MARK BLANKENSHIP, ET AL VS. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT
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RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002044-MR
MARK BLANKENSHIP AND OTHER
INDIVIDUAL APPELLANTS AS
DESIGNATED IN THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-05024
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; CLAYTON AND WINE, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is an action by the Lexington and Fayette County
Firefighters seeking overtime wages and related benefits from the LexingtonFayette Urban County Government (“LFUCG”). The Fayette Circuit Court
dismissed the action on sovereign immunity grounds. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm the decision of the trial court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action was originally filed in the Fayette Circuit Court in
November of 2005. The plaintiffs were 430 currently employed, retired and
formerly employed firefighters (“firefighters”) who worked for LFUCG. The
firefighters contended that there was an improper calculation of their overtime
wages while they worked for LFUCG. As a result, they argued that there was a
violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 337.285 as well as a breach of the
implied contract found in county ordinances and policies which required they be
paid overtime when they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. The
firefighters also argued that this was a violation of KRS 67A.630 et seq., and asked
for liquidated damages in the amount of double the amount originally underpaid as
they claimed there was bad faith pursuant to KRS 337.385. After LFUCG’s
motion for judgment on the pleading was made, the trial court found that the
motion should be granted and the case was dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. By order dated October 1, 2008, the circuit court granted the
firefighters’ motion for Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 54.02
designation, ruling that the court’s December 20, 2007, opinion and order was final
and appealable. The firefighters then brought this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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If the question to be answered on appeal concerns the construction
and application of statutes or regulations and, therefore, concerns a matter of law,
this Court is authorized to review the question on a de novo basis. Aubrey v. Office
of Attorney General, 994 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Ky. App. 1998). Since the issues
involved in this appeal are questions of law, we will apply the de novo standard of
review.
DISCUSSION
The trial court dismissed the action of the firefighters finding that the
legislature had not chosen to waive sovereign immunity in these circumstances. “It
is an inherent attribute of a sovereign state that precludes the maintaining of any
suit against the state unless the state has given its consent or otherwise waived its
immunity.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Ky. 2001). This immunity
extends to counties. Id. at 526. See also Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 132 (Ky. 2004).
KRS 337.285 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) No employer shall employ any of his employees for a
work week longer than forty (40) hours, unless such
employee receives compensation for his employment in
excess of forty (40) hours in a work week at a rate of not
less than one and one-half (1-1/2) times the hourly wage
rate at which he is employed.
****
(5) (a) Upon the request of the county or city
employee, and as provided in subsection (4) of this
section, compensatory time shall be awarded as
follows:
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1. A county or city employee who provided
work in excess of forty (40) hours in a
public safety activity, an emergency
response activity, or a seasonal activity as
described in 29 C.F.R. [Code of Federal
Regulations] sec. 553.24, may accrue not
more than four hundred eighty (480) hours
of compensatory time; or
2. A county or city employee engaged in
other work in excess of forty (40) hours,
may accrue not more than two hundred forty
(240) hours of compensatory time.
(b) A county or city employee who has accrued
four hundred eighty (480) hours of compensatory
time off pursuant to paragraph (a)1. of this
subsection, or two hundred forty (240) hours of
compensatory time off pursuant to paragraph (a)2.
of this subsection, shall for additional overtime
hours of work, be paid overtime compensation.
****
(7) If compensation is paid to a county or city employee
for accrued compensatory time off, the compensation
shall be paid at the regular rate earned by the county or
city employee at the time the county or city employee
receives the payment.
(8) Upon a county or city employee's termination of
employment, all unused accrued compensatory time shall
be paid at a rate of compensation not less than:
(a) The average regular rate received by the county
or city employee during the last three (3) years of
the county or city employee's employment; or
(b) The final regular rate received by the county or
city employee, whichever is higher.
(9) Compensatory time shall not be used as a means to
avoid statutory overtime compensation. A county or city
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employee shall have the right to use compensatory time
earned and shall not be coerced to accept more
compensatory time than an employer can realistically and
in good faith expect to be able to grant within a
reasonable period upon the county or city employee
making the request for compensatory time off.
(10) Nothing in subsections (4) to (9) of this section shall
be construed to supersede any collective bargaining
agreement, memorandum of understanding, or any other
agreement between the employer and representative of
the county or city employees.
(11) As used in subsections (4) to (9) of this section,
“county or city employee” means an employee of any
county, city, charter county, consolidated local
government, unified local government, or urban-county
government, including an employee of a county or city
elected official.
(12) In addition to the designation of a work week under
subsection (1) of this section, local governments, as
defined in KRS 95A.210(3), may designate a work
period for professional firefighter employees as defined
in KRS 95A.210. The designated work period shall be
not less than one (1) work week of seven (7) consecutive
days and not more than four (4) work weeks of twentyeight (28) consecutive days for purposes of complying
with the requirements of the Federal Labor Standards Act
of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. [United States Code]
secs. 201 et seq. This subsection shall not exempt local
governments from complying with the overtime
requirements set forth in subsection (1) of this section
and is intended to:
(a) Clarify the option to designate both a work week
for compliance with Kentucky law and a work period
for compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. secs. 201 et seq.; and
(b) Allow for the application of the partial exemption
set forth in 29 U.S.C. sec. 207(k) in determining
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overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. secs. 201 et seq., only.
Firefighters contend that this statute indicates a desire by the General
Assembly to waive sovereign immunity. KRS 44.072 provides that it is “the
intention of the General Assembly to otherwise expressly preserve the sovereign
immunity of the Commonwealth, . . . except where sovereign immunity is
specifically and expressly waived as set forth by statute.” Under KRS 67A.060,
(1) Urban-county governments may exercise the
constitutional and statutory rights, powers, privileges,
immunities and responsibilities of counties and cities of
the highest class within the county:
(a) In effect on the date the urban-county government
becomes effective;
(b) Which may subsequently be authorized for or
imposed upon counties and cities of that class; and
(c) Which may be authorized for or imposed upon
urban counties.
(2) Rights, powers, privileges and immunities exercised
by urban-county governments pursuant to subsection
(1)(a) and (b) of this section shall continue to be
authorized for urban-county governments
notwithstanding repeal or amendment of the statutes
upon which they are based unless expressly repealed or
amended for urban-county governments.
While the waiver of sovereign immunity by the General Assembly does not have to
be express, LFUCG, 142 S.W.3d at 132, fn.2, the implication must be clear.
Withers v. University of Kentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340, 346 (Ky. 1997).
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Firefighters contend that the General Assembly waived sovereign
immunity by implication when it enacted the Kentucky Wage and Hour Act. They
contend that the waiver is apparent through the broad net that the statute casts.
They also argue that the explicit references to county employees in the language of
the statutes are further evidence of the waiver.
In Withers, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that:
We will find waiver only where stated “by the
most express language or by such overwhelming
implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any
other reasonable construction.” Murray v. Wilson
Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S.Ct. 458, 464-65,
53 L.Ed. 742 (1909).
Id. at 346. Here, the General Assembly did not specify that it was waiving
sovereign immunity when it enacted the wage and hour laws. There is room for
doubt and, pursuant to the standard set forth above, we find that the trial court
correctly dismissed this action based on sovereign immunity.
The firefighters also contend that the Kentucky Attorney General and
Labor Cabinet’s Application of the Kentucky Wage and Hour Law to County
Employees is indicative of the waiver of sovereign immunity. LFUCG argues that
neither the Attorney General nor the Labor Cabinet has the authority to waive
sovereign immunity. Rather, as set forth above, only the General Assembly has
that authority.
We agree that neither the Attorney General nor the Labor Cabinet has
the authority to waive sovereign immunity. Thus, as set forth above, we agree that
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sovereign immunity applies in this action and that the trial court did not err in
dismissing the action based on this defense.
Next, the firefighters contend that their “contract” claims are not
barred by sovereign immunity. While the General Assembly has waived immunity
for “lawfully authorized written contract[s] with the Commonwealth[,]” Com., v.
Whitworth, 74 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Ky. 2002), LFUCG contends that this only
applies to written contracts and not to oral or implied contracts. The latter, it
contends, is barred by sovereign immunity.
The firefighters assert that Whitworth does not apply to counties. As
set forth above, however, counties derive their sovereign immunity due to their
relationship with the state. The trial court did not make a finding regarding
contracts and sovereign immunity as it found that “[e]ven if this Court were to hold
that these claims for Breach of Contract were not governed by sovereign immunity,
the Plaintiffs would have to seek any further relief in Franklin Circuit Court and
would probably be barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations in any event.”
Opinion at p. 6.
In Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Graves County Fiscal Court, 676
S.W.2d 470, 472 (Ky. App. 1984), this Court pondered the question of sovereign
immunity when counties were involved in lawful contracts. It ended, however, by
noting that “[w]hether the contract between the parties was a lawful one or whether
this claim might be barred by a statute of limitations or by payment to a third party
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has not been considered by the trial court, and these matters are not yet ripe for our
consideration.”
We believe that the ordinance and policies cited to by the firefighters
do not constitute a lawful written contract between the parties. Thus, the LFUCG
would have sovereign immunity. We also agree that, had the contracts been found
to be lawful written contracts, actions based upon those contracts would have had
to have been brought in Franklin Circuit Court within one (1) year as set forth in
KRS 45A.245 and 45A.260.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
WINE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
WINE, JUDGE, DISSENTING. Respectfully, I dissent from the
majority opinion that the LFUCG enjoys sovereign immunity under these
circumstances.
Simply stated, KRS 337.010(d) and (e) broadly define employer and
employee, respectively. Counties as employers and firefighters as employees fall
within these pertinent definitions. KRS 337.285, Kentucky’s Wage and Hour Law,
specifically exempts several categories of employees not subject to the overtime
requirements spelled out within subsection (2)(a-e). Firefighters are not included
in those exemptions. In Miller v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government,
557 S.W.2d 430 (Ky. App. 1977), the firefighters challenged a fifteen-minute
unpaid “roll call” that preceded their normal shift. The Court found that,
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[t]he ordinance is not in conflict with KRS 337.285
because it became law prior to the effective date of the
statute. The state law requires the appellee to pay a
minimum hourly wage rate and to pay time and one-half
for hours worked in excess of forty each week.
Id. at 432. Thus, the appellant firefighters (Blankenship, et. al) fall under the
protection of KRS 337.285.
Further, I believe that the Fayette Circuit Court erred when it found
LFUCG’s sovereign immunity was not waived for purposes of the Wage and Hour
Law. In Withers v. University of Kentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1997), the
Kentucky Supreme Court held, “[w]e will find waiver only where stated ‘by the
most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” KRS 337.285(4-9)
details how county employees may request compensatory time in lieu of overtime
pay. Coupled with the previously noted statutory definitions of employer and
employee, as well as the list of exemptions as to overtime compensation which
does not include firefighters, there is an “overwhelming implication” that
sovereign immunity is waived.
For these reasons, I would reverse the December 20, 2007 judgment
of the Fayette Circuit Court and remand this case for further proceedings.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas A. Woodley
Douglas L. Steele
Washington, DC 20005
Tracy W. Jones
Leslye M. Bowman
Lexington, Kentucky
Jerry L. Wright
Lexington, Kentucky
Douglas L. McSwain
Lexington, Kentucky
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