MCGRAW (JOHN PAUL) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002193-MR
JOHN PAUL MCGRAW
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00063
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: ACREE, LAMBERT, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: John Paul McGraw appeals from an order of the Grant
Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief. For the reasons stated
herein, we affirm.
On July 13, 2005, McGraw was indicted by a Grant County grand jury
for second-degree burglary and for being a first-degree persistent felony offender
(PFO-I). Subsequently, McGraw entered a plea agreement to the two offenses
charged in the indictment. He received a ten-year sentence for burglary, which
was enhanced to a mandatory sentence by virtue of his PFO-I conviction. His two
prior five-year sentences were ordered to run consecutively to each other and to his
ten-year sentence for an effective sentence of twenty-years’ imprisonment.
On October 14, 2008, he filed a post-conviction motion pursuant to
CR1 60.02, alleging that his PFO-I conviction was improper because there was no
basis for the charge. He argued that his two prior convictions should be considered
one prior conviction because he never served prison time for either conviction.
Thus, he argued that he could have only been convicted of a PFO-II. Without
granting a hearing, the trial court denied McGraw’s motion. This appeal followed.
McGraw contends that the trial court erred by permitting the use of
two concurrent probated sentences as two separate convictions for PFO purposes.
Because he claims that this was statutorily impermissible, he contends that the trial
court was required to vacate his PFO-I conviction. The Commonwealth contends
that McGraw’s motion was properly denied because it was procedurally barred
pursuant to Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983).
“Civil Rule 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional opportunity
to relitigate the same issues which could ‘reasonably have been presented’ by
direct appeal or RCr 11.42 proceedings.” McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948
S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997). Rather, CR 60.02 permits a judgment’s modification
1
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR).
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based on matters, not shown on the face of the record and not available by appeal,
which were not known until after the rendition of judgment without fault of the
party seeking relief. Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Ky. 1998).
Moreover, CR 60.02 requires that a party make a substantial showing
before he may be entitled to extraordinary relief under its provisions. Ringo v.
Commonwealth, 455 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Ky. 1970). We review the denial of a CR
60.02 motion under the abuse-of-discretion standard. White v. Commonwealth, 32
S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky.App. 2000). Our test for abuse of discretion is to determine if
the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
In this case, McGraw could and should have challenged his PFO-I
conviction during his trial proceedings and then, if necessary, on direct appeal. A
defendant cannot use a CR 60.02 motion as “a substitute for, nor a separate avenue
of, appeal.” Mauldin v. Bearden, 293 S.W.3d 392, 397 (Ky. 2009). Kentucky’s
structure for attacking a final judgment is not haphazard and “is set out in the rules
related to direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02.” Gross, 648
S.W.2d at 856. Here, McGraw did not follow these procedural steps.
In any event, his contention that his two prior convictions resulting in
probation must be deemed to be one conviction for PFO purposes is meritless.
While he contends that actual imprisonment is required between convictions before
a PFO-I conviction can be supported based on prior convictions, our courts have
held that “convictions which [result] in probation, parole, etc., should be included
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in prior convictions...,” and that the requirement of actual imprisonment is no
longer necessary. Commonwealth v. Hinton, 678 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Ky. 1984).
Furthermore, the conviction and disposition sequencing in McGraw’s
case is directly analogous to the facts in Thacker v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d
287 (Ky. 2006). In Thacker, a defendant was convicted and received probation for
two separate, sequential convictions. Id. at 292. Although he reoffended, his
probation for his first conviction was not revoked following his second conviction.
Id. Despite his service of uninterrupted consecutive sentences, the two prior
convictions were permitted to support his PFO-I conviction. Id. at 292-93.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of his CR 60.02 motion was
not erroneous.
McGraw next contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant
him an evidentiary hearing on his CR 60.02 motion. However, a party is not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless he alleges facts which, if true, “justify
vacating the judgment and further allege special circumstances that justify CR
60.02 relief.” Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856. Because McGraw has not met this
standard, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying him a hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Grant Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John Paul McGraw, Pro Se
Sandy Hook, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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