LAY (SUSAN) VS. KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS , ET AL.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001730-MR
SUSAN LAY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-01640
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS and the BOARD OF
TRUSTEES OF THE KENTUCKY
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Susan Lay (Lay) appeals from the June 27, 2008, opinion
and order of the Franklin Circuit Court affirming a decision of the Kentucky
Retirement Systems denying Lay disability retirement benefits. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Lay was employed by the McCreary County Board of Education as a
school bus driver. Her membership in the Kentucky Retirement Systems
(hereinafter “Systems”) began on November 15, 1993. Her last day of paid
employment was April 21, 2004, with 107 months of service credit. Lay describes
her job duties as operating a school bus, cleaning and inspecting the bus, and
overseeing student passengers. Her supervisor stated that she worked a five hour
workday in which she had sat four hours and alternated between standing and
walking during the balance of the time. Lay was required to lift up to ten pounds
occasionally. Given the physical exertion requirements for the job, it is classified
as light work within the meaning of KRS 61.600(5)(c).
Following Lay’s application for disability retirement benefits on May
17, 2004, the Systems' Medical Review Board denied her disability retirement
benefits. Her application for benefits was based on diagnoses of fibromyalgia, and
arthritis, plus experiencing fatigue and back, leg, and knee pain. Lay requested an
administrative hearing, which was conducted on March 1, 2005, to decide whether
she had been permanently, mentally, or physically incapacitated since her last date
of paid employment, and thus, unable to perform her job or a job with similar
duties. The hearing officer recommended denial of her claim and the report, dated
July 22, 2005, was adopted by the Disability Appeals Committee of the Board of
Trustees in a final order entered on October 26, 2005. The Board based its
decision denying Lay’s application on the determination that she had not
established by objective medical evidence that she was totally and permanently
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disabled. Then, on November 28, 2005, Lay appealed the System's denial of her
application for disability retirement benefits to the Franklin Circuit Court. As
noted above, the Franklin Circuit Court upheld the decision of the Disability
Appeals Committee, and this appeal follows.
ISSUE
The crux of Lay’s appeal is that the System's original decision
incorrectly ignored overwhelming substantial medical evidence supporting her
claim for disability retirement benefits. Lay further contends that since the
agency’s decision was not based on substantial evidence, it is clearly arbitrary, and
should have been found clearly erroneous by the circuit court. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
First, we observe that the circuit court’s role in reviewing an
administrative decision is not to reinterpret or reconsider the merits of the claim.
Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com’n v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Ky. App.
1983); Kentucky Bd. of Nursing v. Ward, 890 S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. App. 1994).
Instead, the circuit court must determine whether the findings of fact were
“supported by substantial evidence of probative value” and whether the
administrative agency “applied the correct rule of law to the facts so found.”
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Commission, 437
S.W.2d 775, 778 (Ky. 1969) (citing Brown Hotel Co. v. Edwards, 365 S.W.2d 299
(Ky. 1963)). Finally, when an administrative agency’s findings are supported by
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substantial evidence, these findings must be accepted by a reviewing court. Ward,
890 S.W.2d at 642.
Next, we examine the circuit court’s order affirming the Systems’
decision. In reviewing a state agency's administrative decision adverse to a
claimant, we will not overturn it unless the agency has acted arbitrarily, outside the
scope of its authority, applied an incorrect legal standard, or its decision is not
supported by substantial evidence. E.g., Kentucky State Racing Commission v.
Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 307-08 (Ky. 1972). “Substantial evidence” is proof
having “sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable
men.” Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Heavrin, 172 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Ky. App.
2005). Thus, under the controlling legal standards, the question before us is
whether the circuit court’s decision was arbitrary because it erred in holding that
substantial evidence supported the Systems' determination that Lay failed to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that she has a permanent, occupational
disability that cannot be accommodated. Finally, as long as there is substantial
evidence in the record supporting the agency’s decision, we must defer to the
agency, even if there is conflicting evidence. Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Ky. 1981).
ANALYSIS
1. KRS 61.600
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According to KRS 13B.090(7), which governs administrative
procedure, Lay bears the burden of persuasion. In addition, in order to receive
disability retirement benefits, she must establish under KRS 61.600(3):
Upon the examination of the objective medical evidence
by licensed physicians pursuant to KRS 61.665, it shall
be determined that:
(a) The person, since his last day of paid
employment, has been mentally or physically
incapacitated to perform the job, or jobs of like
duties, from which he received his last paid
employment. In determining whether the person may
return to a job of like duties, any reasonable
accommodation by the employer as provided in 42
U.S.C. sec. 12111(9) and 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 shall
be considered;
(b) The incapacity is a result of bodily injury, mental
illness, or disease. For purposes of this section,
“injury” means any physical harm or damage to the
human organism other than disease or mental illness;
(c) The incapacity is deemed to be permanent; and
(d) The incapacity does not result directly or indirectly
from bodily injury, mental illness, disease, or condition
which pre-existed membership in the system or
reemployment, whichever is most recent. . . .
In sum, Lay must provide objective medical evidence that she is permanently
physically incapacitated since her last date of paid employment by fibromyalgia,
arthritis, back pain, fatigue, plus leg and knee pain so as to be unable to perform
her job.
We begin our discussion by considering the findings of fact relied
upon by the System in denying Lay disability retirement benefits. Lay’s medical
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records indicate some degenerative changes in her hips and back. Although she
was diagnosed with degenerative arthritis, which was labeled as “quite limiting,”
the doctor did not state that Lay was disabled or unable to perform her job duties.
The prognosis for her fibromyalgia is fair. Her bone density studies show
osteopenia but not osteoporosis. Put differently, Lay’s medical evidence
demonstrated that she had mild test results and subjective complaints of pain.
Subjective complaints of pain do not meet the requirements of objective medical
evidence by a licensed physician as required by KRS 61.600(3). In sum, given that
a bus driver’s job duties are classified as sedentary to light and that in all the
medical testimony and reports, no doctor stated that Lay was disabled or unable to
perform her job duties, the agency found that she did not qualify as disabled under
KRS 61.600. Therefore, Lay did not provide objective medical evidence that she
is permanently mentally or physically incapacitated and unable to perform her job
duties.
Furthermore, the circuit court properly found that the Systems applied
the correct legal standard by using the criteria in KRS 61.600. And the Board of
Trustees reviewed the evidence of record, ascertained that Lay did not meet her
burden of proof because the objective evidence did not compel a finding of
disability. Consequently, because Lay did not prove the requisite permanent
physical incapacity, she is not entitled to an award of disability retirement benefits.
The circuit court properly found that substantial evidence supported the Systems’
decision to deny Lay benefits.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is our determination that the Franklin Circuit Court’s
decision upholding the Kentucky Retirement Systems was legally correct, based on
substantial evidence, and not erroneous. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment
of the Franklin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John H. Gray
Frankfort, Kentucky
Katherine Rupinen
Kentucky Retirement Systems
Frankfort, Kentucky
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