ISOM (TARA) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 25, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001715-MR
TARAS ISOM, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00418
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CAPERTON, AND KELLER, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Taras Isom, Jr. (Isom), entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of a forged instrument second degree and to being a persistent felony
offender, second degree. The trial court entered a judgment and sentence
consistent with that plea. It is from that judgment that Isom now appeals. On
appeal, Isom argues that the trial court improperly ruled that the Commonwealth
could introduce evidence of a prior crime at trial. Isom also argues that the trial
court’s ruling denied him due process of law. Having reviewed the record and the
arguments of counsel, we affirm.
FACTS
The underlying facts are not in dispute. In September 2006,
Lexington-Fayette Urban County police officers responded to a call that a young
black man was taking mail from mail boxes. After a short chase, the officers
caught and arrested Isom and charged him with a number of counts of possession
of stolen mail matter.
Four weeks later, a Lexington-Fayette Urban County police detective
received a call from Bobby Jones (Jones), a security specialist employed by
Central Bank & Trust Company. Jones told the detective that one of the bank’s
customers, Laura Blake, reported that her mail had been stolen on August 26,
2006. The stolen mail included a check made payable to Allstate. Jones stated that
Isom cashed the stolen check after first scratching out Allstate as the payee and
inserting his name. When cashing the check, Isom presented his Kentucky driver’s
license as proof of identity. Isom was then charged with an additional count of
possession of stolen mail matter and with one count of second-degree possession
of a forged instrument. Isom ultimately pled guilty to six counts of possession of
stolen mail matter and to one count of second-degree possession of a forged
instrument,1 and, in January 2007, the court sentenced him to five years’
imprisonment probated for five years.
1
The guilty plea involved other crimes; however, the possession of stolen mail matter and
possession of a forged instrument are the only ones relevant to this appeal.
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Eight months later, in August 2007, Isom cashed a check drawn on the
account of Trudy Bubenhofer (Bubenhofer). The check had been made payable to
Kentucky Utilities (KU); however, KU’s name was scratched out and Isom’s was
inserted on the payee line. When cashing Bubenhofer’s check, Isom again
provided his Kentucky driver’s license information as proof of identity. Based on
his actions, a grand jury indicted Isom for second-degree criminal possession of a
forged instrument and for being a persistent felony offender in the second degree
Approximately two weeks before trial, the Commonwealth filed
notice that it intended to introduce into evidence Isom’s January 2007 convictions
of six counts of possession of stolen mail matter and one count of possession of a
forged instrument in the second degree. Following a hearing, the trial court found
that one of the January 2007 convictions for possession of stolen mail matter and
the January 2007 conviction for possession of a forged instrument amounted to
“signature crimes” and would be admissible. However, the court stated that the
other January 2007 convictions for possession of stolen mail matter would not be
admissible. Shortly thereafter, Isom entered into a conditional guilty plea,
reserving the right to contest the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. This he now does
on appeal, arguing that the trial court’s ruling violated the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence (KRE) and his right to due process.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s rulings regarding the admission or exclusion
of evidence for abuse of discretion. Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95
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(Ky. 2007). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision
was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
ANALYSIS
In attacking the trial court’s ruling under KRE 404(b), Isom makes
four arguments; however, we believe those arguments can be reduced to two: (1)
whether the January 2007 possession of a forged instrument conviction is similar
enough to the August 2007 crime to be admissible; and (2) whether the January
2007 possession of stolen mail matter conviction is relevant to the August 2007
crime. We will address these arguments in the order presented.
1. Similarity of Crimes
In its notice that it would be offering into evidence Isom’s January
2007 convictions for possession of stolen mail matter and possession of a forged
instrument, the Commonwealth stated it was doing so in order to establish a course
of conduct, modus operandi, or signature crime. In its order permitting the
Commonwealth to introduce evidence regarding Isom’s January 2007 convictions,
the court noted the following similarities: (1) in both cases checks were taken
from the mail; (2) in both cases the correct payee’s name was scratched out and
Isom’s substituted in its place; and (3) in both cases Isom presented his driver’s
license as identification when cashing the checks.
KRE 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
generally is not admissible. However, such evidence is admissible:
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(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or
(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence
essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could
not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on
the offering party.
Isom argues that the Commonwealth did not present sufficient
evidence to establish that the two possession of forged instrument crimes were
unique enough or so strikingly similar as to constitute signature crimes or to
establish modus operandi.
In order to prove the elements of a subsequent offense by
evidence of modus operandi, the facts surrounding the
prior misconduct must be so strikingly similar to the
charged offense as to create a reasonable probability that
(1) the acts were committed by the same person, and/or
(2) the acts were accompanied by the same mens rea. If
not, the evidence of prior misconduct proves only a
criminal disposition and is inadmissible.
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
[A]s a prerequisite to the admissibility of prior bad acts
evidence, we now require the proponent of the evidence
to ‘demonstrate that there is a factual commonality
between the prior bad act and the charged conduct that is
simultaneously similar and so peculiar or distinct that
there is a reasonable probability that the two crimes were
committed by the same individual.
Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 97 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Buford, 197 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Ky. 2006)). In analyzing this issue, the court must
keep in mind that “‘[i]t is inevitable, particularly when the prior act amounts to an
earlier violation of the charged offense, that there will be some basic similarities
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between the prior bad act and the new criminal conduct.’” Id. at 97-98 (quoting
Buford, 197 S.W.3d at 71).
Isom argues that there is nothing unique about how he committed his
crimes. In support of this argument, he states that “many other criminal defendants
– hundreds, perhaps – have committed the crime of second-degree possession of a
forged instrument by crossing off the name of the payee, writing in their own
name, and cashing the altered check.” While that may be true, Isom has not
pointed to any such crimes wherein the defendant crossed out the name of the
payee, wrote Isom’s name in its place, and presented Isom’s driver’s license as
proof of identity when cashing the check. These factors make it more than a
reasonable probability that Isom committed both crimes and fulfill the prerequisite
for admissibility set forth in Clark and Buford.
However, our analysis does not end there. We must next determine if
the evidence was offered for a purpose recognized under KRE 404(b). As
admitted by Isom, evidence of a similar crime is admissible to prove modus
operandi and/or a signature crime. Isom argues that such evidence may only be
offered to prove identity or mens rea, and that, based on the evidence against him,
neither was at issue.
Isom’s argument puts the “cart before the horse” because it presumes
that Isom’s conviction was a foregone conclusion. While the evidence against
Isom may have been overwhelming, a jury was required to presume his innocence
and the Commonwealth was required to prove that Isom knowingly forged or
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altered Bubenhofer’s check and cashed it with the “intent to defraud, deceive or
injure another.” Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 516.060. Proof that Isom had
committed a similar crime was therefore relevant to prove the requisite intent by
showing a “plan, knowledge . . . or absence of mistake or accident” and was
therefore properly admissible.
Similarly, Isom’s argument that evidence of his January 2007
conviction of possession of stolen mail material was “utterly irrelevant” is not
persuasive. Isom is correct that how a person comes into possession of a forged
instrument is not an element of KRS 516.060. However, knowledge of the forgery
is such an element. While it is unclear from the record what defenses Isom might
have raised, we cannot say that how he came into possession of the check is utterly
irrelevant. Such evidence goes to the element of knowledge regarding the forgery,
which is relevant. Furthermore, the fact that Isom previously was in possession of
stolen mail matter as well as Bubenhofer’s statement that her check had been
stolen from the mail, go to the element of knowledge that the check was forged.
Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that
evidence of the conviction of possession of stolen mail matter was admissible.
2. Due Process
Isom’s due process argument is that “the erroneous admission of
‘highly prejudicial’ and ‘dangerous’ bad act evidence, which ‘impugn[ed]’” his
character denied him a “fundamentally fair trial in violation of the state and federal
constitutional guarantees of due process.” (Emphasis in original). This argument
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is inexorably tied to whether evidence of the January 2007 convictions was
properly admissible. Because we have held that the trial court properly ruled that
evidence admissible, we need not address Isom’s due process argument.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jamesa J. Drake
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
Jason B. Moore
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Meggan Smith
LaGrange, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Jason B. Moore
Frankfort, Kentucky
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