
official immunity and remand for further discovery and proceedings concerning his
qualified official immunity claim.
C. CLAIM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS AGAINST PUGH IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
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Pugh next asserts that he is entitled to have the claims made against
him in his official capacity dismissed. Pugh acknowledges that this claim “is not
‘officially’ before this court,” but he argues that “in the interest of judicial
economy, this court’s pronouncement to the lower court on this issue might well
expedite disposition of it promptly.” While a resolution by this Court “might well
expedite” this case, as a general rule we cannot decide a matter until the circuit
court has had the opportunity to rule on it. Hence, this issue is not properly before
us at this time.
Accordingly, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court determining that
Pugh was not entitled to the defense of qualified official immunity is reversed, and
the claim is remanded to the circuit court with instructions for discovery to be
conducted and further proceedings held regarding whether Pugh is entitled to this
defense.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES:
Michael J. O’Connell
Jefferson County Attorney
Louisville, Kentucky
Andrew J. Horne
Louisville, Kentucky
Ronald E. Johnson, Jr.
Ft. Wright, Kentucky
Chadwick N. Gardner
Louisville, Kentucky
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