MCDANIEL (BEVERLY), ET AL. VS. MODY (BHARATI)
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001995-MR
BEVERLY MCDANIEL AND
THOMAS AMOS, INDIVIDUALLY;
BEVERLY MCDANIEL AND THOMAS
AMOS, CO-ADMINISTRATORS OF
THE ESTATE OF ANNA AMOS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHIL PATTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00732
BHARATI MODY, M.D.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Beverly McDaniel and Thomas Amos, Individually and as
Co-Administrators of the Estate of Anna Amos [hereinafter “Plaintiffs”], appeal
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
from various orders of the Barren Circuit Court whereby the trial court issued
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 11 sanctions against Plaintiffs’ attorney,
David W. Son, and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial or to alter, amend, or
vacate the order imposing sanctions. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s
actions in this matter, we affirm.
On September 28, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice suit
against Bharati Mody, M.D. and T.J. Samson Community Hospital. In their
complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Dr. Mody and T.J. Samson Community Hospital
deviated from the standard of care when they failed to provide Beverly McDaniel
and her unborn child, Anna Amos, with adequate medical care during McDaniel’s
pregnancy. McDaniel ultimately delivered the child prematurely and the child
died.
Upon initiation of the claim, the parties engaged in discovery, which
included exchanging interrogatories and conducting depositions. On August 22,
2006, Plaintiffs’ counsel, David W. Son, filed an Expert Witness Disclosure
pleading pursuant to CR 26.02(4). In this pleading, Son stated that he expected to
call two expert witnesses to establish the Plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claim: (1)
Dr. Jeffrey J. Pomerance, and (2) Dr. William T. Baldwin. Dr. Baldwin was an
economist expected to testify about the economic loss suffered by Plaintiffs as a
result of the death of Anna Amos. Dr. Pomerance was to testify as follows at trial:
Dr. Pomerance specializes in neonatal/perinatal
medicine. Dr. Pomerance is expected to testify regarding
the negligent and sub-standard medical care received by
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Ms. McDaniel from her treating OB/GYN, Dr. Bharati
Mody, and by T.J. Samson Community Hospital staff and
employees. Dr. Pomerance is expected to testify that as a
result of numerous deviations of the standard of care and
negligent care provided by the aforementioned
defendants, Ms. McDaniel delivered her child, Anna
Amos, in her home after which Anna passed away and
was unable to be revived.
Dr. Pomerance is also expected to testify that the
failure to provide the basic standard of medical care by
the defendants, and their failure to document telephone
calls, contacts and care provided to Ms. McDaniel was
well below the standard of care for medical care
providers. The basic medical care required for Ms.
McDaniel for the complaints alleged herein is to perform
a speculum exam to evaluate bleeding and then to
perform a digital exam of the cervix to evaluate dilation.
None of these procedures were performed by any of the
defendants at the relevant times herein.
Dr. Pomerance is expected to testify that on
September 29, 2003, Ms. McDaniel treated at T.J.
Samson Community Hospital with complaints of
bleeding. The record merely notes “no visible bleeding
on perineum,” but there is no documentation as to
whether Ms. McDaniel was having a little spotting on
toilet paper, seeing blood drip into the toilet, passing
blood with bowel movements, or any other
documentation. The only affirmative documentation is
that Ms. McDaniel did not have blood in her urine (per
urinalysis). Dr. Pomerance is expected to testify that Ms.
McDaniel should have had a speculum exam to assess
whether there was any bleeding, bleeding from the
cervix, or if there was bleeding from another part of the
vagina, such as a ruptured vaginal cyst. No hospital staff
or employee performed a digital exam of Ms. McDaniel’s
cervix to assess any dilation. Such an exam is
contraindicated until the source of bleeding has been
evaluated. Ms. McDaniel was discharged with a normal
urinalysis with no diagnosis or explanation of her
complaints.
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....
Dr. Pomerance is expected to testify that the lack
of medical care received by Ms. McDaniel from her
treating OB/GYN, Dr. Bharati Mody, is clearly below the
standard of care and negligent medical practices [sic].
Dr. Mody’s acknowledgement at her deposition of
receiving several phone calls of complaints from Ms.
McDaniel, yet not putting any of them in her medical
records, as well as seeing the patient for an evaluation, all
supports this opinion. Dr. Mody even testified that her
own standard of care for Ms. McDaniel, who was
described as an at-risk patient, was not followed by Dr.
Mody. Dr. Mody’s regular office practices of keeping
medical records and notations of care were also
conspicuously not followed and the records are
completely inadequate and fall will below the standard of
care.
Dr. Pomerance is also expected to testify that had
Ms. McDaniel received the basic minimum medical care
by her treating medical care providers, numerous means
of prolonging the pregnancy and saving the child were
present, and that had she received the basic minimum
standard of medical care, that Ms. McDaniel’s daughter,
Anna Amos, would have had more than a viable chance
to survive and be alive today.
Thereafter, the parties continued to prepare for trial and engaged in
mediation. On October 20, 2006, Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their claim against
T.J. Samson Community Hospital. A March 7, 2007, trial date was set for the
remaining parties.
On numerous occasions prior to trial, Dr. Mody’s counsel attempted
to schedule a deposition with Dr. Pomerance. However, Son was never able to
produce Dr. Pomerance for any deposition dates. Eventually, Plaintiffs agreed to
dismiss their remaining claim against Dr. Mody on March 20, 2007, as they were
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unable to produce an expert to support their claim of medical malpractice. See
Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Ky. 1992) (general rule is that expert
testimony is required to establish liability in medical malpractice cases in absence
of admissions by defendant doctor or res ipsa loquitur).
On March 19, 2008, nearly a year after the case was dismissed, Dr.
Mody filed a motion for CR 11 sanctions against Plaintiffs’ attorney, Son. Dr.
Mody’s counsel stated that he had obtained an ethics opinion allowing him to
contact the Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Pomerance. Having contacted and spoken with
Dr. Pomerance, Dr. Mody’s counsel alleged that Dr. Pomerance never tendered the
opinions set forth in the Plaintiffs’ Expert Disclosure pleading filed with the trial
court on August 22, 2006. In light of the fact that Plaintiffs were forced to dismiss
their medical malpractice claim after two and one-half years of needless litigation
for lack of expert corroboration, Dr. Mody moved that Plaintiffs’ counsel, Son, be
sanctioned pursuant to CR 11 for filing a pleading that was not “well grounded in
fact” and for filing a pleading “for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” CR 11.
On May 13, 2008, the trial court entered a pre-hearing order setting a
hearing on Dr. Mody’s motion for CR 11 sanctions for July 1, 2008, and requiring
the parties to prepare and submit pre-hearing statements and disclosures. That
same day, Son responded to Dr. Mody’s motion for CR 11 sanctions, specifically
conceding that the trial court had authority and jurisdiction to rule on the motion.
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Son argued that no violation of CR 11 had occurred and that sanctions were not
appropriate in this matter.
On July 1, 2008, a hearing was conducted. Dr. Pomerance testified by
telephone. After reviewing his records, Dr. Pomerance stated that he could find
nothing which indicated that he ever reviewed or received payment for the review
of Plaintiffs’ case. He testified that he would have required medical records, which
he did not have in this case, prior to the rendering of any medical opinions. He
further stated that even if he had been given McDaniel’s medical records, he never
would have rendered the opinions attributed to him in Plaintiffs’ Expert Disclosure
pleading since he is not an obstetrician and would not be qualified to give such
opinions. In fact, Dr. Pomerance specifically contended that the statements in
Plaintiffs’ Expert Disclosures pleading were “totally wrong” and that he “would
never have given anybody opinions of that sort.”
Under cross-examination by Son, Dr. Pomerance admitted that it was
possible he had spoken with Son and that he had transmitted a copy of his resume
to Son. However, Dr. Pomerance was adamant that he did not give any of the
opinions set forth in the Plaintiffs’ Expert Disclosure, explaining that such
opinions were “all in obstetrics and I would never have said any of these things
you quote me as saying.” Maintaining that he had no recollection of ever speaking
with Son, Dr. Pomerance opined that at most, he might have rendered an opinion
as to the viability of a fetus of a certain age since neonatology was his area of
expertise.
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Son also testified at this hearing, claiming that he in fact had several
conversations with Dr. Pomerance regarding the statements set forth in the
Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness Disclosure pleading. However, Son was unable to
produce any phone records, emails, or notes to support his claim. Son explained
that the phone records were destroyed after two months and that the notes were
subject to attorney-client privilege. When asked about his paralegal who allegedly
participated in this contact with Dr. Pomerance, Son explained that she was not
available to testify as Son needed her to remain at his office that day.
After considering and summarizing the evidence set forth above, the
trial court found that Son did not have a reasonable basis for the statements
attributed to Dr. Pomerance in the August 22, 2006, Expert Witness Disclosure
pleading that was signed and filed by Son. After considering an affidavit from the
office manager/bookkeeper of the law firm utilized by Dr. Mody to defend this
lawsuit, the trial court determined that this improper filing caused Dr. Mody to
incur $19,591.04 in needless legal fees and expenses. Accordingly, the trial court
entered an order on July 23, 2008, concluding that Son had violated CR 11and as
such, Son was ordered to reimburse Dr. Mody’s insurance company $19,591.04.
On August 4, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial or to alter,
amend, or vacate the trial court’s July 23, 2008, order mandating sanctions against
Son. On August 20, 2008, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial
or to alter, amend, or vacate its July 23, 2008 order, but did grant Plaintiffs a
hearing on the proper amount of sanctions to be imposed against Son. On October
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7, 2008, the office manager/bookkeeper for the law office utilized by Dr. Mody
testified regarding the amount of legal fees and expenses incurred by Dr. Mody in
the defense of this case. Dr. Mody’s primary attorney also testified.
On October 9, 2008, the trial court entered an order affirming the CR
11 sanctions imposed against Son. In this order, the trial court found that Son’s
filing of the false CR 26.02 disclosures needlessly prolonged this litigation and as
such, Dr. Mody was entitled to recover all legal fees and expenses incurred by her
from the date the false disclosures were made, August 22, 2006, to the date the
agreed Order of Dismissal was entered, March 20, 2007. Since testimony
submitted at the October 7, 2008, hearing confirmed that Dr. Mody in fact incurred
$19,591.04 in legal fees and expenses during this time period, the trial court
affirmed the sanctions imposed in its July 23, 2008, order.
Plaintiffs now appeal to this Court from the October 9, 2008, order
affirming sanctions, the August 20, 2008, order denying their motion for a new
trial or to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court’s July 23, 2008, order, and the July
23, 2008, order imposing sanctions. They claim the trial court committed
reversible error in imposing CR 11 sanctions against Son and in allowing Dr.
Pomerance to testify via telephone. For the reasons set forth herein, we disagree.
We first address Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in
permitting Dr. Pomerance to testify via telephone. Plaintiffs complain that
allowing Dr. Pomerance to testify in this fashion was unfair and not in
conformance with CR 32.01(c). However, CR 32.01(c) is inapplicable to the
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determination of this issue as this rule simply sets forth when a deposition may be
used at trial. Plaintiffs cite to no rule or authority which actually prohibits the use
of telephonic testimony in Kentucky courts.
In fact, the use of telephonic testimony in civil matters is common in
this Commonwealth. CR 43.04(1) directs that, unless otherwise provided, “the
testimony of witnesses shall be heard under oath and orally in open court.” While
not physically present at the hearing, Dr. Pomerance’s testimony was live, oral,
under oath, and before the open court. There is no dispute or implication that the
person who testified via telephone at the July 1, 2008, hearing was not Dr.
Pomerance. Nor is there any question as to whether Dr. Pomerance testified of his
own volition and free will. Further, Plaintiffs were granted full opportunity and
leeway to cross-examine and confront Dr. Pomerance in open court. Upon careful
consideration, we hold that Dr. Pomerance’s testimony met the minimum
requirements of CR 43.04(1) and thus, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial
court committed reversible error in permitting the telephonic testimony.
Even if we were to assume that Dr. Pomerance’s telephonic testimony
was not sufficient to satisfy the standard of submitting testimony “under oath and
orally in open court” pursuant to CR 43.04(1), the testimony was admissible under
CR 43.12. CR 43.12 permits motions to be heard via affidavit, or at the trial
court’s discretion, via “oral testimony or depositions.” In this case, both the oral
testimony and affidavit of Dr. Pomerance were submitted for the trial court’s
consideration. Accordingly, the trial court did not commit reversible error in
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utilizing Dr. Pomerance’s testimony through either or both of these mediums for
the purpose of determining whether Son violated CR 11. Plaintiffs’ arguments to
the contrary are overruled.
We next consider Plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court committed
reversible error in the imposition of CR 11 sanctions against Son. CR 11 provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
[t]he signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion
or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
A trial court is authorized to impose sanctions against any party or attorney who
violates this rule. CR 11 (“If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction . . . .”).
In Clark Equip. Co., Inc. v. Bowman, 762 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. App.
1988), this Court explained that the imposition of CR 11 sanctions should be
reserved for “exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 420. “The test to be used by the
trial court in considering a motion for sanctions is whether the attorney's conduct,
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at the time he or she signed the allegedly offending pleading or motion, was
reasonable under the circumstances.” Id.
This Court utilizes multiple standards of review when CR 11
sanctions are imposed. Bowman, 762 S.W.2d at 421. The trial court’s findings are
reviewed for clear error, but the legal conclusion that a violation of CR 11 occurred
is reviewed de novo. Id. As for the standard when reviewing “the type and/or
amount of sanctions imposed,” a trial court’s determination will not be set aside
unless there is an abuse of discretion. Id.
Plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s legal finding that Son’s signature
on the August 22, 2006, Expert Disclosure pleading was unreasonable under the
circumstances. To support their argument, Plaintiffs point to testimony submitted
by Son which indicated that Son did speak with Dr. Pomerance prior to the filing
of the disclosure and that Dr. Pomerance did agree to be an expert in this case.
Plaintiffs further state that Son actually consulted with another expert, Dr. Kathryn
A. Cashner, and that it was Dr. Cashner who was the source of the opinions
attributed to Dr. Pomerance in the disclosure. Son testified that he discussed Dr.
Cashner’s opinions with Dr. Pomerance. He further stated that after this
discussion, he was under the impression that Dr. Pomerance agreed with Dr.
Cashner’s opinions.
While the above would have been acceptable evidence on which to
premise a finding of reasonableness by Son, the trial court was well within its
discretion to reject this testimony in favor of Dr. Pomerance’s testimony that he
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never would have rendered or agreed with such opinions. Plaintiffs contend the
trial court was obligated to favor the testimony of Son in light of inconsistencies
between Dr. Pomerance’s affidavit and his testimony at the hearing. In his
affidavit, Dr. Pomerance stated that he was never contacted at anytime by Son or
Son’s staff. However, at hearing, Dr. Pomerance conceded that he may have
talked to Son at some point since Son had a copy of his resume and was familiar
with the fact that Dr. Pomerance was out of the country in August 2006.
It is axiomatic that credibility determinations are solely within the
province of the fact finder. See CR 52.01; Commonwealth v. Smith, 5 S.W.3d 126,
129 (Ky. 1999). It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find the
testimony of Dr. Pomerance more credible than the testimony of Son. It should be
noted that Dr. Pomerance was consistent in his testimony that he did not recall ever
speaking with Son or his staff. It was also undisputed that Dr. Pomerance never
received medical records from Son or his staff, which Dr. Pomerance testified
would have been required before he rendered opinions in any case. Conceding that
he may have talked to Son or his staff briefly at some point was not fatal to the
crux of Dr. Pomerance’s testimony, nor did this admission preclude the trial court
from utilizing this testimony to support its conclusion that Son violated CR 11 by
filing an expert disclosure statement that was not formed after reasonable inquiry
or well grounded in fact. After careful review of this record, we find no error as a
matter of law in the trial court’s conclusion that CR 11 sanctions were warranted in
this case.
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Plaintiffs next argue the trial court erred in failing to grant their
August 4, 2008, motion for a new trial, or to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court’s
order imposing CR 11 sanctions. They claim they were entitled to a new trial
pursuant to CR 59.01(g) on grounds of “newly discovered evidence.” CR 59.01(g)
provides that “newly discovered evidence” can be grounds for a new trial, but only
if the evidence “could not, with reasonable diligence, have [been] discovered and
produced at the trial.”
The “newly discovered evidence” offered by Plaintiffs is the
discovery of a tax identification number for Dr. Pomerance in Son’s files and the
willingness of Son’s paralegal to testify as to the contact made by Son and his staff
with Dr. Pomerance. Both of these items could have easily been discovered and
produced at the July 1, 2008, hearing in this matter. Accordingly, we find no abuse
of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ CR 59.01(g) motion for a new
trial on grounds of “newly discovered evidence.” See Glidewell v. Glidewell, 859
S.W.2d 675, 677 (Ky. App. 1993) (“The trial court is granted broad discretion in
ruling on a CR 59.01 motion based on newly discovered evidence.”).
In their final argument, Plaintiffs contend that the amount of sanctions
awarded in this matter was an abuse of discretion. They argue that they were not
given sufficient opportunity in which to examine Dr. Mody’s legal bills or to crossexamine Dr. Mody’s attorneys as to the content of these bills. However, on August
20, 2008, the trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial on the issue of
determining the proper amount of sanctions to be imposed against Son. At this
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hearing, Plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to review detailed billing records
and to cross-examine both the office manager/bookkeeper of the law firm
employed by Dr. Mody and Dr. Mody’s primary attorney.
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that several of the charges admitted at this
hearing were either duplicative or excessive. They further argue that the primary
attorney’s supervisor, who also billed time, was not present or made available to
testify. Upon careful review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
calculation of sanctions. Plaintiffs were afforded ample opportunity to review and
cross-examine witnesses regarding the proper calculation of sanctions against Son.
Nothing submitted by the Plaintiffs in this appeal is sufficient to warrant setting
aside the trial court’s findings on this issue.
Finding no reversible error by the trial court, we hereby affirm the
Barren Circuit Court’s October 9, 2008, order affirming CR 11 sanctions against
Plaintiffs’ attorney, David W. Son, the August 20, 2008, order denying Plaintiffs’
motion for new trial or to alter, amend, or vacate the trial court’s July 23, 2008,
order, and the July 23, 2008, order imposing sanctions.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David W. Son
Louisville, Kentucky
Jason E. Taylor
Louisville, Kentucky
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