LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT, ET AL. VS. LEXHL, LP , ET AL.
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 13, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-002145-MR
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY
GOVERNMENT; JIM GRAY; LINDA GORTON;
CHUCK ELLINGER; ANDREA JAMES;
TOM BLUES; DICK DECAMP; JULIAN BEARD;
DAVID STEVENS; KEVIN STINETT; K.C. CROSBIE;
GEORGE MYERS; JAY McCHORD; DON BLEVINS;
RICHARD MOLONEY; and ED LANE
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00081
LEXHL, LP, d/b/a THE LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER;
and PETER BANIAK
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: STUMBO, THOMPSON, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (“LFUCG”)
appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Fayette Circuit Court which
dismissed its declaratory judgment against Lexington H-L Services, Inc., d/b/a
Lexington Herald Leader (“Herald-Leader”). The LFUCG sought a declaration
that the litigation exception to the Open Meetings Act allows it to close council
meetings in order to answer requests for information propounded by administrative
agencies. The trial court concluded that the matter was moot because the
underlying action was no longer pending before the agency. We agree.
Furthermore, the LFUCG has not shown that this issue is capable of repetition
which would allow review. Hence, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the
action as moot.
The underlying facts of this action are not in dispute. On March 30,
2007, Kentucky American Water Company (“Kentucky American”) filed an
application with the Public Service Commission (“PSC”) for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity. Among other things, Kentucky American sought
authorization for the construction of a new pumping station and water treatment
facility on the Kentucky River. In April 2007, the LFUCG sought and received
permission from the PSC to participate in the application process.
As part of that process, the PSC directed the LFUCG to provide it
with answers to specific requests for information. The PSC issued the request on
December 21, 2007, and directed that the LFUCG provide the responses no later
than January 9, 2008. The LFUCG Council scheduled a closed “work session” for
January 8, 2008, to discuss and prepare responses to the PSC’s request for
information. Upon learning of the scheduled meeting, the Herald-Leader filed a
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complaint alleging a violation of the Open Meetings Act, and seeking injunctive
relief to prevent the LFUCG Council from closing the meeting.
On January 8, 2008, the trial court entered a temporary injunction
which prohibited the LFUCG Council from closing the scheduled meeting “or any
other meeting concerning the LFUCG’s responses to the PSC’s requests for
information and the Council’s position regarding the Kentucky American
Application.” On February 27, 2008, the LFUCG filed an answer and
counterclaim seeking dismissal of the injunction and declaratory relief. The
LFUCG argued that the “litigation exception” to the Open Meetings Act applied to
administrative proceedings such as the PSC action. Citing Kentucky Revised
Statute (“KRS”) 61.810(1)(c). The LFUCG followed its answer and counterclaim
with a motion for summary judgment. The Herald-Leader filed a cross motion for
summary judgment.1 In addition to contesting the merits of LFUCG’s arguments,
the Herald-Leader also argued that the matter was now moot because the PSC had
ruled on Kentucky American’s application.
After considering the briefs and arguments of counsel, the trial court
granted the Herald-Leader’s motion to dismiss. In an order entered on September
24, 2008, the court dissolved the temporary injunction and dismissed the action
without addressing the merits of the LFUCG’s claim. The LFUCG now appeals.
As an initial matter, the LFUCG argues that this matter is not moot
even though the underlying application before the PSC has been resolved. In order
1
During the hearing on September 24, 2008, the Herald-Leader’s oral motion to amend the
summary judgment motion to a motion to dismiss was granted.
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to obtain a declaration of rights, there must exist a real or justiciable controversy
involving specific rights of particular parties. KRS 418.040; see also Veith v. City
of Louisville, 355 S.W.2d 295 (Ky. 1962). Proceedings for a declaratory judgment
must not merely seek advisory answers to abstract questions. Mammoth Medical,
Inc. v. Bunnell, 265 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Ky. 2008).
The LFUCG concedes that its claim for declaratory relief is
technically moot since the underlying claim before the PSC is no longer pending
and it is no longer required to submit answers to the agency’s requests for
information. Nevertheless, the LFUCG contends that its claim for relief under an
exception which allows review when the moot claim is “capable of repetition, yet
evading review.” Philpot v. Patton, 837 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1992). “The
decision whether to apply the exception to the mootness doctrine basically involves
two questions: whether (1) the ‘challenged action is too short in duration to be
fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration and [2] there is a reasonable
expectation that same complaining party would be subject to the same action
again.’” Id.
On the first element, the LFUCG correctly notes that the HeraldLeader filed its request for a temporary injunction on January 8, 2008 – one day
before the LFUCG’s responses were due to the PSC and the same day LFUCG had
scheduled the closed hearing. Consequently, the trial court was unable to fully
litigate the merits of challenged action. But it does not appear clear that the issue
is inherently evasive of review. While this particular controversy had passed after
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the response deadline had passed, we are not entirely convinced that the LFUCG
made a timely pursuit of its claim for declaratory judgment on this matter.
Moreover, the LUFCG has not shown that the courts should address
the issue because of the likelihood of repetition. In addressing this element,
Kentucky courts have focused on the probability of the same controversy arising
again. In Lexington Herald-Leader Co., Inc. v. Meigs, 660 S.W.2d 658 (Ky.
1983), the matter involved a trial court’s closure of voir dire proceedings in a
criminal prosecution involving the death penalty. The Kentucky Supreme Court
recognized that individual criminal trials are typically of a short duration, but the
trial courts are faced with death penalty actions on a regular basis. “The problem
of when to hold individual voir dire in such cases, together with the important
questions this raises related to public access, and more particularly news media
access, to criminal trials, will likewise be with us.” Id. at 661. Thus, the Supreme
Court addressed the merits of the claim even though the particular criminal
prosecution had concluded. See e.g. Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852
(Ky. 2005) (Supreme Court addressed constitutionality of public services
continuation plan where same situation had recurred three times in past ten years);
and Woods v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2004) (Supreme Court
addressed authority of judicially-appointed guardian to make health care decisions
on behalf of the patient even though patient had already died).
But in Philpot v. Patton, supra, the Kentucky Supreme Court declined
to address the constitutionality of a Senate Rule after the legislature had adjourned.
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Since the rule expired at the end of the session, the Court noted that a similar rule
would have to be re-enacted at the next session. In addition, the new rule would
have to be invoked regarding particular legislation before a justiciable controversy
could arise. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that it could
not address the constitutional question in the absence of a specific controversy
regarding the application of the rule. Id. at 494. See also Commonwealth v.
Hughes, 873 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1994) (Supreme Court declined to address
controversy regarding confidentiality of communications between parishioners and
church would not be addressed where there was no reasonable expectation that
Commonwealth would again be subject to denial of the discovery materials
sought).
In this case, the LFUCG is seeking a blanket declaration that the
litigation exception applies to all administrative proceedings. However, the Open
Meetings Act envisions that this exception would apply to matters commonly
inherent to litigation, such as preparation, strategy or tactics. Floyd County Board
of Education v. Ratliff, 955 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Ky. 1997). Administrative
proceedings, on the other hand, encompass a broad range of subjects and
procedures. The LFUCG notes that the statutory framework for administrative
proceedings in KRS Chapter 13B mirrors the same principles of adversarial due
process as those practiced in trial courts. However, Chapter 13B expressly
excludes many administrative proceedings, including utility hearings conducted
under the authority of the PSC. KRS 13B.020(3)(d)5b. Given the wide range of
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administrative proceedings and procedures, we could not determine the broad
application of the litigation exception without considerable speculation.
Likewise, the application of the litigation exception to proceedings
before the PSC presents many variables. The Open Meetings Act requires that all
meetings of a quorum of a public agency “at which any public business is
discussed or at which any action is taken by the agency, shall be public meetings,
open to the public at all times…” KRS 61.810(1). The Act sets out specific
exceptions to this rule, including “[d]iscussions of proposed or pending litigation
against or on behalf of the public agency”. KRS 61.810(1)(c). These exceptions
must be strictly construed. Floyd County Board of Education v. Ratliff, supra at
924.
The current case involves a local government’s intervention into a
utility’s petition for a certificate of need and necessity before the PSC. A regulated
utility must obtain the certificate prior to commencing construction on a new
facility. KRS 278.020(1). Any interested party may request to intervene in the
petition and participate in the proceedings. KRS 278.020(8). However, an
“interested” party need not be an adversarial party. Furthermore, the focus of the
proceeding is limited to a determination of whether there is a need and demand for
the public service in question. See Public Service Commission v. City of Paris, 299
S.W.2d 811, 816 (Ky. 1957). Finally, the PSC may apply different procedures for
different types of applications.
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Given the unique and specific nature of this controversy, the LFUCG
has not shown that a similarly-situated party will be subject to the same action
again or even that this precise factual scenario could be duplicated. Consequently,
the LFUCG’s declaratory judgment action must be dismissed until this situation is
again presented. And if the same situation arises again, we would urge the parties
and the trial court to expedite the proceedings on this issue.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Rochelle E. Boland
Leslye M Bowman
Lexington, Kentucky
Thomas W. Miller
Lexington, Kentucky
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