CARPENTER-MOORE (SHEILA) VS. CARPENTER (CHAD), ET AL.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: DECEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000802-ME
SHEILA CARPENTER-MOORE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE LISA O. BUSHELMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-01651
CHAD CARPENTER;
R.M.F.C. (A MINOR CHILD);
M.S.C. (A MINOR CHILD); AND
L.B.C. (A MINOR CHILD)
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Sheila Carpenter-Moore appeals from an order
entered in the Kenton Family Court on March 30, 2009, denying her motion to
relocate the parties’ three minor children. Sheila2 argues that the trial court erred
by: (1) failing to grant her motion because of Chad Carpenter’s failure to timely
respond to her motion; (2) retroactively applying the recent Kentucky Supreme
Court decision in Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 2008); and (3)
failing to give appropriate weight to the testimony of the children’s guardian ad
litem. Because our review of the record discloses that appeal has been taken from
an interlocutory order, we dismiss this appeal on jurisdictional grounds.3
The Kenton Family Court entered an order dissolving Sheila and
Chad’s marriage on August 31, 2005. The trial court entered a subsequent agreed
order resolving all of the outstanding issues in the dissolution action on May 2,
2007. The May 2, 2007, agreed order awarded the parties joint custody of their
three minor children with Sheila serving as the primary residential custodian.
On November 1, 2007, Sheila filed a motion to relocate the children to
Glade Springs, Virginia,4 to reside with her soon-to-be new husband. On
November 13, 2007, the trial court set a hearing date for February 7, 2008, and
appointed a guardian ad litem for the children. On January 30, 2008, Chad filed a
2
We refer to the parties by their given names for the sake of clarity and with no disrespect
intended.
3
This Court must determine for itself whether the jurisdictional requirements have been
satisfied. Wilson v. Russell, 162 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Ky. 2005). Appellate jurisdiction may not be
conferred by the consent of the parties. Id.
4
Ultimately, Sheila requested relocation to Tiffin, Ohio, where her new husband obtained
employment as a football coach.
-2-
motion for review of parenting time, which was set for hearing at the same date as
the motion for relocation. On February 6, 2008, Sheila filed a motion requesting
the trial court to summarily grant her motion for relocation. This motion was not
ruled upon. In response to the motion to summarily grant relocation, Chad filed a
motion to modify custody with two affidavits attached. At the hearing on February
7, 2008, the trial court requested briefing on the relocation and modification issues.
On June 2, 2008, the trial court held a hearing in chambers, which was
apparently not put onto the record. On August 11, 2008, the trial court entered
findings of fact and conclusions of law stating that Chad was entitled to a full
evidentiary hearing pursuant to KRS 403.340(2) because he had presented
substantial evidence of emotional harm to the children. The trial court set a
hearing date for October 31, 2008.
On October 23, 2008, the Supreme Court of Kentucky rendered
Pennington v. Marcum, which dealt specifically with relocation issues. Prior to the
hearing on October 31, 2008, Chad filed a motion to plead in the alternative for a
modification of timesharing to name him the residential parent. At the October 31,
2008, hearing, the trial court determined that Pennington would apply to this case
and that according to Pennington, the best interest of the child standard applies to
motions for relocation. On November 13, 2008, Sheila filed a motion for sole
custody without any supporting affidavits.
On January 6, 2009, the trial court held a hearing on the relocation
and custody modification issues. Chad made an oral motion to deny Sheila’s
-3-
motion for change of custody, which the trial court orally granted. On March 30,
2009, the trial court entered an opinion and order denying Sheila’s motion to
relocate. The trial court did not rule on any other matters and specifically reserved
ruling upon them, including by implication Chad’s motion for modification of
custody and his alternative motion to modify timesharing. The opinion and order
entered on March 30, 2009, did not contain Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
(CR) 54.02 finality language. This appeal followed.
At the outset, we must determine if the order of the trial court is final
and properly appealable. CR 54.02(1) states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may grant a final judgment upon one or more
but less than all of the claims or parties only upon a
determination that there is no just reason for delay. The
judgment shall recite such determination and shall recite
that the judgment is final. In the absence of such recital,
any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is interlocutory and
subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
The language of CR 54.02(1) is mandatory, and in the absence thereof “the order is
interlocutory and subject to modification and correction before becoming a final
and appealable judgment or order.” Wilson v. Russell, 162 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Ky.
2005).
-4-
In the present case there were multiple claims. Chad’s motions for
modification of custody and timesharing were not ruled upon. The trial court
specifically reserved ruling upon issues not addressed in its order entered on March
30, 2009. The order did not include the recitation of CR 54.02(1) finality
language. Therefore, we are without jurisdiction to hear the merits of this appeal
and must dismiss it as premature.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: December 11, 2009
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
R. Kim Vocke
Covington, Kentucky
/s/ William R. Harris
SENIOR JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CHAD
CARPENTER:
M. Patia R. Tabar
Florence, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.