MINNIC (J. STAN), ET AL. VS. LINDO (MICHAEL)
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 20, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001796-MR
J. STAN DEVELOPMENTS, LLC
AND J. STAN MINNIC, INDIVIDUALLY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-010917
MICHAEL LINDO
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND DIXON, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellants, J. Stan Minnic, individually (“Minnic”) and J. Stan
Developments, LLC (“J. Stan”), appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court awarding Appellee, Michael Lindo, $70,000 in damages as well as
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Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute
21.580.
$28,675.42 in attorney fees. The judgment was entered after a jury found Minnic
and J. Stan joint and severally liable to Lindo in this joint venture/security
agreement action. Finding no error, we affirm.
Minnic is the sole member of J. Stan as well as another company,
Minnic Homes, LLC. In May 2003, Lindo entered into a joint venture agreement
with Minnic and J. Stan, whereby Lindo invested $232,400 for a project called
“The Meadows of the Polo Fields” located in Jefferson County. According to
Lindo, Minnic stated that he would use the investment to purchase and develop the
property in question for the purpose of building residential homes on it. The
parties agreed that Lindo, who had no expertise in the area of real estate
development, would act solely as an investor while Minnic and J. Stan would
manage all project operations. It is undisputed that the joint venture agreement
was not registered with the State of Kentucky or the Kentucky Division of
Securities.
Several months into the project, Lindo began having difficulty
contacting Minnic or acquiring any information about the status of the
development. In fact, Minnic had been sued by the owners of the Polo Fields for
repeated failures and breach of the terms and conditions of the purchase agreement.
Minnic eventually settled the claim by giving up all interest in the property.
However, Minnic did not inform Lindo about the lawsuit until after it was settled
and all rights to the property were relinquished. Lindo additionally discovered that
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contrary to Minnic’s claims, Minnic had no expertise or experience in developing
property or constructing residential homes.
In December 2005, Lindo filed a civil action in the Jefferson Circuit
Court against Minnic, individually, and J. Stan seeking damages for violations of
Kentucky’s Blue Sky Laws, KRS Chapter 292 et seq., for securities fraud, gross
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. Following a trial in
November 2007, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Lindo against Minnic and J.
Stan in the amount of $70,0002. Further, because the trial court had previously
determined that as a matter of law the joint venture agreement constituted the sale
of a security, the trial court awarded Lindo $28,675.42 in attorney’s fees pursuant
to KRS 292.480. Following the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or new trial, Minnic and J. Stan appealed to this Court as a matter of
right.
This action was brought under Kentucky’s Blue Sky Laws, Chapter KRS
292. The stated purpose of Chapter 292 is to “[p]rotect Kentucky investors by
preventing investment fraud and related illegal conduct or, if this fraud or illegal
conduct has already occured, remedying, where possible, the harm done to
Kentucky investors through active implementation and application of this chapter’s
enforcement powers[.]” KRS 292.530(1). Essentially, Blue Sky Laws place upon
the seller of a security a duty of full disclosure relevant to the issuance of the
security. Securities Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howey Company, 328 U.S. 293,
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After the lawsuit was filed, Minnic returned approximately $69,323.66, for which he was given
credit under KRS 292.480(1).
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299, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 1103, 90 L.Ed. 1241 (1946). In other words, one cannot
“promise the sky,” and fail to disclose the pitfalls of the deal.
As previously noted, the trial court ruled that the joint venture
agreement was a security within the purview of Chapter 292, and no appellate
issue has been raised as to such ruling by either party. With regard to the sale of a
security, KRS 292.320 provides, in relevant part:
(1) It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the
offer, sale or purchase of any security, directly or
indirectly:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud;
(b) To make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made,
not misleading; or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
The jury herein concluded that in offering for sale the joint venture agreement,
Minnic knowingly or recklessly made an untrue statement of material fact or
omitted to state a material fact and, as a result, Lindo reasonably relied upon the
statement or omission.
On appeal, Minnic first argues that he was entitled to a directed
verdict because Lindo failed to properly plead or prove a cause of action against
him individually under KRS 292.320. Minnic claims that Lindo’s complaint only
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imputed liability to Minnic as a “broker-dealer” of the security, and it was not until
trial that he advanced the new theory of individual liability. We disagree.
Paragraph Six of Lindo’s complaint states as follows:
Minnic, individually, as a broker dealer, and in active
concert with J. Stan Developments and Minnic Homes
offered to sell, and sold, the Security by means of written
and oral communications that included untrue statements
of material fact, and omitted to state material facts
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading . . . .
The complaint then enumerates six specific allegations of securities fraud under
KRS 292.320. Lindo concedes in his brief that he was unable to prove that Minnic
fell within the definition of a “broker-dealer” as set forth in KRS 292.310(2).
Nevertheless, Lindo clearly pled and proved that Minnic acted in his individual
capacity and in concert with J. Stan.
KRS 292.320 prohibits a “person” from selling a security through the
use of untrue material statements and material omissions. “Person” is defined in
KRS 292.310(14) to include an “individual.” It is undisputed that Minnic is the
individual who sold the security to Lindo and, in fact, as the trial court noted, was
the only person involved in any of the entities at issue. See generally Pinter v.
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642-643, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 2076, 100 L.Ed.2d 658 (1988). We
find Minnic’s claim that he was unaware until the date of trial that Lindo was
asserting a claim of individual liability disingenuous at best. It is clear from the
pleadings herein, that in addition to asserting the claim in his complaint, Lindo
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thoroughly discussed Minnic’s individual liability in both his motion for summary
judgment and his pretrial memorandum.
Next, Minnic claims that because J. Stan is a limited liability
company, he is immune from individual liability pursuant to the provisions of
Chapter 275. As such, Minnic argues that there must be a piercing of the corporate
veil in order to impose individual liability. Again, we disagree.
Chapter 275 affords members of a limited liability company a
significant measure of immunity from individual liability. In fact, KRS 275.150
provides:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section or
as otherwise specifically set forth in other sections in this
chapter, no member, manager, employee, or agent of a
limited liability company, including a professional
limited liability company, shall be personally liable by
reason of being a member, manager, employee, or agent
of the limited liability company, under a judgment,
decree, or order of a court, agency, or tribunal of any
type, or in any other manner, in this or any other state, or
on any other basis, for a debt, obligation, or liability of
the limited liability company, whether arising in contract,
tort, or otherwise. The status of a person as a member,
manager, employee, or agent of a limited liability
company, including a professional limited liability
company, shall not subject the person to personal liability
for the acts or omissions, including any negligence,
wrongful act, or actionable misconduct, of any other
member, manager, agent, or employee of the limited
liability company.
Notwithstanding the above provision, KRS 292.320 makes it unlawful
for “any person” to defraud another in connection with a security transaction. To
interpret KRS 292.320 as requiring a piercing of the corporate veil before
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individual liability can be imposed essentially renders the phrase “any person”
meaningless. And it would require this Court to ignore the expansive definition of
“person” set forth in KRS 292.310(14), which includes an individual, in addition to
companies, corporations, partnerships, associations, organizations, and
governments.
Statutes are to be read as a whole and construed so as to give effect to
each word. United States v. Branson, 21 F.3d 113 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 884 (1994). As observed by the Kentucky Supreme Court,
When presented with a statutory conflict whereby one
interpretation would render a portion of a statute
meaningless and the other would harmonize and give
effect to both provisions, rules of statutory construction
require the interpretation that harmonizes the statutes and
prevents a part of a statute from becoming meaningless
or ineffectual.
Brooks v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 219 (Ky. 2007). To harmonize the statutes
in question, the provisions of KRS 275.150 cannot afford individual immunity
when KRS 292.320 specifically imposes individual liability for a violation of
Kentucky’s securities laws.
Further, although KRS 275.150 provides members of limited liability
companies immunity for the acts or liability of the company, whether arising in
contract, tort, or otherwise, as well as for the negligence, wrongful act, or
actionable misconduct of any other member, notably absent from the statutory
language is immunity for the member’s own negligence or actionable misconduct.
A similar interpretation is found in Restatement (2nd) of Agency wherein it is noted
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that a shareholder is personally liable for a tort committed by him although he was
acting for the corporation. See Smith v. Isaacs, 777 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1989).
Indeed, even if KRS 275.150 provided Minnic immunity for the acts committed by
J. Stan, he is nevertheless liable under KRS 292.320 for his individual participation
in the joint venture agreement.
Minnic also argues that the jury instruction pertaining to individual
liability was erroneous. Interrogatory No. 2 provided:
Do you believe clearly and convincingly from the
evidence that the Defendant, J. Stan Minnic in offering
for sale the “security-joint venture agreement” knowingly
or recklessly made an untrue statement of material fact,
or, omitted to state a material fact, and, as a result, the
Plaintiff reasonably relied upon the statement, or
omission.
The above instruction was patterned after the language of KRS 292.320 and was
consistent with the theory upon which the case was tried. Again, we find no merit
in Minnic’s claim that he was immune from individual liability. The instruction
was proper.
Finally, Minnic and J. Stan argue that the trial court erred in denying
the motion for a new trial based upon the health of trial counsel. Apparently, on
the second day of trial, counsel was unknowingly suffering from a serious medical
condition that led to his collapse in the courthouse immediately after closing
arguments had concluded. In support of the motion for new trial, counsel attached
his affidavit wherein he stated that his deteriorating medical condition prevented
him from effectively representing his clients and addressing the critical evidence
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that was presented on the last day of trial. In denying the motion, the trial court
noted that “[o]ther than counsel’s profuse perspiration that manifested itself shortly
before closings, there was nothing to indicate anything unusual to the Court.”
As an appellate court, we review the trial court's denial of the new
trial motion for an abuse of discretion and will only reverse if there is clear error.
Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky. 2001); Rippetoe v. Feese, 217 S.W.3d
887, 890 (Ky. App. 2007). A CR 59.01 ruling is “a discretionary function assigned
to the trial judge who has heard the witnesses firsthand and observed and viewed
their demeanor and who has observed the jury throughout the trial.” Davis v.
Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Sand
Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483, 493-95 (Ky. 2002)3.
Furthermore, an appellate court is precluded from stepping “into the shoes” of the
trial court, and disturbing its ruling unless it is found to be clearly erroneous.
Prater v. Arnett, 648 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Ky. App. 1983). As our Supreme Court noted
in Turfway Park Racing Association v. Griffin, 834 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Ky. 1992),
“a proper ruling on a motion for new trial depends to a great extent upon factors
which may not readily appear in an appellate record. Only if the appellate court
concludes that the trial court's order was clearly erroneous may it reverse.”
Without question, counsel was suffering from a serious medical
condition that manifested itself following the close of trial. Nevertheless, this
Court cannot step into the shoes of the trial court to conclude that counsel
3
Sand Hill was subsequently vacated by Ford Motor Co. v. Estate of Smith, 538 U.S. 1028, 123
S.Ct. 2072, 155 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2003).
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somehow did not fulfill his duties. The trial court observed counsel firsthand and
determined that other than perspiring, counsel exhibited no signs that he was
impaired or ineffective on the final day of trial. Our review of the trial video also
leads to the conclusion that counsel provided satisfactory representation. Thus, we
cannot find that the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial was clearly
erroneous.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven D. Yater
Louisville, Kentucky
F. Larkin Fore
Louisville, Kentucky
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