VANHOOK (JASON) VS. THOMAS (JULIE)
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RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001789-MR
JASON VANHOOK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00108
JULIE THOMAS, BRANCH MANAGER,
OFFENDER INFORMATION SERVICES,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Appellant, Jason Vanhook (Vanhook), appeals the dismissal
of his petition for declaration of rights filed in the Lyon Circuit Court. We find
that Vanhook’s arguments are without merit.
OPINION
Vanhook was convicted of arson in the first degree in Lincoln Circuit
Court in 2002. The conviction was based on an incident which took place on
October 3, 2001. He contends that his classification as a violent offender under
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 439.3401 was in error as it would be an ex post
facto violation of the Constitution. We disagree.
“A law is retrospective if it ‘changes the legal consequences of acts
completed before its effective date.” Purvis v. Com., 14 S.W.3d 21, 23 (Ky. 2000).
In Purvis, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that “[t]he standard for determining
whether a law violates the ex post facto prohibition is two-part. First, the law
‘must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its
enactment[.]’” (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67
L.Ed.2d 17(1981)).
KRS 439.3401 provides that:
(1) As used in this section, ‘violent offender’ means any
person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to the
commission of:
(a) A capital offense;
(b) A Class A felony. . . .
This statute was enacted in 1986 and the above cited language was in
the original statute, having not changed. Clearly, Vanhook’s conviction of a Class
A felony fell within the purview of this statute and was appropriately considered to
be a violent offense. Vanhook’s appeal of this issue must be denied.
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Vanhook next contends that he has a liberty interest in his parole
eligibility date. In Stewart v. Com., 153 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Ky. 2005), the
Kentucky Supreme Court specifically set forth that “[p]arole is a privilege and its
denial has no constitutional implications.” See also Land v. Com., 986 S.W.2d 440
(Ky. 1999); Garland v. Com., 997 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. App. 1999). Since parole is
not a right, it follows that a defendant would not have a liberty interest in a parole
eligibility date. Thus, we deny Vanhook’s appeal on this issue as well.
We affirm the decision of the Lyon Circuit Court
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jason Vanhook, pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Brenn O. Combs
Kentucky Justice & Public Safety
Cabinet
Frankfort, Kentucky
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