SINGLETON (RUBEN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001907-MR
RUBEN SINGLETON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-000422, NO. 06-CR-002214,
AND NO. 06-CR-002696
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: CAPERTON AND DIXON, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Appellant Ruben Singleton was convicted by a
Jefferson Circuit Court jury of one count of receiving stolen property valued at
over $300 and one count of receiving stolen property valued at under $300. For
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
these crimes, Singleton received a total sentence of three years and nine months,
probated for a period of five years. Singleton now appeals the judgment to this
Court as a matter of right. Because the Commonwealth did not present sufficient
evidence to convict Singleton of receiving stolen property, we reverse the trial
court’s judgment and remand for dismissal of the indictment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Sections of copper guttering at Byck Elementary School began
disappearing in March 2005. In early September 2005, Byck’s plant manager
contacted Steve Cheatham, a security investigator for the Jefferson County Public
Schools, to document the missing guttering for insurance purposes. Through
various inquiries, Cheatham found that Singleton had sold copper guttering to
Freedom Metals. Cheatham asked the manager of Freedom Metals to contact him
if Singleton returned to sell additional copper. On October 1, the same day that the
school’s plant manager reported that more copper guttering had been taken, the
manager of Freedom Metals informed Cheatham that Singleton was at Freedom
Metals attempting to sell copper guttering. Cheatham instructed the manager to
buy the material and hold it until Cheatham could conduct further investigation.
Cheatham and Officer Kessinger, a detective with the Louisville
Metro Police Department, went to Freedom Metals to inspect the copper that
Singleton had sold to the store. Thereafter, police arrested Singleton and brought
him to the police station. Officer Kessinger testified that he did not believe that an
arrest warrant had been served. As explained by Officer Kessinger, Singleton had
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“open charges” and needed to be interviewed in order to have “actual charges”
placed against him. While at the station, Singleton signed a rights waiver form and
gave a taped statement to Officer Kessinger. In the statement, Singleton denied
taking the copper guttering from Byck, and said that he received the guttering from
a man named Rob. Singleton and Rob had agreed that Singleton would sell the
copper and divide the profits. Singleton also stated that he did not know if the
guttering was stolen from Byck, but admitted that he suspected that the guttering
might be stolen when he heard that a reward had been offered relating to the Byck
guttering.
Singleton was indicted and charged with one count of receiving stolen
property valued at over $300 for the time period of September 24, 2005 through
September 27, 2005. Subsequently, he was also indicted and charged with being a
persistent felony offender in the second degree, as well as three counts of theft by
unlawful taking of property valued at over $300 and one count of receiving stolen
property valued at over $300 for the time period between September 28, 2005 and
October 4, 2005.
Singleton’s case went to a jury trial, and prior to seating the jury, a
suppression hearing was held regarding Singleton’s taped statement at the police
station. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the police had
probable cause to arrest Singleton for receiving stolen property before taking his
statement and that Singleton knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.
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The jury acquitted Singleton of all of the theft charges, but found him
guilty of one count of receiving stolen property valued at over $300 for being in
possession of copper guttering between September 24 and 27, 2005, and one count
of receiving stolen property valued at under $300 for being in possession of copper
guttering between September 28 and October 4, 2005. Thereafter, the trial court
conducted a joint persistent felony offender and sentencing proceeding. The jury
ultimately found Singleton not guilty of being a persistent felony offender and
fixed his sentence at three years and nine months for the felony offense. The court
imposed this sentence, but probated the sentence for five years. The court also
imposed a $250 fine for the misdemeanor offense and assessed court costs.
Thereafter, Singleton filed a timely notice of appeal of the final judgment.
DISCUSSION
Singleton argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence that the copper material sold by Singleton was the same copper guttering
that had been stolen from Byck and failed to present sufficient evidence of the
value of the copper to support the felony conviction. We agree.
The Commonwealth has the burden of proving every element of a
criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. KRS 500.070. When reviewing the
denial of a directed verdict, this Court must determine whether, taking the evidence
as a whole, “it would be clearly unreasonable for the jury to find guilt.”
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). The test is the same
when the sole evidence of guilt is circumstantial. Bussell v. Commonwealth, 882
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S.W.2d 111, 114 (Ky. 1994). Further, “[r]eversal of a judgment of conviction on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment precludes
retrial of the defendant for the same offense.” Coomer v. Commonwealth, 694
S.W.2d 471, 472 (Ky. App. 1985) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98
S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978)).
Kentucky courts have addressed the identification of copper in cases
with facts similar to those involved in this case. In Beasley v. Commonwealth, 339
S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1960), Beasley was convicted of grand larceny for theft of copper
wire from poles along railroad tracks. He appealed, arguing that the evidence did
not sufficiently link the copper wire sold by him to the stolen copper wire. The
Commonwealth provided evidence that Beasley sold sixty-one pounds of copper,
while approximately sixty-two pounds had been stolen from the railroad poles.
Additionally, Beasley sold No. 6 gauge wire, and the Commonwealth provided
testimony that No. 6 gauge wire was not used widely by businesses other than the
railroad industry, with railroads being “practically the only place” where that
particular gauge of copper wire was utilized.
Here, it was unreasonable for the jury to find Singleton guilty of
receiving stolen property because the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence that the property sold by Singleton was the same property stolen from
Byck. KRS 514.110(1) states that:
A person is guilty of receiving stolen property when he
receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or having reason
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to believe that it has been stolen, unless the property is
received, retained, or disposed of with intent to restore it
to the owner.
Therefore, the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Singleton possessed copper guttering which belonged to the Jefferson County
Public Schools. While the general manager at Freedom Metals testified that it was
unusual that the copper sold by Singleton still had the manufacturer’s stamp on it,
the Commonwealth presented no evidence that either Cheatham or Officer
Kessinger attempted to compare or match the stamp with the copper guttering
remaining at Byck. Additionally, neither the police nor any school employees
measured the amount of copper guttering that had been taken to compare to the
amount sold by Singleton. Rather, the police and the school system simply made
visual inspections from ground level. As stated by the Court in Beasley, the
“identification of stolen property detected in the possession of an accused must be
established by testimony as direct and positive as the particular case permits.”
Beasley, 339 S.W.2d at 180. Apart from Singleton’s statement that he “had
suspicions” about whether the copper might be stolen, the sum total of proof
presented to the jury regarding Singleton’s possession of stolen property in this
case, was that he sold scrap copper on or near the dates that similar copper was
stolen from Byck Elementary School grounds and that he sometimes stayed in an
apartment near the school. It was within the Commonwealth’s ability in this case
to determine the amount of stolen guttering and to ascertain any unique
characteristics that would have connected the copper sold by Singleton to the
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copper stolen from Byck. Their failure to do so warranted a directed verdict of
acquittal due to insufficient evidence regarding the receiving stolen property
offenses.
Additionally, the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence
of the value of the copper to support the felony conviction, as the only evidence
presented was hearsay that did not fall under any recognized exception. In the
course of his investigations, Cheatham asked Wes Rodgers, a roof and gutter
repairman for the school system, the cost of a linear foot of copper in September
2005. Rodgers provided the following handwritten note: “FOR MATERIAL
ONLY $23.71 PER FOOT” and “Total 680 ft $16,122.80.” Cheatham added a
parenthetical notation when he received the estimate: “(copper).” Rodgers did not
appear as a witness in the trial, and the Commonwealth provided no information as
to how Rodgers arrived at those totals. While defense counsel objected to the
introduction of these amounts, the trial court ruled that the Commonwealth could
present testimony concerning the estimate Cheatham received from Rodgers. The
trial court also allowed the Commonwealth to introduce the handwritten note as an
exhibit over defense counsel’s objection.
The note was “a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial . . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted,” which was that the value of a linear foot of copper was to be determined
by the dollar estimate listed in the note. KRS 801(c). See Salinas v.
Commonwealth, 84 S.W.3d 913 (Ky. 2002), and Gosser v. Commonwealth, 31
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S.W.3d 897 (Ky. 2000) (diagrams prepared out-of-court by absent witnesses or
based on information furnished by absent witnesses were inadmissible hearsay).
Although the Commonwealth argues that the owner of property in a receiving
stolen property prosecution may provide information and opinion regarding the
value of the subject property, the case cited by the Commonwealth does not deal
with hearsay, but rather with the actual testimony of the owner at trial. Phillips v.
Commonwealth, 679 S.W.2d 235 (Ky. 1984). Further, Kentucky courts have
consistently held that “there is no separate rule, as such, which is an investigative
hearsay exception to the hearsay rule” unless an officer is testifying “about
information furnished to him only where it tends to explain the action that was
taken by the police officer as a result of this information and the taking of that
action is an issue in the case.” Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 541
(Ky. 1988) (emphasis original) (overruled on other grounds by Hudson v.
Commonwealth, 202 S.W.3d 17 (Ky. 2006)). That is clearly not the case in this
situation. Because the statement does not fall under any hearsay exception, and
because this was the only evidence introduced by the Commonwealth with regard
to the value of the copper, the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence
of value to support the felony conviction.
Because we reverse on the insufficiency of the evidence, we do not
reach Singleton’s other assignments of error.
CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
is reversed and, because Coomer precludes retrial of Singleton for the same
offenses, the case is remanded to that court for dismissal of the indictment.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Elizabeth B. McMahon
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
W. Bryan Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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