SEALS (DANNY), ET AL. VS. AMBURGEY (EDGAR), ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 30, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002217-MR
&
NO. 2008-CA-002247-MR
DANNY SEALS; IRIS SEALS,
AND DOVE LOGGING, LLC
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM KNOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLEY CORNETT CHILDERS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00292
EDGAR AMBURGEY AND
LAVERA AMBURGEY
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, MOORE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: This is an appeal by Danny Seals, Iris Seals, and Dove
Logging, LLC (the Seals) from Judgment entered by the Knott Circuit Court. The
Amburgeys cross-appeal the amount of damages awarded in Judgment. We
reverse and remand on the issue of damages.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Amburgeys have owned and resided upon a tract of land since
1960. Danny and Iris Seals purchased an adjoining tract of land, separated by a
common boundary line, around 1997 or 1998. In late 2004, Danny Seals entered
into an oral contract with Dove Logging, LLC to cut and remove standing timber
from an area of property as designated by Danny Seals and to which he claimed
ownership. In early 2005, the Amburgeys discovered Dove Logging, LLC
carrying out timbering activities on a portion of property to which the Amburgeys
claimed ownership. The Amburgeys then filed suit to quiet title and to enjoin
further trespass. They requested equitable relief and triple damages to compensate
them for the loss of their timber and the injury to their property.
An Agreed Order was entered by the court, providing that Richard
Hall, licensed land surveyor and Letcher County Surveyor, be appointed to review
the pleadings, evidence, etc., including surveys obtained independently by the
Seals and the Amburgeys. The Seals’s independent survey indicated that the
property on which the logging occurred belonged to Danny and Iris Seals. The
Amburgeys’ independent survey indicated that the property on which the logging
occurred belonged to Edgar and Lavera Amburgey. Hall was authorized to take
whatever steps were necessary to report to the court whether the property timbered
by the Seals was located upon property owned by Danny and Iris Seals or Edgar
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and Lavera Amburgey. The Agreed Order provided “[t]hat the report of Richard
Hall to the Court and his conclusions therein expressed shall be binding upon the
parties and adopted by the Court in its judgment.” Hall filed his report with the
court, finding that Danny Seals’s survey erroneously located his deed description
on the property and map and that the survey undertaken by the Amburgeys was
correct. Hall concluded that the area timbered by the Seals occurred on property
owned by the Amburgeys.
As a result of Hall’s conclusions in conjunction with the Agreed
Order, the Amburgeys filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Knott Circuit
Court entered Summary Judgment in favor of the Amburgeys on October 15, 2007,
finding that the Seals did enter upon property owned by the Amburgeys and did cut
and remove timber from the Amburgeys’ property and converted same to their own
use. Based on the trespass, the trial court held that the Amburgeys were entitled to
compensation under the law. For reasons explained infra, this judgment is not
before this Court.
The issue of damages to be awarded to the Amburgeys was set for
bench trial. However, by agreement of the parties and Order of the court, the
matter was submitted for determination upon the depositions, affidavits, exhibits,
and other evidence in the record. The trial court found the Seals to be innocent
trespassers and awarded, in addition to other damages, actual damages for the
stump value of the trees taken and damage to the property thereby.
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The Seals appeal on two grounds. First, the Seals argue that the trial
court erred in entering Summary Judgment based on its determination that the
logging occurred on the Amburgeys’ property. Second, the Seals assert that no
damages or fees should have been awarded to the Amburgeys under KRS1
364.130. The Amburgeys filed a cross-appeal, arguing they should have received
triple damages under KRS 364.130 rather than actual damages for the stump value
of the trees taken and damage to the property.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is
whether it correctly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact and
that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Amos v. Clubb,
268 S.W.3d 378, 380-81 (Ky. App. 2008) (citing Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779,
781 (Ky. App. 1996)). We are mindful that “[t]he record must be viewed in a light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all
doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Id. (citing Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991)). Summary judgments are
reserved for cases where the movant demonstrates that the nonmoving party
cannot, under any circumstances, prevail at trial. Price v. Godby, 263 S.W.3d 598,
601 (Ky. App. 2008) (citing Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480). Appellate courts
review grants of summary judgment de novo. Baker v. Weinberg, 266 S.W.3d 827,
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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831 (Ky. App. 2008) (citing Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App.
2001)).
The trial court granted Summary Judgment based on its finding of
fact, established by the Agreed Order, that the property which was timbered
belonged to the Amburgeys. We review findings of fact made by the trial court
only to determine if they are clearly erroneous. CR2 52.01 states, in part,
“[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.”
The test of whether a finding of fact is clearly erroneous is whether it
is supported by substantial evidence. Black Motor Co. v. Greene, 385 S.W.2d 954
(Ky. 1964); D.H. Overmyer Warehouse Co. v. Smith, 451 S.W.2d 668 (Ky. 1970).
Substantial evidence does not mean undisputed evidence, but where both parties
introduce adequate evidence, if believed, to support their respective positions, the
findings of the trial judge are not clearly erroneous. Hensley v. Stinson, 287
S.W.2d 593, 594 (Ky. 1956). The clearly erroneous standard has been applied
specifically to boundary disputes. West v. Keckley, 474 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1971);
Croley v. Alsip, 602 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1980). The fact finder may choose between
the conflicting opinions of surveyors so long as the opinion relied on is not based
upon erroneous assumptions or fails to take into account established factors. Webb
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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v. Compton, 98 S.W.3d 513, 517 (Ky. App. 2002) (citing Howard v. Kingmont Oil
Co., 729 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. App. 1987)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Seals’s Appeal of Summary Judgment
The Seals assert that the Amburgeys “failed to sustain the burden of
proof imposed upon them of establishing their property line.” In support of their
argument, the Seals cite to their lack of intent to trespass upon land beyond the
extent of their own true boundary in accordance with their own survey. The Seals
fault the Amburgeys in not formally disputing the boundaries before the logging
even occurred. They argue that the accuracy of a land survey in proving ownership
is a matter of discretion and that the land descriptions found in those surveys were
“more than enough to confuse the Court as to the decision relating to the boundary
lines.”
The Seals also attempt to place the burden on the Amburgeys to quiet
title. In their brief, the Seals casually mention the concept of adverse possession.
The relevance of adverse possession in this case is not clear. The Seals are not
arguing that they adversely possessed the portion of the Amburgeys’ property on
which the logging occurred. It appears that the Seals are attempting to insinuate
that the Amburgeys acquired the land by adverse possession but did not quiet title
in the land. If this is their argument, it is unpersuasive. The Amburgeys obtained a
deed in 1960 granting them title to the land.
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As the rightful owners, the Amburgeys are not required to quiet title.
It is not the Amburgeys’ duty to dispute the boundary lines of their own property,
prior to any trespass, so that the Seals can be put on notice that future logging
activities will be unlawful. Rather, it is the Seals’s duty to determine their own
boundary lines prior to authorizing logging on property which they believe is their
own but in reality does not belong to them.
The Seals attack the boundary line determined by Summary Judgment
entered on October 15, 2007. In their Notice of Appeal, the Seals provide, “[t]he
Judgment appealed is from the Judgment . . . dated October 31, 2008.” The
Judgment on October 31, 2008 addresses only the issue of damages. Pursuant to
CR 73.03(1), “[t]he notice of appeal shall . . . identify the judgment, order or part
thereof appealed from.” Accordingly, the Summary Judgment entered on October
15, 2007 is not before this Court.
Where the notice of appeal does not conform to CR 73.03(1) by
failing to designate the judgment appealed from, the appeal will be dismissed.
Rose Bowl Lanes, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 373 S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1963).
“Dismissal is not an appropriate remedy for this type of defect so long as the
judgment appealed from can be ascertained within reasonable certainty from a
complete review of the record on appeal and no substantial harm or prejudice has
resulted to the opponent.” Ready v. Jamison, 705 S.W.2d 479, 481-82 (Ky. 1986).
In this case, it is clear from the Notice of Appeal which judgment is
designated on appeal. The Seals did not make a technical or clerical error, and the
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designation is not ambiguous. Rather the Seals neglected to designate both
judgments. Because the October 15, 2007 judgment is not before us, we will not
address the Seals’s claim as to the placement of the boundary.3
B. The Seals’s Appeal of Damages and the Amburgeys’ Cross-appeal
As the Seals’s remaining appeal and the Amburgeys’ cross-appeal
both deal with the award of damages, they will be analyzed together. Both parties’
appeals are based on KRS 364.130. The construction and interpretation of statutes
are matters of law; therefore, our standard of review is de novo. Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Health v. Lloyd, 115 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Ky. App. 2003). When
interpreting a statute, we must “ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature and that intention must be determined from the language of the statute
itself if possible.” Id. at 347. “We have a duty to accord to words of a statute their
literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable
conclusion.” McElroy v. Taylor, 977 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Ky. 1998). When
reviewing a statute, we must give “significance and effect ... to every part of [an]
Act.” Id. at 931. However, where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, we should not resort to the legislative record in order to interpret the
statute. City of Vanceburg v. Plummer, 275 Ky. 713, 122 S.W.2d 772, 775 (1938).
3
Had the October 15, 2007 judgment been before us, the Agreed Order would have been
dispositive on the issue of ownership. Hall concluded that the Amburgeys’ survey was correct
and that the timbered land belonged to the Amburgeys. The trial court adopted Hall’s findings of
fact pursuant to the Agreed Order. The Seals would be bound by this determination of
ownership. There would be no genuine issue of material fact as to who owned the land on which
the logging occurred. Summary Judgment in favor of the Amburgeys would be affirmed.
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KRS 364.130 sets out the liability of a person entering upon and
cutting timber growing upon land of another and provides for the measure of
damages. It reads:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section,
any person who cuts or saws down, or causes to be cut or
sawed down with intent to convert to his own use timber
growing upon the land of another without legal right or
without color of title in himself to the timber or to the
land upon which the timber was growing shall pay to the
rightful owner of the timber three (3) times the stumpage
value of the timber and shall pay to the rightful owner of
the property three (3) times the cost of any damages to
the property as well as any legal costs incurred by the
owner of the timber.
(2) (a) If a defendant can certify that prior to cutting:
1. A signed statement was obtained from the
person whom the defendant believed to be the
owner of all trees scheduled to be cut that:
a. All of the trees to be cut were on his
property and that none were on the property
of another; and
b. He has given his permission, in writing,
for the trees on his property to be cut; and
2. Either:
a. A written agreement was made with
owners of the land adjacent to the cut that
the trees to be cut were not on their
property; or
b. Owners of the land adjacent to the cut
were notified in writing, delivered by
certified mail, restricted delivery, and return
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receipt requested, of the pending cut and
they raised no objection,
the court may render a judgment for no more than
the reasonable value of the timber, actual damages
caused to the property, and any legal costs incurred
by the owner of the timber.
(b) With respect to subsection (2)(a)2.b. of this
section, if no written objection was received from the
persons notified within seven (7) days from the date of
signed receipt of mail, it shall be presumed, for the
purposes of setting penalties only, that the notified
owner had no objection to the proposed cut.
(3) This section shall not be construed as repealing any of
the provisions of KRS 514.030 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes and any penalties provided by this chapter shall
be considered as additional thereto.
KRS 364.103(2) provides for the mitigation of damages if it can be
proven that specific formalities are satisfied. In this case, none of the formalities
identified in the statute took place. Therefore, any claim by the Seals for
mitigation of damages under the statute fails.
The exceptions in subsection (2) not applying, subsection (1) then
controls our analysis. Subsection (1) provides that the trespasser must pay the
owner of the timbered property three times the stumpage value of the timber and
three times the cost of any damages to the property, in addition to other damages.
To be liable for these triple damages, however, the trespasser must have cut or
sawed down or caused to be cut or sawed down, with intent to convert to his own
use, timber growing upon the land of another without legal right or without color
of title in himself to the timber or to the land upon which the timber was growing.
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The trial court found that the Seals cut or sawed down or caused to be
cut or sawed down, with intent to convert to his own use, timber growing upon the
land of another. The Seals’s actions took place on the Amburgeys’ land. It is
undisputed that Danny Seals entered into a verbal contract with Dove Logging,
LLC to cut and remove standing timber from an area of property as designated by
Danny Seals. As pointed out in the Seals’s brief, “Seals was to be paid 25% of the
sale price for the timber cut and removed by Dove Logging, LLC under this
agreement.” We do not see how the Seals can argue “[t]here was no evidence that
the Appellants had any intent to convert [the timber] to their own use . . . .” The
findings established in Summary Judgment are certainly supported by substantial
evidence.
The remaining issue that we must address to determine whether the
Amburgeys are entitled to triple damages under the statute is whether the Seals
timbered the property without legal right or without color of title to the timber or to
the land upon which the timber was growing. It is clear from the facts that the
Seals did not have legal right to the timber or to the property on which the timber
was located. The trees were located on the Amburgeys’ land, and the Amburgeys
did not grant permission to timber their property. Thus, the determinative factor is
whether the Seals had color of title.
A recent Kentucky Supreme Court case is directly on point. In Meece
v. Feldman Lumber Co., 209 S.W.3d 631 (Ky. 2009), Feldman filed an appeal of
the trial court’s judgment quieting title in Meece. Meece filed a cross-appeal on
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damages, contending that the trial court erred in failing to award triple damages
and attorney fees under KRS 364.130. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court on quieting title in Meece and affirmed the trial court on denying triple
damages. The Court denied triple damages because it agreed with the trial court
that “Feldman had reason to believe the timber was his and thus possessed color of
title.” The Court of Appeals concluded that Feldman was an innocent trespasser
not subject to KRS 364.130. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary
review to discuss the issue of damages and KRS 364.130.
Our Supreme Court held that the lumber company lacked objective
evidence of title from which a subjective belief could be founded that it owned the
property upon which it cut down trees, and thus, lacked “color of title,” requiring
statutory award for triple damages, rather than mere stump value, of the timber it
cut. The Meece Court required objective evidence to establish color of title.
In the case before us, the Knott Circuit Court held that “KRS 364.130
provides a distinction between a willful and an innocent trespasser. The former
knows he is wrong and the latter believes he is right.” The circuit court determined
that the Seals were innocent trespassers and thereby awarded actual damages rather
than triple damages.
At common law, it was necessary to distinguish between an innocent
and willful trespasser because the amount of damages awarded was based on that
distinction. Meece, 209 S.W.3d at 632. But the common law, prior statutes, and
the public policy growing out of them all must yield to the superior authority of a
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later enacted statute. General Elec. Co. v. Am. Buyers Coop., 316 S.W.2d 354, 358
(Ky. 1958); see also Com. ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, 828 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Ky.
1992).
An early version of KRS 364.130 altered the common law distinction
between an innocent or willful trespass. The statutory determination became
whether the person has or does not have “color of title” in himself. The current
version of KRS 364.130 has not changed that early distinction. So, it is irrelevant
under the statute whether the trespasser was innocent or willful. Being an innocent
trespasser will not mitigate damages under the statute. Color of title is now the
crucial determination. If the trespasser did have color of title, he would be liable
for actual damages. Conversely, if the trespasser did not have color of title, he
owes triple damages. Meece, 290 S.W.3d at 635; KRS 364.130.
“While a trespass may be innocent based only on a subjective belief, a
trespass with ‘color of title’ requires an objective ‘color of title’ to form a
subjective belief that the trespass is innocent.” Meece, 290 S.W.3d at 634 (citing
Swiss Oil Corp., et al. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (1934); Hurst v.
Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 824, 125 S.W.2d 772 (1939)). “Color of title is not based
on a subjective belief, but on objective evidence of title from which a subjective
belief may by founded.” Meece, 290 S.W.3d at 631.
The burden is on the persons claiming ownership through color of title
to locate the boundaries and to show that the land in dispute was embraced within
the lines claimed by them. Id. at 636. “When there is uncertainty as to whether the
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description in a deed embraces the land in question, the claim of color of title
fails.” Id.
However, we are not dealing with a disputed boundary under a deed.
The deeds, as read by Hall and agreed to by the parties, establish a boundary in
favor of the Amburgeys. The issue with which we are faced revolves around the
land surveys. Not only did Hall perform a survey, but the Seals and the
Amburgeys commissioned their own independent surveys to be performed. The
Seals’s survey indicated that Danny and Iris Seals owned the land to be timbered,
allegedly causing the Seals to have a subjective belief that Danny and Iris Seals
owned that land.
This Court must now determine whether the Seals’s survey can be
objective evidence upon which the Seals’s subjective belief of ownership was
based. If the survey is objective evidence, then the Seals had color of title. If the
survey is not objective evidence, then the Seals did not rely on objective evidence
to form their subjective belief of ownership and, therefore, did not have color of
title.
In Kelly v. Kelly, 293 Ky. 42, 168 S.W.2d 339 (1943), the Court held
the allegations in that case were insufficient to show that plaintiff had color of title,
where she did not claim under any instrument or deed as vesting her with color of
title. Kelly indicated that the words “color of title,” as defined in section 11, page
267, 27 Am. Jur., mean
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that which is appearance of title, but which in reality is
not title. Color of title may be said to be a writing, upon
its face professing to pass title, but which does not do it,
either from a want of title in the person making it, or
from the defective conveyance that is used- a title that is
imperfect, but not so obviously imperfect that it would be
apparent to one not skilled in the law.
See in accord Bragg v. McCoy, 188 Ky. 762, 224 S.W. 200 (1920).
“In the same section of the same authority it is also said that: ‘There
can be no color of title in an occupant who does not hold under any instrument,
proceeding, or law purporting to transfer to him the title or to give him the right of
possession.’” Kelly, 168 S.W.2d at 342. A bare survey does not give color of title.
Holcomb v. Swift Coal & Timber Co., 251 Ky. 642, 65 S.W.2d 741, 744 (1933)
(see 2 C. J. p. 192, § 377).
A survey is the measuring of a tract of land and its boundaries and
contents or a map indicating the results of such measurements. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). We find it persuasive that “[i]n no event can the survey
done at the request of an owner or owners have any further effect than to establish
the true boundary lines . . . . [I]t cannot in any way affect or determine the title.”
11 C.J.S.4 Boundaries § 179 (citing Mahlandt v. Jabes, 232 Kan. 435, 658 P.2d 356
(1983)). In submitting to a survey a party does not put himself in the position of
surrendering his or her land, or any part of it. Id. (citing Cleveland v. Obenchain,
107 Ind. 591, 8 N.E. 624 (1886)). The survey cannot defeat a title held and
acquired by adverse possession (id.) (citing Wood v. Kuper, 150 Ind. 622, 50 N.E.
4
Corpus Juris Secundum.
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755 (1898)) and does not affect the location of an independent agreed boundary.
Id. (citing Chessmore v. Terrell, 94 Kan. 611, 146 P. 1152 (1915)).
Pursuant to 201 KAR5 18:150, a professional land surveyor is not
permitted to represent that (i) a boundary survey determines land ownership, (ii) a
boundary survey provides more than evidence of rights in land, or (iii) land
ownership can be established by a means other than an action in a Kentucky court.
The survey commissioned by the Seals was not an appearance of title.
It was not an instrument purporting to transfer title, and it did not give the Seals a
right of possession. Additionally, the surveyor would not have been permitted to
assert that the survey was evidence of title. The Seals even assert in their brief that
the accuracy of a land survey in proving ownership is a matter of discretion.
Therefore, the survey was not objective evidence of title, the Seals did not base
their subjective belief of ownership on objective evidence, and the Seals did not
have color of title.
The Seals entered upon the land of another without legal right and
without color of title and sawed down the trees. They did not obtain mitigating
statements as authorized by KRS 364.130(2). Thus, the Amburgeys are entitled to
triple damages. Therefore, this case must be remanded to the trial court for an
award of damages pursuant to KRS 364.130(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
5
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
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This Court being otherwise duly advised, we affirm Summary
Judgment in favor of the Amburgeys, establishing that the timbering occurred on
the Amburgeys’ property. Awarding the Amburgeys triple damages under KRS
364.130(1), we reverse the judgment and remand for proceedings by the circuit
court on the sole issue of damages.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James W. Craft, II
Whitesburg, Kentucky
Gene Smallwood, Jr.
Whitesburg, Kentucky
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