GLENVIEW SPRINGS, LLC VS. STERLING DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LTD.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002215-MR
GLENVIEW SPRINGS, LLC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN F. MCDONALD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-000660
STERLING DEVELOPMENT GROUP,
LTD.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND DIXON, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Glenview Springs, LLC (Glenview)
appeals the November 14, 2008, opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Sterling Development Group,
Ltd. (Sterling). In granting summary judgment, the court found that Sterling was
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
not required to purchase two lots it had previously agreed to purchase because
Glenview did not perform within the time allowed in the contract and did not
extend the time for closing in writing. After a thorough review of the record, the
applicable law, and the arguments of the parties, we affirm.
On December 13, 2005, Glenview and Sterling entered into two
separate lot purchase agreements. Under the agreements, Sterling agreed to buy
Lots 31 and 42 from Glenview in a residential subdivision which Glenview was in
the process of developing in Jefferson County. Sterling paid a deposit of
$10,000.00 on each of the two lots. The agreements, which were identical,
provided that closing would occur no sooner than the date the final subdivision plat
was recorded in the Jefferson County Clerk’s Office, and no later than January 1,
2007, unless extended by Glenview. Both agreements included a “time is of the
essence” clause and required notice to be served personally or by certified mail.
According to Glenview, during the fall of 2006, its sole member,
Stephen Cox, realized that he would not be able to complete the regulatory agency
approval process in time to record the subdivision plat by January 1, 2007.
Glenview states that as a result, a written notice was sent to the eight lot
purchasers, including Sterling, inviting them to a meeting which was to be held on
September 27, 2006. Glenview further states that during the hour immediately
preceding the scheduled meeting, Sterling’s president, Carl Baker, called Cox and
advised him that because of a scheduling conflict he would not be able to attend
the meeting, and inquired as to the meeting’s purpose. Glenview states that at that
-2-
time, Cox advised Baker that the lot closings would not occur until sometime in
2007. It further asserts, as set forth in Cox’s sworn affidavit, that Cox also
verbally updated Baker on the progress in obtaining agency approvals and the
estimation of a closing date on a number of other occasions during the fall and
early winter of 2006.
Ultimately, the closings did not occur by January 1, 2007, and Sterling
sent a February 2, 2007, letter to Glenview, stating that the Lot Agreements had
terminated due to Glenview’s failure to close on the lots by the January 1, 2007,
deadline. Sterling also demanded return of its two $10,000.00 deposits. Glenview
refused to return the deposits, stating that it had verbally extended the closing
dates. Sterling denied that Baker, or any other employee of Sterling, ever received
notification, either verbal or written, that Glenview was extending the closing
deadline.
Glenview then filed this action seeking to retain the $10,000.00
deposit on Lot 31, and seeking to enforce the purchase agreement on Lot 42.
Sterling filed its answer and counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment as to the
two agreements and the return of its two $10,000.00 in deposits. Sterling also filed
a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the statute of frauds, as codified in
KRS 371.010(6), required any modification of the written contract setting forth the
January 1st closing deadline to be in writing, and that the Lot Agreements
themselves required all notifications, including any extensions of the January 1st
deadline, to be in writing.
-3-
Glenview argued to the court below that Stephen Cox orally notified
Carl Baker that closings on the lots would occur sometime in 2007. Glenview also
asserted that the agreements did not require written notice, and further, that
Sterling had agreed in advance that Glenview could unilaterally extend the closing
dates. Baker denied that Sterling ever received verbal or written notice that the
closing date would be extended.
As noted, the court below entered an opinion and order in this matter
on November 14, 2008, in which it granted summary judgment in favor of Sterling.
In so doing, the court found that the statute of frauds, codified at KRS 371.010(6),
requires that any contract for the sale of real estate be in writing. Further, the court
stated that under Kentucky law, when time is of the essence of the contract, a
modification of the time of performance must also be in writing. See Farmers
Bank and Trust Co. of Georgetown, Ky. v. Willmott Hardwoods, Inc., 171 S.W.3d
4 (Ky. 2005); Specht v. Stoker, 237 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1951); Klatch v. Simpson, 237
Ky. 84, 34 S.W.2d 951 (1931); and Murray v. Boyd, 165 Ky. 625, 177 S.W. 468
(1915).
The court below found that in the matter sub judice, there was no
written extension of the closing date, and that the attempted modification by
Glenview did not extend the closing date. Accordingly, the court held that Sterling
was entitled to recover the deposits it paid for the two lots because Glenview did
not perform within the time allowed in the contract, and did not extend the time for
closing in writing. The court therefore granted Sterling’s motion for summary
-4-
judgment, finding that it was not required to purchase either lot under the purchase
agreements, and that it was entitled to recover the two $10,000.00 deposits which it
paid to Glenview.
It is the well-settled law in this Commonwealth that when considering
a motion for summary judgment, the court is to view the record in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that all doubts are to be resolved in
that party’s favor. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480
(Ky. 1991). The trial court must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of
fact, but to discover if a real issue of material fact exists. Id. The moving party
bears the initial burden of showing that no issue of material fact exists, and then
the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to present at least some
affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
See Lewis, supra, 56 S.W.3d at 436 (citing Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 482).
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion
for summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were not
genuine issues as to any material fact, and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.
1996); Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. Because summary
judgment involves only legal questions and the existence of any disputed material
issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision and will
review the issue de novo. Scifres, 916 S.W.2d at 781. We review this matter with
these standards in mind.
-5-
On appeal to this Court, Glenview argues that the trial court erred in
holding that the statute of frauds, as set forth in KRS 371.010(6), required written
notice of Glenview’s extension of the closing date. In support of this argument,
Glenview asserts that its extension of the closing date did not constitute a material
modification of the lot purchase agreements, and asserts that Sterling had already
agreed in advance that Glenview could unilaterally extend the closing dates.
Glenview further argues that even in those instances in which an
extension of a closing date would require a contract modification or amendment,
the statute of frauds would not require that the modification be in writing unless
the extension went to the essence of the contract. Glenview relies upon Klatch v.
Simpson, 237 Ky. 84, 34 S.W.2d 951 (Ky. 1931), in support of this assertion.
In Klatch, the purchaser contended that the parties had orally agreed
to extend the closing date set forth in a written contract for the purchase of a house
and lot. The seller denied that he had agreed to the extension, and argued that in
any event, the extension would be invalid under the statute of frauds. Our
Supreme Court held that the extension was not invalid under the statute of frauds
because it did not go to the essence of the contract, nor did it affect the subject
matter thereof (price or property description), but only postponed the closing date
for a brief period of time so that the purchaser could obtain his financing.2 Thus,
Glenview argues that in the matter sub judice, there was no need for Glenview to
2
As discussed further herein below, we believe Klatch to be distinguishable from the matter sub
judice insofar as the parties in Klatch did not specify that time was of the essence upon entering
into their agreement.
-6-
obtain Sterling’s agreement to a modification of the contract, as Sterling had
already agreed, in writing, that Glenview could unilaterally extend the closing
dates. Further, Glenview argues that the contract contained no language
terminating the contract unless a particular type of notice was given with respect to
an extension.
In response, Sterling argues that a written contract may be orally
modified only if the contract is not one that is required by law to be in writing, and
notes that the statute of frauds requires contracts for the sale of real estate to be in
writing and signed by the parties. In support thereof, Sterling cites to our holding
in Cox v. Venters, 887 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Ky. App. 1994), wherein we state that
when a contract is required by the statute of frauds to be in writing, a subsequent
agreement which changes its terms must also be in writing and signed by the party
charged to be enforceable.
As our Kentucky Supreme Court held in Farmers Bank, 171 S.W.3d
at 8:
If the contract is required to be in writing, evidence will
not be admitted to prove a subsequent parol agreement
which materially modifies the writing; that is, if the
subsequent agreement is itself within the statute of
frauds, and of a nature required by law to be in writing.
Citing Murray v. Boyd, 165 Ky. 625, 177 S.W. 468, 471-72 (1915).
Thus, as Sterling correctly notes, the dispositive question in this
matter is whether extension of the closing date was a material modification.
Sterling correctly asserts that if the extension of the January 1st closing deadline
-7-
materially affected the terms of the Lot Agreements, then any attempt by Glenview
to postpone or extend the closing deadline must comply with the statute of frauds
and be in writing.
A review of the record reveals that it is undisputed that the parties, in
entering into these agreements, specified that time was of the essence. Further, our
courts have held that in a contract where time is of the essence, postponement or
extension of the closing date is a material change in the contract, and the statute of
frauds applies. See Farmers Bank, 171 S.W.3d at 8.
In the matter sub judice, it is undisputed that the parties expressly
stated their intention to make time of the essence in the performance of both
agreements. Accordingly, any extension of the closing date, even if the parties
agreed that the closing date could be extended, constitutes a material modification
for which a writing is necessary.
Upon review, we cannot ignore the plain language of the contracts
themselves, despite Glenview’s arguments to the contrary. As the parties specified
that time was of the essence, we believe that our jurisprudence requires any
extension to be in writing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the
statute of frauds applied to the Lot Agreements, and that the extension was a
material modification of the agreements and required to be in writing.
Having so found, we need not reach the additional issue raised by the
parties as to whether or not Glenview was required to provide Sterling with written
notice of the extension. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the November 14, 2008,
-8-
opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, the Honorable Martin McDonald,
presiding.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Harold W. Thomas
Louisville, Kentucky
Jennifer Hatcher
Louisville, Kentucky
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.