BRIERLY (JUSTIN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 2, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001815-MR
JUSTIN BRIERLY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00206
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; THOMPSON, JUDGE; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Justin Brierly appeals from a Campbell Circuit Court
order revoking his probation.
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Upon learning that Brierly had been granted shock probation while
this appeal was pending, we ordered the parties to file responses addressing his
present status and whether this appeal should be dismissed as moot. Both parties
have filed their responses, which we have considered. It is undisputed that Brierly
is presently on shock probation under the trial court’s order of April 30, 2009. One
condition of shock probation is that he complete a 12 to 14 month residential drug
rehabilitation program in which he is now participating. There was no such
condition in the original probation order.
The Commonwealth argues that this appeal is moot because Brierly is
now on shock probation and any future effort to revoke his shock probation would
involve facts and circumstances different from those which underlay the decision
to revoke his original probation. Brierly argues that the appeal is not moot because
if he prevails on appeal, this Court would have the option of directing the trial
court to reinstate him to his original probation status. Brierly cites Keith v.
Commonwealth, 689 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Ky. App. 1985), which supports his
position in this regard.
This Court recently dealt with an issue of mootness in the context of a
probated defendant’s appeal in Jones v. Commonwealth, 260 S.W.3d 355 (Ky.
App. 2008). There it was written that “[a] moot case is one which seeks to get a
judgment on a pretended controversy, when in reality there is none. . . .” Id. at 358
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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In Medical Vision Group, P.S.C.
v. Philpot, 261 S.W.3d 485, 491 (Ky. 2008), this Court put it this way: “[A]n
appellate court is required to dismiss an appeal when a change in circumstance
renders that court unable to grant meaningful relief to either party.”
Applying these principles to the case before us, we conclude that this
appeal is not moot. Both the original probation order and the subsequent shock
probation order granted the appellant freedom from prison, but the original order
imposed conditions less restrictive and onerous than those imposed by the shock
probation order. If we ultimately reversed the order which revoked the original
probation order and directed the trial court to reinstate the appellant to his prior
probation status, as was done in Keith v. Commonwealth, supra, we would be
granting him meaningful relief. Consequently, we decline to dismiss this appeal as
moot and will now address the merits.
Brierly claims that the Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient
evidence to conclude that he violated the conditions of his probation. Although the
Commonwealth presented minimal evidence of probation violations, we find that
the trial court reasonably concluded that Brierly knowingly violated his probation.
In 2005, Brierly pled guilty to first-degree robbery. Although he was
only fifteen years old, Brierly was charged as an adult and sentenced to ten years’
imprisonment. In 2006, Brierly was granted shock probation. Six months later,
Brierly’s juvenile probation officer filed an affidavit alleging that Brierly violated
the conditions of probation. After a hearing on the matter, Brierly’s shock
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probation was revoked. On March 26, 2008, Brierly appeared before the trial court
pursuant to KRS 640.030 to be re-sentenced upon his eighteenth birthday. The
trial court once again granted Brierly probation.
Upon his release on probation, Brierly moved into the basement of his
father’s home. Less than five months later, his probation officer filed an affidavit
alleging that Brierly had violated his probation by possessing a gun, ammunition,
and beer. According to the affidavit, Brierly had been fully informed that neither
he nor anyone in his home could possess such items. He had also been instructed
to share his conditions of probation with his family and search the house to ensure
that no contraband was present in the home.
On July 10, 2008, Brierly’s probation officer discovered a knife and
alcohol during a home visit. At this time, Brierly was warned about these items
and informed that he was responsible for the items present in the home. On
August 13, 2008, the probation officer conducted another home visit and found a
gun and ammunition in a lock box in Brierly’s father’s bedroom closet. She also
found beer in the basement near Brierly’s sleeping quarters. These findings
resulted in the probation officer filing the affidavit mentioned above.
A revocation hearing was held August 19, 2008. Brierly stipulated
that the gun, ammunition, and alcohol were found in the home but disavowed
ownership or knowledge of their existence. Brierly’s father testified that he owned
the gun and that the alcohol belonged to his older son. Brierly’s brother also
testified that the alcohol belonged to him. The Commonwealth’s proof consisted
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of Brierly’s probation officer’s testimony, which supported the filed affidavit. On
August 26, 2008, the trial court concluded that Brierly “violated the terms and
conditions of his probation when he knowingly resided in a home where [a gun],
ammunition, and alcohol were present”. The trial court revoked Brierly’s
probation and imposed the ten-year sentence. This appeal follows.2
Our review of a trial court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s
probation is limited to whether or not the court abused its discretion. Tiryung v.
Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. App. 1986). Generally, we have
declined to find an abuse of discretion where at least one violation is supported by
evidence. Messer v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Ky. App. 1988).
Although we are skeptical that the evidence supported a finding that
Brierly knowingly possessed the gun and ammunition, we must conclude that
ample evidence existed to suggest that Brierly was knowingly in possession of the
beer. Brierly was repeatedly informed that it was his responsibility to ensure that
no alcohol or weapons were present in his residence. Further, the alcohol was
found in the basement near his sleeping quarters.
Although Brierly’s brother testified that the alcohol was his, the trial
court must only find that the violations occurred by a preponderance of the
evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, to justify probation revocation.
Rasdon v. Commonwealth, 701 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Ky. App. 1986). Due to the
2
The Commonwealth argues that Brierly failed to preserve his arguments for appeal because in
closing statements during the revocation hearing defense counsel conceded that evidence existed
that Brierly violated the terms of his probation. We are not convinced that this statement
constituted a waiver of appeal. Therefore, we will address Brierly’s arguments.
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proximity of alcohol to his sleeping quarters and personal property and the
extensive warnings that he had received, we conclude that the trial court had
sufficient evidence before it to find that Brierly knowingly violated his probation
by a preponderance of the evidence.
Although Brierly also argues that he did everything in his power to
comply with probation and that revocation was unnecessary because he planned to
leave his father’s home, we find these arguments unconvincing. Trial courts are
not required to determine whether a defendant attempted to comply with the terms
of probation. Instead, the court must only assess whether the defendant violated
the terms and conditions of probation. Likewise, the trial court is not required to
determine whether the defendant intended to continue violating probation. Here,
as we previously stated, the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to
determine that the defendant violated his probation. There was no abuse of
discretion.
Accordingly, the probation revocation order of the Campbell Circuit
Court, entered on August 26, 2008, is affirmed.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Rebecca Hobbs
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
John Paul Varo
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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