CATRON (EDWARD) VS. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT
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RENDERED: JULY 23, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002081-MR
EDWARD CATRON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00028
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WHITE, SENIOR JUDGE: Edward Catron, a former candidate for an
environmental inspector position at the Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government (LFUCG), Department of Environmental and Emergency
Management (DEEM), appeals from a Fayette Circuit Court summary judgment in
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Senior Judge Edwin M. White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
favor of LFUCG. The trial court based its decision upon Catron’s failure to prove
that he was disabled or that LFUCG regarded him as disabled. The trial court also
concluded that Catron was unable to perform the duties required of an
environmental inspector due to his heavy lifting restriction. On appeal, Catron
claims that the summary judgment was erroneous because: (1) LFUCG perceived
that Catron was disabled; (2) Questions of fact existed concerning whether heavy
lifting was an essential function of the position; and (3) Catron was physically
capable of performing the job. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the
Fayette Circuit Court’s summary judgment.
From 1994-2005, Catron was employed by LFUCG as a firefighter.
During his service, Catron suffered a series of back injuries. His final back injury
occurred in 2005 when Catron bent over to pull a fire hose. Following this injury,
Catron had three medical examinations to assess his condition. In July 2005,
Catron’s treating physician determined that Catron had reached maximum medical
improvement. The physician assessed a permanent restriction of lifting no greater
than 10-15 lbs. An independent medical assessment concurred with the treating
physician’s opinion. A third medical examination in 2005 found that Catron was
unable to significantly bend over and that he was only able to perform sedentary
functions. Based upon his injuries and prognosis, Catron applied for and received
disability retirement from LFUCG.
Three months later, Catron applied for a position as an environmental
inspector with the LFUCG Division of Environmental and Emergency
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Management. The following excerpt from the job listing describes the position’s
duties:
Duties include performing inspections and investigating
complaints related to Fayette County ordinances;
conducting on-site operational inspections of
under/above ground storage tanks for removal and
installation and of the facilities which have under/above
ground storage tanks; conferring with property owners,
contractors, and others to discuss violations and possible
sources of corrective action; and other related duties. . . .
The listing further stated that the position “requires physical strength and agility to
allow considerable walking, carrying heavy equipment and working outside in
various weather conditions.”
Catron had two interviews for the environmental inspection position.2
The first interview was conducted by DEEM employees Pat Dugger, Steve
Jackson, and Shelly Bendall. In a sworn affidavit filed on September 8, 2008,
Catron stated, “Ms. Dugger told me the job required heavy lifting and walking with
‘booms’ over your shoulders as well as manning the EOC as needed.” Although
Catron claims that he expressed concern that he would be unable to physically
perform the job based upon his back injuries, the panel asked him to return for a
second interview.
At the second interview, Catron alleges that he was told that the
position involved teaching rather than field work. Dugger told Catron that they
would like to offer him the position with the approval of the human resources
2
The record contains conflicting information concerning whether Catron had two or three
interviews with DEEM.
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department following a review of Catron’s medical records. Later Dugger called
Catron and informed him that he would not be offered the environmental inspector
position based upon the review of his medical records. Later, Dugger contacted
Catron again to inform him of another position available with DEEM. Catron told
Dugger that he did not wish to be considered for the position because it was funded
by a federal grant and was subject to grant renewal each year.
On January 3, 2006, Catron filed a complaint against LFUCG, in the
Fayette Circuit Court, claiming that he was denied the environmental inspector
position based upon his disability. On October 6, 2008, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of LFUCG. This appeal follows.
In order to establish a disability discrimination claim, a plaintiff must
show: (1) a disability as that term is used in KRS 344.010; (2) that he was
otherwise qualified to perform the job with or without reasonable
accommodations; and (3) that he suffered an adverse employment decision due to
the disability. Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 706-07 (Ky.
App. 2004). LFUCG does not dispute that Catron was denied employment based
upon his history of back injuries and lifting restrictions. Therefore, our inquiry
focuses upon whether Catron was disabled, or perceived as disabled, and whether
Catron was capable of performing the job with or without reasonable
accommodation.
While the first prong requires plaintiffs to prove a disability, the
definition of “disability” provided in KRS 344.010(4)(c) includes perceived
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disabilities and allows plaintiffs to show that they experienced discrimination
based upon a condition that the employer believed to cause impairment. KRS
344.010(4) defines a disability as:
(a) A physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one (1) or more of the major life activities of the
individual;
(b) A record of such an impairment; or
(c) Being regarded as having such an impairment.
[Emphasis added.]
Despite asserting that he qualified as disabled in his claim, Catron later
acknowledged that he would not likely qualify as disabled under the above statute.
Although he now claims that he does have a disability, Catron nonetheless bases
his claim on the premise that LFUCG regarded him as being disabled.
“As with actual impairments, the perceived impairment under the
‘regarded as’ prong must be one that, if real, would substantially limit a major life
activity of an individual.” Hallahan, 138 S.W.3d at 707. See also Howard Baer,
Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Ky. 2003). This prong protects job
applicants from being denied employment based upon “myths, fears, and
stereotypes associated with disabilities.” Hallahan, 138 S.W.3d at 708.
Although Catron was medically restricted from lifting weight in
excess of 10-15 lbs., Catron failed to present evidence to show that the injury
substantially inhibited his life functions. Evidence that a restriction
inconvenienced Catron’s daily life or made his daily activities more difficult is
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insufficient. “[A]n individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely
restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most
people’s daily lives. The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long
term.” Id. at 711, quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S.
184, 198, 122 S.Ct. 681, 691, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002).
United States courts and Kentucky courts have previously found work
to be an activity of central importance. In order to prove that he was substantially
limited in the major life activity of working or regarded as so limited, Catron must
have shown that he is:
significantly restricted in ability to perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as
compared to the average person with comparable
training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a
single particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working.
McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg, U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1997),
quoting 29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
Catron failed to show that LFUCG believed that Catron’s lifting
restriction prevented him from performing a broad class of jobs. Instead, the
record only reflects that LFUCG believed the lifting restriction to inhibit Catron’s
ability to perform the functions of an environmental inspector which specifically
included heavy lifting in, at times, emergency situations.
Further, we are unconvinced that Catron could have performed this
job with or without reasonable accommodation. Catron claims environmental
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inspectors were rarely required to lift heavy objects and that a factual dispute
existed as to whether heavy lifting was an essential function of the position.
The job listing, however, clearly stated that heavy lifting was a
requirement of the position. In his deposition, Stephen Jackson, the environmental
manager, described the lifting requirement: “You’re not gonna lift a manhole
cover every single day, but you may be required to do that everyday.” The
position requires inspectors to lift heavy objects such as manhole covers and
booms in creeks in emergency situations with little or no notice. Lack of notice
may prevent inspectors from receiving assistance in lifting.
Based upon Catron’s failure to prove that LFUCG regarded him as
disabled, as well as his failure to show that he could perform the job with or
without reasonable accommodation, we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s
summary judgment.
We must note that our decision was not based upon LFUCG’s claim
that the fact that Catron was subsequently offered a different position proves that
LFUCG did not regard Catron as disabled or unable to perform a broad class of
positions. Catron was not offered the second position as an alternative to the
environmental inspector position. Catron was offered the job only after he was
denied the inspector position. Our inquiry focused upon the facts at the time of the
denial of employment rather than subsequent remedial measures.
Accordingly, we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s summary
judgment in favor of LFUCG.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward E. Dove
Lexington, Kentucky
Keith Moorman
Lexington, Kentucky
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