BLAKLEY (AMOS WAYNE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001518-MR
AMOS WAYNE BLAKLEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00124
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: LAMBERT AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Amos Wayne Blakley was convicted of fleeing/evading in
the first degree, theft by unlawful taking or disposition under $300, possession of a
controlled substance in the second degree, and of being a persistent felony offender
in the second degree. Blakley was sentenced to a total of eight years’
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
imprisonment and now appeals this conviction. After careful review, we affirm the
judgment entered by the Bell Circuit Court.
On February 23, 2007, Officer Busic of the Middlesboro Police
Department was off duty and in his truck when he spotted Blakley standing outside
a silver Pontiac vehicle on the side of the road. Blakley had the hood of the car
raised, but did not appear to be working on the car or to be having car trouble.
Officer Busic saw Blakley walk to the yard of a house, pick up a tire and rim out of
the yard, and place the items into the silver Pontiac. As Blakley drove away,
Officer Busic called the Middlesboro Police Department for help and followed
Blakley.
Blakley stopped at a stop sign and Officer Busic got out of his truck
but before he could identify himself completely, Blakley sped off. Officer Busic
followed Blakley. Meanwhile, Officer Cowan also began to follow Blakley, and a
chase ensued. Officer Cowan lost Blakley. Later, Officer Busic found the silver
Pontiac Blakley had been driving abandoned in an area known as Polly Hollow.
Officer Busic called in the license plate number and discovered that the vehicle
was registered to a woman with whom Blakley had been staying. Officer Busic
went to this address and arrested Blakley for theft by unlawful taking of less than
$300.00 and for fleeing and evading police. A search incident to arrest uncovered
a single pill which contained hydrocodone, a schedule III controlled substance.
At trial the Commonwealth presented the testimony of the two police
officers and a laboratory analyst. The defense presented no testimony or witnesses
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to contradict their testimony. Due to the evidence of there being a high speed
chase, defense counsel in closing argument began to argue about the risks involved
in a chase and not wanting her personal family members to be involved in such an
event. The Commonwealth objected to defense counsel’s statements, and the trial
court sustained the objection.
Blakley was found guilty on all three counts and sentenced to four
months in jail for the theft and one month in jail for the possession of a controlled
substance. After hearing evidence of Blakley’s prior felony convictions, the jury
returned with sentences of five years on the fleeing/evading charge and eight years
for being a persistent felony offender (PFO), second degree, and recommended that
the eight years be served in lieu of the five years. Blakley was sentenced to a total
of eight years by judgment dated July 25, 2008. He now appeals his convictions as
a matter of right.
Blakley’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court erroneously
sustained the Commonwealth’s objection regarding his defense counsel’s
statement that she would not want her daughter and her four grandchildren
involved in a high speed chase. Blakley argues that the jury should have been
permitted to hear this as part of trial counsel’s closing argument. Blakley claims
that he received a severe sentence of eight years for stealing a tire and a rim and
that his defense counsel’s inability to finish her closing argument contributed to the
verdicts and the harsh punishment.
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The Commonwealth argues the trial court properly sustained the
objection to Blakley’s defense counsel’s personal statements about her family and
argues that even if the trial court erred in sustaining the objection, any error was
harmless. We agree with the Commonwealth on both counts.
Matters involving the conduct of closing argument are within the
discretion of the trial judge. Hawkins v. Rosenbloom, 17 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Ky.
App. 1999). Such closing argument issues are to be evaluated based upon the facts
and the totality of circumstances of each case. While allowed great leeway during
closing argument, counsel may offer an opinion only if based upon trial evidence.
Derossett v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 195, 198-198 (Ky. 1993). Great latitude
in closing argument is permissible, and counsel may draw reasonable inferences,
but “may not argue facts that are not in evidence or reasonably inferable from the
evidence.” Garrett v. Commonwealth, 48 S.W.3d 6, 16 (Ky. 2001).
In the instant case, defense counsel offered highly personal
commentary on police car pursuits of criminal suspects that clearly was not based
on or inferable from the evidence submitted at trial. This effort to express her
assessment of the car chase in terms of her family interest was editorial in nature
and not based on trial evidence, and thus fell outside the parameters established in
Derossett, supra, and Garrett, supra. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to defense counsel’s
editorial statements regarding her personal family and fears of police car chases.
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Further, even if the trial court did err in sustaining the
Commonwealth’s objection, any error was harmless and therefore was not
reversible error. RCr 9.24 provides:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order, or
in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
parties, is ground for granting a new trial or for setting
aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order unless it appears to the
court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent
with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.
Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 964 S.W.2d 228, 230 (Ky. App. 1998), articulates the
standard of review for a claimed trial error:
In determining whether an error is prejudicial or harmless
‘an appellate court must consider whether on the whole
case there is a substantial possibility that the result would
have been any different.’ Commonwealth v. McIntosh,
646 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. 1983). A harmless error is ‘any
error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.’ RCr 9.24. The weight
of the evidence and the amount of the punishment
imposed are factors available to determine if an error was
harmless. Abernathy v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.2d
949, 953 (Ky. 1969).
Id.
Blakley argues that his sentence proves that this alleged error was
prejudicial to him. He relies on Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.
1976), which sets forth the two important factors in making a determination that an
error was prejudicial: “the weight of the evidence and the degree of punishment
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fixed by the verdict.” Id. at 222. Blakley argues that he received an eight year
sentence for stealing a tire and a rim, and thus the trial court’s ruling on his defense
counsel’s statements directly affected the outcome of his trial. We disagree.
As to the first factor, the weight of the evidence, Blakley was
convicted in a trial which featured uncontroverted evidence from two police
officers and a laboratory analyst, with the defendant offering no evidence of his
own. The evidence was compelling that Blakley stole the property of another
person, unlawfully fled from police officers, and illegally possessed a controlled
substance. Given the lack of any defense witnesses or evidence, there is no
substantial possibility that the jury could have reached an alternate conclusion
regarding Blakley’s guilt for the crimes charged.
Blakley also argues that the punishment imposed is evidence of
prejudice to him, but an examination of his sentence rebuts this claim. Blakley
faced up to twelve months in jail and/or up to a $500 fine for each of the theft by
unlawful taking and possession of a controlled substance charges. The trial court
followed the jury recommendation and sentenced Blakley to four months for the
theft and one month for the possession offenses. The trial court followed the jury
recommendation and sentenced Blakley to five years for fleeing or evading police,
for which he could have received one to five years. The trial court also followed
the jury verdict and sentenced him to eight years for being a second-degree PFO,
which carried a possible confinement of five to ten years. Blakley ultimately
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received an eight year sentence as a second-degree PFO. This sentence falls in the
mid-range of the possible time he faced on that charge.
The ultimate conclusion regarding the sentence imposed is that
Blakley did not receive maximum sentences for the theft and possession charges.
He did receive the maximum sentence on the fleeing charge, and ultimately he was
sentenced to a mid-range punishment of eight years as a PFO. His sentence was
not excessive and his guilt was determined by uncontroverted evidence. Thus,
Blakley did not receive eight years for “stealing a tire and a rim,” but instead
received eight years’ imprisonment for being a persistent felony offender and for
fleeing the scene of a crime. Thus, it is clear in light of the weight of the evidence
and the sentence imposed that any error the trial court made in sustaining the
Commonwealth’s objection was not prejudicial to Blakley. Finally, Blakley
presented no arguments whatsoever that defense counsel’s personal statements
about her family and her fears would have affected the outcome of his trial in any
way. Thus, any error by the trial court was harmless and did not substantially
affect Blakley’s rights.
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court did not err in sustaining the
Commonwealth’s objection to defense counsel statements during closing
arguments. Even assuming that the trial court did err, such error was not
prejudicial to Blakley and was harmless. Thus, we affirm the judgment and
sentence entered by the Bell Circuit Court on July 25, 2008.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Karen S. Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
W. Bryan Jones
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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