DUNCAN (CHESTER R.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED DECEMBER 18, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000920-MR
CHESTER R. DUNCAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 90-CR-00087
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, DIXON, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal from a decision of the Bell Circuit Court
denying appellant, Chester Duncan’s, motion for relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. Based upon the following, we will affirm the
decision of the trial court.
OPINION
Duncan was convicted of sodomy in the first degree and two counts of
sexual abuse in the first degree in 1991. He filed a direct appeal and the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the jury. Duncan then began a series of
collateral attacks on the judgment. First, he filed a Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion. The trial court denied this motion after an
evidentiary hearing. Duncan appealed the trial court’s decision to our Court,
which affirmed the trial court.
Duncan thereafter filed a CR 60.02 motion in October of 1998. The
trial court denied this motion as well and our Court, once again, affirmed the trial
court’s decision. Then, in June of 2005, Duncan filed a motion for correction of
errors pursuant to RCr 10.26 and CR 61.02. The trial court also denied these
motions and our Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
In February of 2009, Duncan filed another motion which was
essentially the same motion he had filed in October of 2008. While the trial court
denied this motion as well, Duncan did not appeal this decision. Finally, in March
of 2009, Duncan filed the motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.02 the denial of
which is the subject of this appeal. The trial court found that the latest CR 60.02
motion was untimely and denied it. We are of the opinion that the trial court was
correct.
The trial court did not address the substantive issues raised in
Duncan’s appeal, but held that a CR 60.02 motion eighteen years after his
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conviction was too late. While CR 60.02 provides that “[t]he motion shall be made
within a reasonable time . . .”, we agree with the trial court that eighteen years
after the conviction as well as after numerous motions for relief which have been
denied on the merits, is simply too late.
We therefore affirm the decision of the trial court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Chester Duncan, pro se
Burgin, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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