CHISM (DAVID SCOTT) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 27, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000589-MR
DAVID SCOTT CHISM
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE IRV MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-000879
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: David Scott Chism (Chism) appeals the trial court’s denial of
his post-conviction Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion and
request for an evidentiary hearing. Chism pled guilty to Second Degree Arson and
First Degree Wanton Endangerment and was sentenced to a total of ten-years’
imprisonment. On appeal, Chism argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel and that the trial court erred when it denied his RCr 11.42 motion without
an evidentiary hearing. Having reviewed the record and arguments of the parties,
we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. On February 14,
2007, the Buechel Fire Department responded to a report of a fire at 4023 Lambert
Avenue, a house owned by Chism and his estranged wife, Stephanie. Chism and
Stephanie resided in the house, with their four children, until August of 2006, at
which point Stephanie and the children moved out due to pending divorce
proceedings. Chism, who still lived at the residence, was found at the scene and
taken by Louisville EMS to a local hospital where he was treated for burns. It
became clear early in the investigation, from the presence of flammable liquid pour
patterns and an accompanying odor resembling gasoline, that the fire was the result
of arson. Chism was subsequently arrested and later indicted by a Jefferson
County Grand Jury for the offenses of Second Degree Arson and First Degree
Wanton Endangerment.
Chism has a history of mental illness, including bouts of depression
and attention deficit disorder (ADD). Chism also has a history of alcoholism.
Through the years, he has reportedly suffered from psychotic episodes as a result
of his mental condition. Chism’s last psychotic episode occurred weeks prior to
the date he set fire to his residence. However, Chism has never disputed the fact
that he set fire to the residence, and he has taken full responsibility for his actions.
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On September 14, 2007, Chism entered into a guilty plea to both
offenses in exchange for the Commonwealth recommending a sentence of ten
years for Second Degree Arson and five years for First Degree Wanton
Endangerment to run concurrently for a total of ten years. The Commonwealth
recommended that Chism be required to serve the full sentence, but agreed that
Chism was free to ask the court for probation. The court followed the
Commonwealth’s recommendation and sentenced Chism to ten-years’
imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, Dr. Peter Steiner testified regarding the
condition of Chism’s mental health. Dr. Steiner’s testimony indicated that he had
diagnosed and was treating Chism for Major Depression and ADD, and that on the
day of the fire, Chism was in fact trying to take his own life. He also stated that
Chism was successfully being treated for his alcohol addiction, was holding down
a job waiting tables at a Chili’s restaurant, and was cleared to have unsupervised
contact with his children on a regular basis. In Dr. Steiner’s opinion, Chism was
completely competent to enter the plea, and he even stated that Chism took full
responsibility for his actions and never used his mental illness as an excuse for his
actions.
Chism timely filed a motion seeking shock probation, which the court
denied. Chism then moved for relief under RCr 11.42 which included a motion for
an evidentiary hearing. The trial court denied Chism’s RCr 11.42 motion without a
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hearing, reasoning that the issues could be resolved from the record. Chism now
appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must satisfy the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See Gall v.
Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985). Under this standard, a party asserting
such a claim is required to show: (1) that the trial counsel’s performance was
deficient in that it fell outside the range of professional, competent assistance; and
(2) that the deficiency was prejudicial because there was a reasonable probability
that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s performance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. This test is modified in cases
involving a defendant who enters a guilty plea. In such instances, the second
prong of the Strickland test includes the requirement that a defendant demonstrate
that, but for the alleged errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that he
would not have entered a guilty plea, but rather would have insisted on proceeding
to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203
(1985); Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. App. 1986).
ANALYSIS
Chism argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court erred to his substantial
prejudice and failed to protect his constitutional right to a fair trial and effective
assistance of counsel when it denied his RCr 11.42 motion and ruled that his
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defense counsel did render effective assistance. Chism points to five areas in
which his counsel provided ineffective assistance: (1) counsel failed in his duty to
investigate; (2) counsel failed to properly advise Chism about the necessity of an
independent mental health expert and the defense of extreme emotional
disturbance; (3) counsel failed to move for a hearing on Chism’s competency to
stand trial; (4) counsel failed to discuss with Chism the possibility of receiving
instructions for and being convicted of a lesser-included offense if he were to stand
trial; and (5) that given the totality of the circumstances, Chism’s guilty plea was
invalid as his attorney was never fully informed or understood the terms of the
agreement. These arguments can be condensed into two issues that we will
address: (1) whether Chism’s counsel adequately presented his mental health
history and the impact that history had on his actions and competency to stand
trial; and (2) whether Chism’s counsel fully advised him about the law, facts, and
possible outcomes of the case.
1. MENTAL HEALTH AND COMPETENCY
There is no question that Chism has a history of mental illness. Since
the year 2000, he had bouts of major depression, ADD, and had experienced
several psychotic episodes as a result of his mental illness. The last of the
psychotic episodes reportedly occurred just weeks before he set fire to his house.
On this issue, the questions for this Court to decide are whether Chism’s counsel
adequately investigated his mental health history and effectively presented that
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information to the court, and whether further action by his counsel would have led
to a different outcome.
The first issue for this Court to determine is Chism’s mental status at
the time he set fire to his house. Chism’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Steiner, clearly
set forth that, at the time Chism set fire to his house, he was trying to take his own
life. However, Chism has taken full responsibility for his actions from the time the
fire department found him at the scene of the fire. Furthermore, Dr. Steiner
testified that, while Chism suffered from a history of mental illness, he never used
that as an excuse for his actions. Because Chism has never denied responsibility
for his actions and has presented no evidence that insanity would have been an
available defense, any failure by his counsel to address that issue is of no
consequence.
Chism further argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
move for an evidentiary hearing on his competency to stand trial. RCr 8.06 states:
If upon arraignment or during the proceedings there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant lacks the
capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or her, or to participate
rationally in his or her defense, all proceedings shall be
postponed until the issue of incapacity is determined.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S. Ct.
836, 842, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966), that where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as
to a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the judge must conduct a sanity hearing
to determine competency. Chism argues that he was not competent to stand trial,
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triggering the mandatory RCr 8.06 evaluation. We disagree. Chism never gave
any indication that he was not competent to stand trial at the time, and he has not
presented any such evidence since then. In fact, based on our review of the record
and Dr. Steiner’s testimony, it is clear that Chism was competent to stand trial.
Chism also argues that his guilty plea was invalid due to his
imcompetency. However, during his plea hearing the court thoroughly inquired
into Chism’s competency to enter the plea. Chism stated that he fully understood
the terms of the plea agreement, stated that he had no questions regarding the terms
of the agreement, and stated that there was nothing that would hinder his ability to
enter into the plea. Also during this hearing, Chism’s counsel stated that he had
rationally discussed the case on numerous occasions with his client and that
Chism’s mental health was no obstacle to the plea agreement. In an affidavit filed
prior to the sentencing hearing, counsel averred that he had obtained information
from Dr. Steiner regarding Chism’s mental health and had shared that information
with the Commonwealth as part of plea negotiations. Furthermore, after reviewing
video of all of the courtroom proceedings, this Court observed that Chism was not
only coherent but readily able to and did assist his counsel. Given all of the
evidence, we discern no error in the trial court’s finding that Chism failed to prove
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his competency to stand
trial.
Next, Chism argues that his counsel had a duty to further investigate
his mental health history by obtaining the opinion of an independent mental health
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expert. This argument is without merit because, as noted above, Chism’s counsel
had correspondence from Chism’s treating psychiatrist giving a detailed account of
his mental health history. Chism’s counsel stated at the plea hearing that he and
his client had discussed at length his mental health history. Furthermore, Dr.
Steiner’s report, issued prior to the plea hearing, stated that Chism was “compliant
with treatment and stable on medication.” Dr. Steiner also indicated that Chism
was fit to have unsupervised visitation with his children. In light of Dr. Steiner’s
report and testimony and counsel’s statement at the plea hearing that he had
discussed Chism’s mental status with him, counsel was not required to take further
action.
2. FAILURE TO INFORM
Chism also argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to “give
the jury instructions on lesser-included offenses, the impact of extreme emotional
disturbance on the offenses charged, and the possibility of his only being convicted
of one of those lesser-included offenses if he chose to stand trial by jury.” This
Court finds these arguments to be without merit.
Chism argues that he should have been informed of the availability of
lesser-included offenses. Chism was charged with two offenses, Second Degree
Arson and First Degree Wanton Endangerment. The only lesser-included offense
for Second Degree Arson is Third Degree Arson. A person is guilty of Second
Degree Arson when: “he starts a fire or causes an explosion with the intent to
damage or destroy a building . . . .” Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 513.030. A
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person is guilty of Third Degree Arson if “he wantonly causes destruction or
damage to a building of his own or another . . . .” KRS 513.040. The major
difference between the two is in the element of intent. An instruction of ThirdDegree Arson is appropriate only where there is evidence of a lack of intent to
damage the property. Perdue v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148, 160 (Ky. 1995).
Where an accelerant was used, a claim of lack of intent is “preposterous.” Id. at
161. Chism admitted that he intended to burn down his house. He went to Target,
bought a gas can, obtained gasoline, and set fire to his house. Therefore, given the
evidence, Third Degree Arson would be unavailable as a lesser-included offense.
As for the charge of First Degree Wanton Endangerment, the lesserincluded offense would be Second Degree Wanton Endangerment. One is guilty of
First Degree Wanton Endangerment when “under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life, he wantonly engages in conduct
which creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another
person.” KRS 508.060(1). “A person is guilty of wanton endangerment in the
second degree when he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a substantial
danger of physical injury to another person.” KRS 508.070(1). A jury could not
have convicted Chism of Second Degree Wanton Endangerment as that charge is
only available when danger to others arises out of one’s negligence, not his
intentional actions. Furthermore, the differentiation is inconsequential given that
the court ran Chism’s sentences concurrently, and he received no additional time as
a result of the charge of First Degree Wanton Endangerment. The plea allowed
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Chism to receive the minimum total sentence that was available to him. Therefore,
the trial court’s finding regarding counsel’s effectiveness with regard to lesser
included offenses was not in error.
Chism further argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
inform him of the possible defense of “Extreme Emotional Distrurbance.” This is
not a defense that is statutorily available to someone charged with Second Degree
Arson. Given that statutorily this defense is unavailable, Chism’s counsel had no
reason to discuss it with him.
Furthermore, if extreme emotional disturbance were available, Chism
has put forth no evidence to support that defense. To establish extreme emotional
disturbance, there must be a showing of a temporary state of mind “so enraged,
inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s judgment, and to cause one to act
uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance
rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715
S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986). Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to
Chism, he intended to commit suicide and burn down his house. As noted above,
he purchased a gas can, bought gas, and set the house on fire. These are not the
acts of a person acting uncontrollably and without judgment. Therefore, Chism
could not prove that he acted under extreme emotional disturbance and his counsel
had no duty to explain this unavailable defense to him.
Given the evidence presented, this Court discerns no error in the trial
court’s finding that counsel was not ineffective. Furthermore, there is no
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indication that, if Chism’s counsel had provided further information or taken
additional steps, Chism would have chosen to go to trial instead of entering into the
plea agreement. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that counsel was not
ineffective with regard to advising Chism about potential defenses and/or lesser
included offenses.
3. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Chism’s third argument is that the trial court erred in ruling on his
motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. There is no
automatic entitlement to an evidentiary hearing with regard to an RCr. 11.42
motion. Rather, a hearing is required only if there is an “issue of fact that cannot
be determined on the face of the record.” RCr 11.42(5); Stanford v.
Commonwealt, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993). Furthermore, “[w]here the
movant’s allegations are refuted on the face of the record as a whole, no
evidentiary hearing is required.” Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727
(Ky. App. 1986) (citing Hopewell v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Ky.
App. 1985)). Our review indicates that the trial court correctly found that Chism’s
allegations are refuted on the record, and thus the trial court did not err in refusing
to hold an evidentiary hearing.
CONCLUSION
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Based on the record and evidence presented by Chism, we hold that
the RCr 11.42 motion was properly denied and that an evidentiary hearing was not
necessary to make a decision with regard to the motion. Therefore, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
C. Fred Partin
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
David B. Abner
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
David B. Abner
Frankfort, Kentucky
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