WOODS (INGRID) VS. WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001825-MR
INGRID WOODS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVE ALAN WILSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-01788
WESTERN KENTUCKY
UNIVERSITY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, STUMBO, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Ingrid Woods appeals from a directed verdict entered by
the Warren Circuit Court in favor of Western Kentucky University (WKU) in a
case of alleged race discrimination. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Woods received bachelor of science and master of education degrees
from WKU and was, at all times relevant to this action, a doctoral candidate in
higher education administration at the University of Louisville. From 1999 until
her resignation in 2006, Woods was employed as the assistant director for the
academic advising and retention center (AARC) at WKU. She acted as the interim
director for the AARC from 2004 until 2006, while the job search for the position
of director was in process.
In 1999, the educational qualifications for the position of director of
the AARC required a master degree. In 2005, the qualifications were changed to
require a doctorate degree in an academic core area and faculty experience, which
Woods did not possess - either at the time the position was filled, or at the time of
the filing of this suit. Woods applied, but was not chosen for the position of
director. She then filed this action claiming that the change in qualifications for
the director’s position was racially motivated, in violation of the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act (KCRA).
At the close of Woods’ case-in-chief, WKU moved for a directed
verdict. After providing Woods’ counsel time to prepare a written response, the
trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. Applying to Woods’ claim the
burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Kentucky
Ctr. for the Arts v. Handley, 827 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Ky.App. 1991), the trial court
granted the motion for a directed verdict after making the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law:
(1) During the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, there was no
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factual evidence presented that WKU changed the position
requirements for the director of the AARC to require a
doctorate degree for any racially discriminatory reason.
(2) There is not a scintilla of evidence developed by the
plaintiff to show [that] WKU did not promote Woods on
the basis of race.
(3) The plaintiff cannot rely upon speculation to prove
pretext under the KCRA.
(4) Requiring credentials for the vacant director position
that the plaintiff did not possess (i.e., faculty experience
and a doctorate degree) was insufficient to prove that the
position requirements were motivated by race.
Woods’ motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment was denied. This appeal
followed.
As stated in Sutton v. Combs, 419 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1967), the
purpose of a motion for a directed verdict is:
[T]o save the time and trouble involved in a lengthy
jury determination when (1) there is a complete
absence of pleading or proof on an issue or issues
material to the cause of action or defense, or (2)
there are no controverted issues of fact upon which
reasonable men could differ. When [a] motion is
made the trial court must consider the evidence in
its strongest light in favor of the party against whom
the motion was made and must give him the
advantage of every fair and reasonable intendment
that the evidence can justify. On appeal, the appellate
court considers the evidence in the same light.
With regards to Woods’ civil rights claim, Kentucky courts have
“consistently interpreted the civil rights provisions of KRS1 Chapter 344 consistent
with the applicable federal anti-discrimination laws.” Williams v. Wal-Mart
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Stores, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Ky. 2005). As a result, the courts have relied
upon federal cases applying Title VII in addressing claims under the KCRA. See
id.
As stated by the Kentucky Supreme Court:
There are two paths for a plaintiff seeking to
establish a [race] discrimination case. One path
consists of direct evidence of discriminatory animus.
Absent direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff
must satisfy the burden-shifting test of McDonnell
Douglas. The reasoning behind the McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting approach is to allow a
victim of discrimination to establish a case through
inferential and circumstantial proof.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
In this case, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach
provides a framework for evaluating the merits of Woods’ claim. Thus:
An employment discrimination action unfolds
in three stages. First, the plaintiff must make a prima
facie case of discrimination by offering proof that
1) she is a member of a protected class, 2) she is
qualified for and applied for an available position,
3) she did not receive the job, and 4) the position
remained open and the employer sought other
applicants. Second, the employer must then
articulate a “legitimate nondiscriminatory” reason
for its action. Third, once such a reason is given,
it is incumbent on the employee to demonstrate
that the stated reason is merely a pretext to cover
the actual discrimination.
Kentucky Ctr. for the Arts, 827 S.W.2d at 699 (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
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As courts have recognized, “[t]he employer has the right to fix the
qualifications that are ‘necessary or preferred’ in selecting the employee for
promotion, and, in order to make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff must establish
that she meets these qualifications.” Brown v. First Citizens Bank, 47 F.Supp.2d
648, 653 (D.S.C. 1998) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
698 F.2d 633, 671 (4th Cir. 1983)). In the present case, the job description for the
director position was developed by Dr. Luther Hughes, who oversaw the AARC.
The job description included the requirement of a doctorate degree, which Dr.
Hughes testified was necessary in order for WKU to meet the Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools’ (SACS) accreditation standard requiring that
all academic programs be directed by persons with doctorate degrees in academic
core areas. Moreover, Dr. Hughes testified that the requirement of a doctorate
degree would give instant credibility to the director’s position among faculty
members, and would improve academic advising.
Woods was objectively unqualified for the position, since she did not
possess a doctorate degree or faculty experience at the time she applied. After
considering Woods’ arguments and reviewing the evidence in its strongest light in
favor of Woods, we conclude that she is unable to meet the burden of establishing
a prima facie case of discrimination as a matter of law.
Even if Woods could make a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden would then shift to WKU to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its employment decision. See Williams, 184 S.W.3d at 497. “The defendant
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bears only the burden of production and this involves no credibility assessments.”
Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120
S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Here, the reasons provided for
changing the qualification requirements, as articulated by Dr. Hughes, suffice so as
to satisfy WKU’s burden under McDonnell Douglas.
Since WKU met its burden, Woods must demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the stated reasons are merely a pretext to mask
actual discrimination. See id. Woods “may demonstrate that the defendant’s
explanation was merely pretext by showing (1) that the proffered reason had no
basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reason did not actually motivate [the
employment decision], or (3) that the proffered reason was not sufficient to
motivate [the employment decision].” Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752,
759 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
As explained by the Kentucky Supreme Court:
The ultimate question is whether the employer
intentionally discriminated, and proof that “the
employer’s proffered reason is unpersuasive, or
even obviously contrived, does not necessarily
establish that the plaintiff’s proffered reason . . .
is correct.” In other words, “[i]t is not enough
. . . to dis believe the employer; the factfinder
must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of
intentional discrimination.”
Williams, 184 S.W.3d at 498-99 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47, 120 S.Ct. at
2108 (internal citations omitted)).
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At trial, Woods argued that WKU’s asserted compliance with the
SACS in 2004, when the director of the AARC did not possess a doctorate degree
in an academic core area, was evidence that WKU’s claim of changing the
educational requirements in order to comply with the SACS accreditation
standards was pretextual. In addition, Woods asserted her belief that she was
qualified for the position and placed significance on the fact that she served as the
interim director of the AARC.
By contrast, WKU presented evidence that the SACS Committee had
“grave concerns” about WKU’s accreditation with regards to the director position.
WKU asserted that the SACS’ concern had not existed prior to 1999 because all
previous directors had been faculty members. Under Williams, even if we found
WKU’s proffered reason to be unpersuasive, proof of intentional discrimination
does not necessarily follow.
Moreover, “a plaintiff’s own opinions about her work performance or
qualifications do not sufficiently cast doubt on the legitimacy of her employer’s
proffered reasons for its employment actions.” Ost v. West Suburban Travelers
Limousine, Inc., 88 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Thus, Woods’
assertion that she “felt as though her experience and education fully qualified her
for the position of director of AARC” is not sufficient to cast doubt on the
legitimacy of WKU’s employment decision. Objectively, Woods was not qualified
for the position of director. Thus, under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
Woods did not prove her claim of discrimination.
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The order of the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David F. Broderick
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Greg N. Stivers
Scott D. Laufenberg
Bowling Green, Kentucky
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