MCCLEES (BETTY), ET AL. VS. COMBS (GARY), ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 23, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001808-MR
BETTY MCCLEES;
AND BOBBY COMBS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM KNOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SAMUEL T. WRIGHT III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CI-00277
GARY COMBS;
DELENA COMBS;
AND JAMES COMBS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; VANMETER, JUDGE; LAMBERT,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Betty McClees and Bobby Combs (collectively referred to
as McClees) appeal from a summary judgment, entered by the Knott Circuit Court
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
in favor of appellees (collectively referred to as Combs), regarding ownership of
certain real property (Property) by record title or adverse possession. For the
reasons stated hereafter, we affirm.
An extensive recitation of the facts and procedural history of this
matter is unnecessary. Briefly, the action originated in 1997 when appellees’
predecessor, Stella Combs, sought a declaration of rights relating to the alleged
trespass and unauthorized mining of the Property, which consisted of some 38.42
acres including a 6.11-acre tract described in a 1995 quitclaim deed from the
Kentucky River Coal Company (KRCC) to McClees. Both parties claimed
ownership of the entire surface. Combs also claimed ownership of all mineral
rights to the entire Property, while McClees claimed ownership of the mineral
rights except as to the 6.11-acre tract.
Certain mineral royalties were placed in escrow pending the dispute’s
resolution. In June 2003, the trial court entered a partial summary judgment
finding that Combs possessed record title to the Property outside the 6.11-acre
tract. The court reserved the determination of which party held superior record
title to the 6.11-acre portion. McClees’s appeal from the partial summary
judgment was dismissed as interlocutory, and the trial court released the escrowed
funds to Combs after McClees failed to post a bond.
In September 2008, the trial court entered a final summary judgment
for Combs. Reaffirming and expanding its prior partial summary judgment, the
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court found that Combs possessed the entire Property, including the 6.11-acre tract,
by both record title and adverse possession. The Master Commissioner was
directed to execute a deed quieting title in Combs’s favor against any claim by
McClees. This appeal followed.
Summary judgment shall be granted only if “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” CR2 56.03. The trial court must view the record “in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be
resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476,
480 (Ky. 1991). Further, “a party opposing a properly supported summary
judgment motion cannot defeat it without presenting at least some affirmative
evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Id. at 482.
On review, the appellate court must determine “whether the trial court correctly
found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d
779, 781 (Ky.App. 1996).
Here, both parties adduced substantial evidence regarding the
Property’s record chain of title. Nevertheless, the record demonstrates, as found by
the trial court, that the property described in Combs’s record chain of title,
2
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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including the 6.11-acre tract, simply was not the same property described in
McClees’s record chain of title. As stated in French v. Childers, 280 Ky. 339, 133
S.W.2d 63, 63 (1939), a party challenging the title to land “must recover on the
strength of his own title” rather than on the weakness of the opponent’s title. Here,
absent proof of ownership by record title or adverse possession, McClees’s claim
to the Property must fail, and the trial court did not err by finding that no genuine
issue of material fact existed as to the superiority of Combs’s record title to the
Property’s surface and mineral rights.
We further agree with the trial court that no genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether Combs also established title to the surface of the
Property, including the 6.11-acre tract, by adversely possessing the Property for the
requisite period of time. Proof of adverse possession requires a claimant to show
possession of disputed property under a claim of right
that is hostile to the title owners interest. Further, the
possession must be shown to be actual, open and
notorious, exclusive, and continuous for a period of
fifteen years. Tarter v. Tucker, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 150,
152 (1955); Creech v. Miniard, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 432,
436 (1965); KRS 413.010. “The ‘open and notorious’
element requires that the possessor openly evince a
purpose to hold dominion over the property with such
hostility that will give the non-possessory owner notice
of the adverse claim.” Appalachian Regional
Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., Ky., 824
S.W.2d 878, 880 (1992) (citing Sweeten v. Sartin, Ky.,
256 S.W.2d 524, 526 (1953)).
Phillips v. Akers, 103 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Ky.App. 2002).
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Here, for purposes of addressing the adverse possession claim, the
trial court specifically traced the Property’s possession from 1941 until the court’s
judgment. According to the record, the Property’s surface and mineral estates
were separated in 1941, when John L. Combs sold the surface by recorded deed to
the Combs predecessors, retaining the mineral estate. Clayton Pelfrey then
purchased the surface estate by deed in 1947. It was undisputed that Pelfrey
deeded easements across the Property for a county road and power lines, that he
and his family built and lived in several houses on the Property between 1947 and
1961, and that he buried a child on the 6.11-acre tract. Between 1947 and 1961,
Pelfrey also raised livestock, gardened, and took action to clear and farm most of
the unmined portions of the Property, including parts of the 6.11-acre tract. He
temporarily mortgaged the Property in 1958, and he took steps to halt the
unauthorized cutting of trees on the Property. In 1961 Pelfrey sold the Property by
recorded deed to Stella Combs, who ultimately filed this action. Stella Combs
drilled a gas well on the Property in 1963, and either she or her tenants resided on
the Property until 1966.
Meanwhile, John L. Combs or his various lessees continuously
conducted underground mining operations on the Property between 1947 and 1961.
Chutes were constructed, ponies and mules were used in removing the coal, and
Pelfrey was employed as a night watchman in the mines. A recorded deed shows
that in 1967, the mineral estate was sold to James Combs and Jimmie Combs, who
auger mined the entire Property through 1968. At one point they paid KRCC a
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mineral royalty after unintentionally mining beyond the Property’s northern
boundary, but the record contains no indication they ever paid royalties for mining
coal on any portion of the Property, including the 6.11-acre tract. Finally, the
Combs witnesses stated that the ownership and use of the Property, including the
6.11-acre tract, was never challenged prior to McClees’s claims. McClees
confirmed the existence and location of the houses and roadway across the
Property, that the houses were occupied until the mid-1960s, and that the Property
was mined.
As noted above, proof of adverse possession requires a showing that
the claimant possessed the disputed property “under a claim of right that is hostile
to the title owner’s interest[,]” and that the possession was “actual, open and
notorious, exclusive, and continuous for a period of fifteen years.” Phillips, 103
S.W.3d at 708. Here, the undisputed evidence showed that during the nineteen
years between 1947 and 1966, Combs and the Combs predecessors actually,
openly, notoriously, exclusively and continuously possessed the entire surface of
the Property, including the 6.11-acre tract, under a claim of right which was hostile
to the interests of any other party claiming title ownership. Further, as the adverse
possession occurred under color of title, the possession extended to the entire tract
as described in the deed and as established by the survey commissioned by Combs.
See Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 824
S.W.2d 878, 8880 (Ky. 1992). Thus, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether Combs’s adverse possession of any portion of the Property’s surface,
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including the surface of the 6.11-acre tract, ripened into title by 1966. The trial
court did not err by granting summary judgment for Combs as to the issue of
adverse possession.
McClees next contends that the trial court erred by ordering the
distribution of the accrued mineral royalties. However, given our conclusion that
Combs possesses superior record title to the Property’s surface and mineral rights,
McClees’s contention on appeal regarding the trial court’s distribution of accrued
mineral royalties is rendered moot.
Next, we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to afford greater weight to the deposition testimony of one of McClees’s
witnesses. Clearly the judge, as the trier of fact, had the right to believe or not
believe the witness in whole or in part. Bissell v. Baumgardner, 236 S.W.3d 24
(Ky.App. 2007). Further, in the absence of any showing of exceptional
circumstances pursuant to CR 26.02(4)(b), the trial court properly denied
McClees’s notice to take the deposition of an expert witness whom Combs had
retained but decided not to call at trial.
Finally, we are not persuaded by McClees’s claim that error occurred
because the special circuit court judge failed to grant McClees’s motion to transfer
the proceeding to a regular circuit court judge. The special judge, who was not the
chief judge of the administrative region, possessed no authority to reassign the
case. See SCR3 1.040(1).
3
Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court.
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The summary judgment entered by the Knott Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Michael S. Endicott
Paintsville, Kentucky
Wayne F. Collier
Lexington, Kentucky
James D. Asher
Whitesburg, Kentucky
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