BRUMFIELD (VIRGIL) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 1, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000503-MR
VIRGIL BRUMFIELD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MITCHELL PERRY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CR-001456
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Virgil Brumfield appeals from the Jefferson Circuit
Court’s order denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky
Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. After a careful review of the record and
briefs, and for the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
In June 1999, Brumfield was indicted for assault in the first degree,
murder, and for being a persistent felony offender (“PFO”) in the second degree.
After a jury trial, Brumfield was found guilty of first degree manslaughter and
sentenced to 20 years incarceration. He was also found guilty of being a PFO in
the second degree, and his sentence was enhanced to 30 years. Brumfield appealed
his conviction to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, which affirmed the judgment
and conviction of the trial court. See Brumfield v. Commonwealth, No. 2001-SC0851-MR (Ky. Sept. 18, 2003).
Thereafter, Brumfield filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. Brumfield’s original pro se motion was
subsequently supplemented by counsel with an additional memorandum in support
of the motion. In this memorandum, Brumfield also requested an evidentiary
hearing. The trial court denied the motion, as well as an evidentiary hearing, by an
opinion and order entered on February 24, 2009. Brumfield’s appeal is from that
order.
We first address whether Brumfield’s original motion met the
requirements for a motion for RCr 11.42 relief. RCr 11.42(2) states that:
The motion shall be signed and verified by the movant
and shall state specifically the grounds on which the
sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the
movant relies in support of such grounds. Failure to
comply with this section shall warrant a summary
dismissal of the motion.
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Although Brumfield named the motion a “Motion For This Court’s Ruling
Pursuant to CR 52.01,” it appears in the memorandum attached to the motion that
Brumfield intended the motion to include his RCr 11.42 claims. For instance, he
states;
Next, the Petitioner[’s] [sic] RCr 11.42 claims that are
presently known will be stated below. However, if this
Court finds that the below claims will serve, if true, as
means to appoint this Petitioner with a Counsel from the
“DPA’s” Office, then please feel free to do so.
He then proceeds to list “Known Claims of Counsel’s Ineffectiveness,” which
explain the grounds on which he claims his counsel was ineffective and the facts
on which he relied to support his claims. He also requested the opportunity to
supplement those claims at a later date if the need arose. Therefore, we find the
motion to be sufficient to meet the requirements under RCr 11.42(2).
The Commonwealth argues that the lack of verification of the motion
rendered the trial court without jurisdiction to address the merits of the motion.
Neither the original motion filed by Brumfield nor the supplemental memorandum
of law filed by Brumfield’s subsequent counsel contained a verification by
Brumfield.
Brumfield counters that because the trial court reached the merits of
the motion in its order denying the motion, and because the Commonwealth failed
to object to the lack of verification, the issue of verification was waived. Kentucky
courts have stated that a motion filed pursuant to RCr 11.42 that is not verified
“may be summarily dismissed.” Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452
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(Ky. 2001) (citing Odewahn v. Ropke, 385 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Ky. 1964)). While
we agree that verification is an important component of the rule, in this case we
will not substitute our opinion for that of the trial court with regard to the dismissal
of the motion for lack of verification, particularly in light of the language in Fraser
that says the trial court “may” dismiss the case.
Therefore, we will review the appeal on the merits. The burden of
proof for RCr 11.42 motions lies with the accused. Dorton v. Commonwealth, 433
S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, “petitioner must show that ‘counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.’” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Further, “petitioner must show that
‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. at 694.
Brumfield first argues that his trial counsel should have impeached
Renee Griffin, the girlfriend of the man Brumfield was accused of killing. At trial,
Griffin stated the following about the victim, Gilbert Stivers: “Gilbert wasn’t a
violent person, as far as getting into fights, especially at home. He was in a good
mood.” Brumfield claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
question Griffin about her knowledge of Stivers’ prior violent behavior to impeach
her testimony indicating that the victim “wasn’t a violent person.”
It appears from the record, however, that Brumfield’s counsel sought
to admit evidence of the victim’s prior conviction for second degree wanton
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endangerment, but that the trial court excluded the evidence.2 Without that
evidence in the record, had Griffin denied knowledge of the victim’s prior
conviction, it is not unlikely that the jury would have viewed Brumfield’s counsel
as unnecessarily and unfairly attacking the deceased victim without sufficient
evidence to maintain such an attack, thus arousing the jury’s ire against Brumfield.
Moreover, in view of other testimony offered at trial, trial counsel’s
impeachment of Griffin was not needed. Griffin testified that she had witnessed
the victim violently attack and beat her daughter on another occasion, which
directly contradicted her previous testimony that Stivers was not a violent person.
Trial counsel’s decision not to ask the question of Griffin falls within the penumbra
of trial strategy and was reasonable under the circumstances. See Moore v.
Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Ky. 1998). Consequently, Brumfield is not
entitled to relief pursuant to this allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Brumfield also contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
request a jury instruction for wanton assault in the fourth degree. The jury found
Brumfield guilty of manslaughter in the first degree. This finding necessarily
required the jury’s determination that Brumfield intended to inflict serious physical
injury on Stivers.3 Since the jury found Brumfield guilty of an intentional crime,
2
Brumfield could not appeal this issue because he raised it on direct appeal. Motions pursuant to
RCr 11.42 must be limited to issues that were not and could not be raised on direct appeal.
Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Ky. 2001).
3
Pursuant to KRS 507.030, a person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when “(a)
[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such
person or of a third person” or “[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder
because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in subsection
(1)(a) of KRS 507.020.” (Emphasis supplied).
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trial counsel’s performance was not deficient when he failed to request a wanton
fourth degree assault instruction.4 Even if counsel’s performance is deemed
deficient, Brumfield cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and is
not entitled to relief based on counsel’s failure to request the instruction.
Lastly, Brumfield argues that the trial court erred when it overruled
his post-conviction motion without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. RCr
11.42 requires a hearing only “if the answer raised a material issue of fact that
cannot be determined on the face of the record.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 975
S.W.2d 901, 904 (Ky. 1998). As discussed above, the issue of trial counsel’s
performance can be resolved on the face of the record, and the trial court did not
err in denying Brumfield’s request for an evidentiary hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Melanie A. Foote
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
4
In Hager v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 828 (Ky. 2001), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
it is improper to give an instruction on fourth-degree assault as a lesser-included offense of
homicide.
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