CHAMBERS (DANNY) VS. HAAS (SCOTT A.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 23, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001546-MR
DANNY CHAMBERS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-01310
DR. SCOTT A. HAAS;
DR. HAROLD DOUGLAS CRALL;
JOHN REES, COMMISSIONER,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
DR. BASHIRAMED AMEJI; JOHN
DOE; AND JANE DOE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND WINE, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: Danny Chambers filed this action alleging that he
received improper medical treatment while an inmate at the Eastern Kentucky
Correctional Complex. The Franklin Circuit Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the appellees. Upon review, we affirm.
FACTS
During the times involved in this case the appellant, Danny Chambers,
was an inmate at the Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex at West Liberty,
Kentucky. In February 2004 Chambers was seen by Dr. Bashir Ameji, a physician
who was then employed by the Department of Corrections. Dr. Ameji found that
Chambers had developed a hernia. In Dr. Ameji’s opinion surgery was not
indicated at that time because the hernia was not large, was reducible and did not
descend into the scrotum. He ordered a truss for Chambers and directed that he not
lift weights in the prison gym, and limited his lifting in other situations to twentyfive pounds. Dr. Ameji did not prescribe pain medication because in his opinion it
was not indicated, but over-the-counter pain medication was available to Chambers
thorough the inmate canteen or at pill call lines.
Even though Dr. Ameji did not believe that surgery was medically
necessary to correct Chambers’ hernia when it was first diagnosed, he referred the
case to the prison’s Therapeutic Level of Care Committee2 with a request for
surgical repair. The Committee did not refer Chambers for surgery.
2
The Committee is a group of clinicians whose duties include review of non-emergency surgical
referrals made by treating physicians employed by the Department of Corrections. The
Committee, not the treating physician, is authorized to make referrals for non-emergency
surgery.
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In March, 2005, just over one year after the first diagnosis, Chambers
was seen by a nurse practitioner regarding his hernia. Chambers was sent out for a
surgical consult. Chambers’ condition had worsened, and this time surgery was
ordered. The surgery was performed in July 2005. As discussed below the
complaint was filed prior to the surgery. No claim is made in this action relating to
Chambers’ hernia operation or the results of the surgery. For purposes of this case
we assume that the surgery was successful and that his recovery was uneventful.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Chambers filed a grievance when the Committee denied Dr. Ameji’s
request for approval for hernia surgery. The grievance was denied on appeal.
Thereafter Chambers filed this action pro se in Franklin Circuit Court. The
complaint was filed in September 2004, after the first referral for surgery was
denied in February 2004 but prior to the surgical consult in March 2005 and
Chambers’ surgery the following July. Discovery was conducted by both parties,
motions and responses were filed, hearings were conducted and various rulings
were made by the circuit court. Finally in August 2007 the defendants’/appellees’
motion for summary judgment was granted and Chambers’ complaint was
dismissed. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Chambers’ appeal is divided into two arguments: first, that the circuit
court erred by construing his complaint as only a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and
ignoring his state law claims; and second, that the court failed to construe the
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pleadings in the light most favorable to him as required by law. The appellees
have countered these two arguments with a responsive brief divided into nine
subparts. The first and last of these subparts respectively discuss the correct
standard of review and the summary judgment standard. Three subparts deal with
Chambers’ claim that he is entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The appellees also contend that they are entitled to
qualified official immunity, that Chambers failed to establish a prima facie case for
medical negligence, that he failed to state a claim for negligence against
defendant/appellant John Rees, and that he failed to state a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
We have generally followed the organization of the appellees’
response because it provides a more thorough and coherent framework for our
discussion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether
the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material
fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Scifres v. Craft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). In this case the circuit
court’s task was complicated by the moving target presented by Chambers’ pro se
pleadings. However it is also true that “[i]f the summary judgment is sustainable
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on any basis, it must be affirmed.” Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Ky.
2006).
EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
While Chambers’ pleadings below and some parts of his argument to
this Court seem directed toward a recovery for medical malpractice or negligence,
the circuit court interpreted his complaint to be primarily a Bivens3-type claim for a
violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. As the federal cases have developed the law in this area, to state a
cognizable claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights due to improper
medical care an inmate “must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). In order to prevail, an
inmate must show that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety[.]” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970,
1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The failure or refusal to render proper treatment
must be so callous and deliberate as to constitute “punishment,” because “[t]he
Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual “conditions”; it outlaws
cruel and unusual “punishments.” Id. Clearly, an inmate’s complaint that his
3
The United States Supreme Court recognized a federal cause of action against employees of the
United States government for violations of a claimant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619
(1971). A similar action against state officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was discussed in
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978); and a Bivens-type claim
for violation of a prisoner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment was discussed by the Court in
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).
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successful hernia operation was performed in accordance with the prison’s
timetable rather than his own does not make out a cognizable claim. Our own
review supports the circuit court’s determination that there is no evidence (indeed,
apart from Chambers’ bare allegations there is nothing) in the record which would
justify an Eighth Amendment claim.
NEGLIGENCE
We agree with the appellants that Chambers failed to establish a
prima facie case for medical negligence. Leaving aside the fact that proof of some
of the basic elements of any negligence case – duty, breach of duty, and
consequent injury – cannot be found in the record, Chambers presented no expert
medical testimony to support his claim. “It is an accepted principle that in most
medical negligence cases, proof of causation requires the testimony of an expert
witness because the nature of the inquiry is such that jurors are not competent to
draw their own conclusions from the evidence without the aid of such expert
testimony.” Bayliss v. Lourdes Hosp., Inc., 805 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky. 1991).
OUTRAGE
Because Chambers mentions “outrageous conduct” in his brief, the
appellees felt compelled to respond that such a claim is not supported by the record
of this case. Again, we agree. The tort of outrage or intentional infliction of
emotional distress was neither sufficiently established by Chambers’ pleadings, see
Humana of Ky. Inc. v. Seitz, 797 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Ky. 1990), nor did the allegations
made in his complaint rise to the level of seriousness required to establish the tort.
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Id. And, because Chambers’ state-law tort complaint for medical malpractice (if
he had succeeded in making one) would of necessity be one to which he could
append a claim for infliction of emotional distress, he had no separate claim for the
tort of outrage unless he alleged and proved conduct by the tortfeasor which was
intended solely to cause extreme emotional distress. See Rigazio v. Archdiocese of
Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295, 298-9 (Ky. App. 2001). Chambers did not allege such
conduct, nor was there any indication in the record at the time of the appellees’
summary judgment motion as to how Chambers might produce such proof.
SUMMARY
In the Opinion and Order the circuit court acknowledged its
responsibility to view the record in the light most favorable to Chambers and to
resolve all doubts in his favor, and stated the correct standard of review. As in the
circuit court it appears to us “impossible for [Chambers] to produce evidence at
trial warranting a judgment in his favor[,]” and therefore the motion for summary
judgment was properly granted. Steelvest, Inc., v. Scansteel Service Center, 807
S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991). We find it unnecessary to reach the appellees’
remaining arguments including that they are protected by qualified official
immunity and that some of them cannot be held accountable under a theory of
respondeat superior liability, although each of those arguments may have merit in
their own right. In sum, this action is utterly lacking in merit. We find no error
and no basis for relief.
The Opinion and Order of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Danny Chambers, pro se
West Liberty, Kentucky
Amy V. Barker
Frankfort, Kentucky
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