HAYWOOD (CLINTON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000009-MR
CLINTON HAYWOOD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-04607
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Clinton Haywood appeals pro se from the Fayette Circuit
Court’s order dismissing his petition for declaration of rights based on an alleged
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Senior Judge William R. Harris, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
violation of his due process rights during a May 14, 2008, prison disciplinary
hearing. After careful review, we affirm.
On April 29, 2008, during a strip search of Haywood, Sgt. Joel
Helmburg found a small baggie of tobacco tied to a string on Haywood’s pants.
Following an investigation, Haywood was charged with the offense of smuggling
contraband items. A disciplinary hearing was held on May 14, 2008, and
Haywood received written notice of the hearing on May 8, 2008. At the hearing,
Haywood was found guilty of smuggling contraband based upon Sgt. Helmburg’s
statement that he found tobacco in Haywood’s possession, as well as Haywood’s
statement that he did in fact possess the tobacco. As a result of this finding,
Haywood forfeited sixty days of good time with an additional sixty days that was
suspended, for a total of 120 days good time lost. Haywood appealed the
adjustment officer’s decision to the warden, and the warden concurred with the
findings of the adjustment officer.
Haywood then filed a petition for declaration of rights pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 418 in Fayette Circuit Court alleging
that the May 14, 2008, prison disciplinary proceedings violated his due process
rights. Haywood argued that he was searched in violation of Corrections Policy
and Procedure and that the smuggling contraband charge had no basis in fact.
The Fayette Circuit Court entered an opinion and order dismissing the
petition on December 9, 2008, finding that Haywood received his due process
rights as set out in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L.
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Ed. 2d 935 (1974). Further, the court found that there was more than sufficient
evidence to support the findings of the hearing officer and the consequences
imposed upon Haywood. The court found that the specific charge against
Haywood was appropriate and was within the discretion of the corrections officers.
Finally, the court found that even if there was some failure on the part of the
corrections officer to follow policy or procedure of the Department of Corrections,
that afforded Haywood no relief, as the polices and procedures are not
constitutional rights conferred upon inmates and thus no due process violation
occurred. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d
418 (1995).
Haywood now appeals, arguing that he was improperly charged with
smuggling rather than possession of contraband; that corrections policy and
procedure regarding strip searches and the confiscation of dangerous contraband
was not followed; and that he was denied the right to present documentary
evidence and to examine evidence.
Appellees first argue that Haywood failed to name indispensable
parties on the notice of appeal and therefore this appeal should be dismissed. In
support of this argument, Appellees note that when Haywood filed his petition for
declaration of rights, he named Warden Kimberly Whitley and Adjustment Officer
Eric Sizemore as respondents, but he failed to name either Warden Whitley or
Office Sizemore on the notice of appeal to this Court. “It is well-established that
failure to name an indispensable party in the notice of appeal results in dismissal of
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the appeal.” Slone v. Casey, 194 S.W.3d 336, 337 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing City of
Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1990)); CR 19.02. The failure to
name an indispensable party in the notice of appeal is more complex than a simple
adding of names; this is considered a jurisdictional defect. See Stallings, 795
S.W.2d at 957. In this case, we find no jurisdictional defect that mandates
dismissal.
The caption of Haywood’s notice of appeal is styled Clinton Haywood
v. Kimberly Whitley, et. al. However, the body of the notice states that the
appellee will be the “Commonwealth of Kentucky.” [P]oorly drafted notices of
appeal can meet the jurisdictional mandate set forth in Stallings, so long as the
court is satisfied that the notice of appeal, when reasonably read in its entirety, is
sufficient to confer fair notice to all indispensable parties of their status as a party
to the appeal. See Blackburn v. Blackburn, 810 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Ky. 1991)
(dismissal not warranted where parties were named in style of action captioning
the Notice of Appeal but not in body of said Notice).
Appellees cite to Watkins v. Fannin, 278 S.W.3d 637 (Ky. App.
2009), for the proposition that we should dismiss Haywood’s appeal because he
did not include Warden Whitley and Officer Sizemore in the body of the appeal.
Appellees are correct in stating that Watkins and the Civil Rules of Procedure
require an appellant to name each party that is necessary to adequate and proper
appellate review and disposition in an appeal. Id. at 640. However, Haywood
included Warden Whitley in the caption of the appeal, and therefore the instant
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action can be distinguished from the facts of Watkins, where the Warden was not
named at all in the notice of appeal, either in the body or the case caption.
In Watkins, the central issue before this Court was whether the
Warden was an indispensible party to an appeal of a declaration of rights involving
the revocation of good time. A panel of this Court determined that because the
Warden was in charge of reinstating good time, he/she was an indispensible party
to any appeal concerning the revocation of good time, and thus dismissed the case
for failure to name the warden anywhere in the notice of appeal. Just as the
Warden was an indispensable party in Watkins, Warden Whitley was an
indispensable party to this appeal, but Haywood conferred fair notice to Warden
Whitley that she was a party to this appeal by naming her in the caption on the
notice of appeal. Thus we find no reason to dismiss the case for failure to name an
indispensable party.
Addressing the merits of Haywood’s appeal, we find no errors by the
trial court, and thus affirm the court’s order dismissing Haywood’s petition for
declaration of rights. Prison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal prosecutions
and “the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply.” Wolff , 418 U.S. at 556; see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,
315-16, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1557, 47 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1974). Prison disciplinary
proceedings are civil, administrative actions. In Wolff, the Supreme Court held that
procedural due process, in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, requires:
“(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity when
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consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence in defense; and (3) a written statement by the fact
finder of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions.”
Superintendent Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S. Ct.
2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985) (summarizing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67).
The prison authorities satisfied all of the due process requirements
under Wolff. Part I and II of the disciplinary report form show that Haywood
received advance notice on May 8, 2008, of the May 14, 2008, disciplinary
hearing; no witnesses were requested by Haywood; and the adjustment officer
provided a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
disciplinary actions. While Haywood appears to concede that he received the due
process set forth in the paragraph above, he argues that he was denied the
opportunity to present documentary evidence and to examine evidence. However,
Haywood never articulates what documentary evidence he sought to present or
examine. To the extent this is an extension of Haywood’s argument that the
evidence against him lacked a chain of custody verification due to the officer’s
failure to properly confiscate the contraband, this claim has no merit. Haywood
admitted to having the tobacco in his possession, and therefore documentation
showing that the officer failed to follow the administrative procedures set forth on
the prison’s chain of custody form was irrelevant. Thus, any introduction of such
documentation by Haywood would have been futile, given that he admitted to
having the tobacco in question.
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In addition to the requirement of due process provided in Wolff, there
must have been “some evidence” to support the adjustment officer’s finding that
Haywood committed the infraction charged. See Hill, 472 U.S., at 454. In
determining the existence of “some evidence,” the analysis “does not require
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, or weighing of evidence.” Id. at 455-56. Rather, “the relevant question
is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion
reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455-56. If “some evidence” exists that
supports the decision arrived at by the prison disciplinary board, it may not be
disturbed on appeal. Id. at 455.
This Court acknowledged the United States Supreme Court’s approval
of the minimum Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements for prison
disciplinary proceedings, noting that this was necessary “to balanc[e] the prison
administrator’s profound interest in maintaining order against the inmate’s
relatively minor interest in avoiding a portion of his sentence.” Smith v. O’Dea,
939 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Ky. App. 1997). The Court went on to hold that the
“judicial deference” provided to prison disciplinary bodies under federal law was
required under the Kentucky Constitution as well. Id. at 358.
Thus, if there is any evidence in the record that could support the
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board, that decision must be upheld. In the
instant case, the evidence in the record is that Sgt. Helmburg found a small baggie
of tobacco tied to the drawstring of Haywood’s sweatpants and tucked down into
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his waistline. Haywood acknowledged that he had this tobacco. Thus, there was
“some evidence” to support the disciplinary board’s conclusion and we will not
disturb that conclusion on appeal.
The bulk of Haywood’s argument, both at the circuit court level and
here on appeal, is that corrections policy and procedure was violated during Sgt.
Helmburg’s search and during the confiscation of the contraband. However, any
failure to comply with corrections policy and procedure was not a violation of due
process. A state’s implementation of procedural directives to guide prison
administrators, such as the directives contained in the corrections policy and
procedure, does not create protected liberty or property interests under the U.S.
Constitution. Levine v. Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 46 (6th Cir. 1996); Levine v. Torvik,
986 F.2d 1506, 1516 (6th Cir. 1993). “Prison regulations primarily designed to
guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison,” such as those at issue
herein, are not “designed to confer rights on inmates.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-82.
Thus, any failure of Sgt. Helmburg to follow Corrections Policy and Procedure did
not constitute a due process violation against Haywood.
Finally, Haywood argues that he was improperly charged with
smuggling rather than possession. However, it appears from the record that the
charge of smuggling was also appropriate, given that Haywood was carrying,
transporting, or bearing a small baggie of tobacco, and could have been engaged in
activity that fits within the definition of smuggling. While such activity also fits in
the description of possession, that does not preclude the smuggling charge. The
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“some evidence” standard does not require that the evidence logically preclude any
conclusion but the one reached by the hearing officer. See Webb v. Sharp, 223
S.W.3d 113, 121 (Ky. 2007).
In conclusion, Haywood’s due process rights were not violated and
the trial court properly dismissed Haywood’s petition for declaration of rights.
Accordingly, we affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s December 9, 2008, order
dismissing Haywood’s petition for declaration of rights.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Clinton Haywood, Pro Se
St. Mary, Kentucky
Angela T. Dunham
Kentucky Justice & Public Safety
Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
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