REED (BILLY) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001563-MR
BILLY REED
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEVEN D. COMBS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00048
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; VANMETER, JUDGE; LAMBERT,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE: Appellant, Billy Dwayne Reed, appeals from his
conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, for second-degree manslaughter. The
conviction arose from a motor vehicle fatality. In this court, Appellant asserts that
the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence concerning his medical treatment.
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
He also argues that the recording of a 9-1-1 call from an anonymous caller was
erroneously admitted in evidence. Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to quash the indictment and dismiss the charge of
wanton murder based on his constitutional claim that wanton murder under KRS
507.020(1)(b) is void for vagueness.
The factual circumstances giving rise to Appellant’s conviction
occurred on January 7, 2008, when Appellant drove his pick-up truck into the
victim’s motorcycle. The victim was sitting, unmoving, in a turning lane when
Appellant swerved into the lane and struck the victim, throwing him nearly sixty
feet. The evidence showed that Appellant made no attempt to brake before the
collision and his vehicle traveled another 500 feet before coming to a stop.
Emergency personnel responded, but the victim’s injuries were fatal. At the scene,
police officers performed various sobriety tests on Appellant, and he was arrested
upon his failure to pass any of the tests. It was later determined that Appellant had
visited a treatment center in West Virginia earlier the day of the accident where he
received a therapeutic treatment of methadone. Thereafter, he consumed about
half of a beer despite warnings from the methadone treatment center that mixing
alcohol and methadone was highly dangerous. Blood tests revealed that Appellant
also had Valium and Xanax in his system.
Appellant was charged with wanton murder pursuant to KRS
507.020(1)(b), which provides that a person is guilty of murder when:
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Including, but not limited to, the operation of a motor
vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
person and thereby causes the death of another person.
He was convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second
degree under KRS 507.040(1)(a), which provides:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree
when he wantonly causes the death of another person,
including, but not limited to, situations where the death
results from the person’s . . . [o]peration of a motor
vehicle[.]
The culpable mental state, “wantonly,” is central to our review of
Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of
testimony from his medical treatment providers. Appellant asserts that Dr. Azeb
and Dr. Hoover should not have been permitted to testify because both physicians
had prescribed Loritab for Appellant, a drug that was not detected in his system at
the time of the accident. However, Dr. Hoover had also prescribed Xanax, a drug
that was present.
The mental state “Wantonly” is defined as follows:
A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense
when he is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur
or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such
nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation. A
person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof
solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts
wantonly with respect thereto.
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KRS 501.020(3). To establish that Appellant was voluntarily intoxicated, as
opposed to accidental intoxication due to ingesting various drugs without
reasonably anticipating the result, the Commonwealth introduced the testimony of
Dr. Azeb, Dr. Hoover, and Mr. Joe Chapman, the clinical director of the
methadone treatment center. The two physicians testified that neither of them
knew that Appellant was getting medication from the other or from the methadone
treatment facility and that, had they known, they would not have treated him.
Moreover, both physicians testified that they had counseled Appellant about the
effects of alcohol when mixed with the narcotics that were prescribed and that they
had warned Appellant not to see other physicians, use multiple pharmacies, or
drink alcohol. Mr. Chapman testified concerning Appellant’s methadone
treatment, and he produced a “consumer information form” signed by Appellant.
The form included information as to the risks and hazards of methadone treatment
and explained that using alcohol, Valium, or other drugs in combination with
methadone could have lethal effects. The form specifically urged patients to use
caution while driving.
The testimony described hereinabove was admissible under Kentucky
Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b)(1) to show that Appellant’s intoxication was not
the result of an accident in mixing the drugs. Moreover, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that its probative value outweighed the danger of any
prejudicial effects. KRE 401; KRE 403.
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Appellant’s related contention that the testimony of Dr. Azeb and Dr.
Hoover was not relevant because their treatment of Appellant was too attenuated
and remote in time is clearly refuted by the record. Indeed, Appellant had received
a prescription from Dr. Azeb less than thirty days before the accident, and Dr.
Hoover had treated Appellant as recently as the month before the accident.
Upon thorough consideration of Appellant’s arguments and the
entirety of the physicians’ testimony in view of the culpable mental state, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings in this regard.
Appellant next contends that a 9-1-1 recording of an anonymous caller
should not have been admitted into evidence. The caller reported that a vehicle,
roughly matching Appellant’s vehicle, was driving erratically and had struck a
guard rail. The caller indicated that the vehicle was traveling in the direction of the
point where the fatal accident later occurred. The call was placed at 5:12 p.m., six
minutes before the accident. Appellant asserts that admission of the 9-1-1 call
violated his confrontation rights as recently expressed in the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177
(2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224
(2006).
We recognize that Crawford and Davis have significantly restricted
the admissibility of testimonial statements, particularly, in comparison with the
more liberal “indicia of reliability” test of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct.
2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the previously prevailing rule. Upon review of the
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trial court’s decision to admit the 9-1-1 call, we must first determine whether the
statements made during the call were testimonial in the context of Confrontation
Clause analysis. Davis provides specific guidance for evaluating statements to
determine whether they are testimonial or non-testimonial.
Statements are non-testimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Id. at 822. For a discussion of the testimonial/non-testimonial dichotomy, see also
Heard v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 240 (Ky. 2007).
In this instance, the 9-1-1 caller was reporting to the emergency
operator that he was seeing a dangerous circumstance as it was unfolding.
Whether concerned for his own safety or for the safety of other drivers on the
highway, the caller was clearly seeking police assistance to address what he
perceived as an imminent, ongoing safety threat. With respect to conclusory
statements made in response to the operator’s follow-up questions, which may
have evolved into testimonial statements, the trial court properly ordered redaction.
Thus, only the safety concerns expressed by the 9-1-1 caller were admitted in
evidence. Accordingly, admission of the 9-1-1 call did not violate the rule in
Davis nor the Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation as it was not testimonial.
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Further attacking the 9-1-1 caller’s description of the vehicle as
different from the actual vehicle Appellant was driving, Appellant contends that
the call should have been excluded due to unreliability. Appellant emphasizes that
his accident reconstructionist testified that the damage to the side of Appellant’s
vehicle could have been caused by a guardrail, but not by a guardrail in the
immediate vicinity – again, a potential discrepancy in the content of the 9-1-1 call.
Appellant’s legal argument concerning these discrepancies is unclear, as he relies
on a qualification applicable only to the business records hearsay exception, one
which is clearly not implicated here, as well as on KRE 403. Therefore,
presumably, Appellant’s argument is based on a claim of undue prejudice in the 91-1 call. This argument must fail. Appellant has not shown an abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s refusal to find that the danger of undue prejudice outweighed the
probative value of the 9-1-1 call.
Finally, we address Appellant’s contention that the wanton murder
statute and second-degree manslaughter statute are void for vagueness when
applied to vehicular homicide cases.
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Kentucky specifically rejected a
contention that wanton murder under KRS 507.020(1)(b) was void for vagueness.
Brown v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1998). The constitutional
challenge in Brown referenced the culpable mental state of “wantonly,” but
focused primarily on the additional requirement of “manifesting extreme
indifference to human life.” KRS 507.020(1)(b). Conceding that the foregoing
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phrase is not “capable of precise definition,” the Court explained that “[t]he
accepted test in determining the required precision of statutory language imposing
criminal liability is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as
to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices.” Brown, 975 S.W.2d at 925 (quoting Sasaki v. Commonwealth, 485
S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1972)). “However, all that is required of a statute is fairness.
‘Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from
our language.’” Brown, 975 S.W.2d at 925 (quoting Payne v. Commonwealth, 623
S.W.2d 867, 870 (Ky. 1981) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)). Brown concluded that the
wanton murder statute was not void for vagueness. This holding was reaffirmed in
Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351 (Ky. 2004).
Appellant’s argument is similar to those rejected in Brown and Cook.
However, Appellant focuses primarily on the definition of “wantonly.” He asserts
that the definition of “wantonly,” and particularly that portion stating that “a
person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary
intoxication also acts wantonly with respect thereto,” cannot serve as a predicate to
criminal liability.
“Voluntary Intoxication” is defined as:
Intoxication caused by substances which the defendant
knowingly introduces into his body, the tendency of
which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know,
unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or
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under such duress as would afford a defense to a charge
of crime.
KRS 501.010(4). Appellant devotes much of his argument to a claimed lack of
notice under the statute that ingestion of a small amount of alcohol and prescription
medicine may constitute “wanton” conduct. However, the statute specifically
declares that where a person creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk, but is
unaware that he is doing so solely by virtue of his own voluntary intoxication, he
acts wantonly. Thus, the General Assembly provided Appellant with adequate
notice. Portions of Appellant’s argument seem to allege ambiguity in the statute
because intoxication depends on individual factors, such as a person’s tolerance.
However, this is an evidentiary question concerning whether Appellant was
actually “intoxicated” and is not an attack upon the constitutionality of the statute.
Although Appellant’s constitutional challenge focuses on the
definition of “wantonly,” as opposed to the “extreme indifference to human life”
provision that was challenged in Brown and Cook, the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in those cases is equally applicable here. Appellant’s challenge is even less
persuasive as “wantonly” has been given a statutory definition. KRS 501.020(3).
Accordingly, Appellant’s conviction of second-degree manslaughter
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
Tommy Ryan May
Pikeville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Julie Scott Jernigan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Julie Scott Jernigan
Frankfort, Kentucky
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