PIKE (BRADLEY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 6, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000145-MR
BRADLEY PIKE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HUNTER DAUGHTERTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00018
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; MOORE; JUDGE; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Bradley Pike conditionally pled guilty to one count of
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree. After our review of the
record, we affirm the Garrard Circuit Court.
On February 1, 2008, the Kentucky State Police (KSP) received a tip
from an employee of the Kentucky Department of Transportation (KDOT) in
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Danville. The informant told the KSP that another KDOT employee would be
driving a state-owned truck in the Bright Leaf Estates subdivision in Garrard
County. According to the informant, the employee in the truck would be
intoxicated, would be going to Mt. Hebron Road to trade Lortabs for methadone,
would also be travelling to Shelbyville to purchase cocaine, and would have drugs
in a black duffel bag.
The KSP responded by notifying the Garrard County Sheriff’s
Department of the tip. Deputy Addison went to Bright Leaf Estates where, within
minutes, he observed a state-owned truck disregard a stop sign and fail to use a
turn signal before entering Highway 27. Deputy Addison then stopped the truck,
which Pike was driving.
When Deputy Addison approached Pike’s vehicle on foot, he noticed
the odor of alcohol and bubble gum. He asked Pike if he had been drinking. Pike
admitted that he had consumed part of a beer at home and had part of a beer in the
console. Addison continued asking Pike questions about the other elements of the
tip. Pike admitted that he was going to buy methadone from someone on Mt.
Hebron Road, but he denied trading Lortabs for it. Furthermore, he admitted that
he had bought cocaine in Shelbyville but that he would not do so anymore.
Addison asked Pike for consent to search the truck. Pike declined.
Then Addison told him that he would obtain consent from the KDOT. At that
point, Pike reached into a black duffel bag, retrieved a bottle of methadone, and
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handed it to Addison. In the subsequent search incident to arrest, officers found
more drugs and paraphernalia. The entire stop was recorded by a camera in
Addison’s car. Pike was charged with three counts related to possession of
controlled substances. He filed a motion to suppress the methadone, which the
court denied. Pike then entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession
of a controlled substance in the first degree. He now appeals the denial of the
motion to suppress.
The standard of a review for a motion to suppress evidence is twofold. First, Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78 provides that, “If
supported by substantial evidence the factual findings of the trial court shall be
conclusive.” The trial court’s application of the law to the facts is reviewed de
novo. Lynn v. Commonwealth, 257 S.W.3d 596, 598 (Ky. App. 2008).
The only issue in Pike’s appeal is whether he voluntarily abandoned
the bottle of methadone or whether Deputy Addison obtained it from him by means
of improper coercion. This court has held that “where a motorist is initially
stopped for a valid purpose and subsequently gives consent to a search of his
vehicle, the voluntariness of his consent is the only issue to consider for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment[.]” Commonwealth v. Erickson, 132 S.W.3d 884, 889
(Ky. App. 2004).
A search conducted without a warrant is considered violative of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution unless it falls within a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Cook v. Commonwealth, 826
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S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. 1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971)). One of those exceptions is consent. Id. Consent is valid only if it is
given voluntarily; i.e., if it is not a result of coercion. Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 549 (1968). When determining whether conduct was coercive, we
must examine the objective actions of the police officer rather than analyze the
subjective perception of those actions by the accused. Farmer v. Commonwealth,
6 S.W.3d 144, 146 (Ky. App. 1999).
Pike premises his appellate argument on the coercive behavior that he
alleges on the part of Deputy Addison and his threat to obtain consent from KDOT
to search the vehicle. Although Pike characterizes Deputy Addison’s conduct as
aggressive and forceful, the Commonwealth characterizes the interaction between
the two men as casual and polite. In his brief, Pike’s only evidence of Addison’s
alleged coercion is contained on the video recording from the deputy’s car.
However, the videotape was not included in the appellate record. Therefore, we
“must assume that the [videotape] supports the decision of the trial court.”
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky. 1985). The trial court
specifically stated in its order that it had viewed the videotape and that it did not
find Deputy Addison’s behavior coercive. Thompson dictates that we cannot
substitute our judgment under these circumstances.
Pike did not hand over the bottle containing the methadone until after
Addison offered to obtain consent from KDOT to search the truck. Neither side
disputes that fact. Pike argues that the threat alone was coercive. We disagree.
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Addison’s statement that he could obtain permission from the KDOT
to search Pike’s vehicle was a statement of fact. A third party who has “shared use
and joint . . . control” has authority to consent to a search. Colbert v.
Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Ky. 2001) (citing U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164 (1974)). Certainly, the KDOT could have provided legitimate third-party
consent to search its own vehicle. In addition, the initial tip to the KSP came from
a KDOT supervisor. Pike was aware of these facts. Our Supreme Court has held
that the mere stating of matters of fact does not constitute coercion in the objective,
legal sense. Henson v. Commonwealth, 20 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Ky. 2000).
The trial court made findings as to the circumstances of the stop after
viewing the video recording. There was no impropriety in Deputy Addison’s
conduct. Accordingly, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support
the Garrard Circuit Court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
We affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David Russell Marshall
Nicholasville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
John Paul Varo
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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