SWOFFORD (JAMES A.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 1, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001992-MR
JAMES A. SWOFFORD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN J. SHEEHAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00065
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND MOORE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: James A. Swofford appeals from an order of
the Kenton Circuit Court denying his motion to conduct a pretrial evidentiary
hearing to determine his entitlement to immunity from prosecution. For the
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
following reasons, we vacate Swofford’s conviction and remand the case for
further proceedings.
A Kenton County grand jury indicted Swofford on a charge of firstdegree assault for shooting Demonta Behanon with a gun when Behanon allegedly
refused to leave Swofford’s property. Swofford filed a motion to dismiss claiming
immunity pursuant to KRS 503.0852 or, in the alternative, for a hearing to
determine if he met the requirements of the immunity statute. The circuit court
found that Kentucky law did not require a pretrial hearing on Swofford’s claim of
immunity and that the court would rule on the claim at trial upon a motion for a
directed verdict.
The parties subsequently entered into a plea agreement in which the
Commonwealth agreed to amend the charge from first-degree assault, a Class B
felony, to first-degree assault under extreme emotional disturbance, a Class D
felony. The Commonwealth also agreed to forego prosecution on the uncharged
offense of possession of a firearm by a felon. The Commonwealth recommended a
five-year sentence, but Swofford was free to argue for a lesser sentence. Further,
Swofford maintained the right to appeal the court’s order denying the immunity
hearing. The court accepted the conditional guilty plea and sentenced Swofford to
five years’ imprisonment. Thereafter, Swofford appealed from the court’s final
judgment and sentence.
2
KRS 503.085(1) states: “A person who uses force as permitted by KRS 503.050, 503.055,
503.070, and 503.080 is justified in using such force and is immune from criminal prosecution
and civil action for the use of such force . . . As used in this subsection, the term ‘criminal
prosecution’ includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.”
-2-
Swofford’s original brief in this case contained arguments concerning
pretrial hearings under KRS 503.085 that were subsequently considered by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in another case, Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d
740 (Ky. 2009). After the Supreme Court rendered the Rodgers opinion, Swofford
filed a supplemental brief addressing how the Court’s discussion of KRS 503.085
immunity in Rodgers affected this case. In its brief, the Commonwealth agreed
that, pursuant to Rodgers, the circuit court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the
issue of immunity but that Swofford was only entitled to a non-evidentiary hearing
based on a probable cause standard.
In Rodgers, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that KRS
503.085 requires a pretrial hearing once a defendant claims immunity. Rodgers,
285 S.W.3d at 753-56. Specifically, the Court stated that “[b]ecause immunity is
designed to relieve a defendant from the burdens of litigation, it is obvious that a
defendant should be able to invoke KRS 503.085(1) at the earliest stage of the
proceeding.” Id. at 755.
Additionally, the Court determined that the applicable standard to be
utilized during an immunity hearing is a probable cause standard:
[W]e infer from the statute that the controlling standard
of proof remains “probable cause.” Thus, in order for the
prosecutor to bring charges or seek an indictment, there
must be probable cause to conclude that the force used by
the defendant was not fully justified under the controlling
provision or provisions of KRS Chapter 503. Similarly,
once the matter is before a judge, if the defendant claims
immunity the court must dismiss the case unless there is
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probable cause to conclude that the force used was not
legally justified.
Id. at 754.
The Court expressly rejected Rodgers’ contention that an evidentiary
hearing was required at which the defendant could counter with proof that the force
was justified. Explaining its reasoning, the Court noted as follows:
An evidentiary hearing on immunity . . . would involve
the same witnesses and same proof to be adduced at the
eventual trial, in essence a mini-trial and thus a process
fraught with potential for abuse. Moreover, it would
result in one of the elements of the alleged crime (no
privilege to act in self-protection) being determined in a
bench trial. In RCr 9.26 this Court has evinced its strong
preference for jury trials on all elements of a criminal
case by providing specifically that even if a defendant
waives a jury trial in writing, the court and the
Commonwealth must consent to a bench trial. Thus,
where probable cause exists in criminal matters the
longstanding policy has been to submit those matters to a
jury and we find no rational basis for abandoning that
stance.
Id. at 755. The Court determined that the burden of demonstrating probable cause
was upon the Commonwealth and that the Commonwealth could prove probable
cause “by directing the court’s attention to the evidence of record including
witness statements, investigative letters prepared by law enforcement officers,
photographs and other documents of record.” Id.
Thus, pursuant to the Court’s holding in Rodgers, Swofford is entitled
to a probable cause hearing on his claim of immunity. We decline, however, to
examine whether Swofford is immune from prosecution, as requested by Swofford.
-4-
The circuit court made no specific findings as to probable cause in its decision not
to hold a hearing on immunity. Moreover, because there was no trial in this case,
there was never an examination of the immunity issue by either the court or a jury.
The trial court must first be allowed to make its decision before we can review the
merits of that decision. The foundation of appellate review is based on the
principle that the lower court has first had a chance to deliberate and decide upon
the issues. Florman v. MEBCO Ltd. Partnership, 207 S.W.3d 593, 607 (Ky. App.
2006).
Accordingly, we vacate Swofford’s conviction and sentence and
remand this matter to the Kenton Circuit Court for a probable cause hearing.
Given our remand of the case, the remainder of the parties’ arguments are rendered
moot.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jamesa J. Drake
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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