BECKER (CHAD) VS. COLLINS (A. D.)
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001514-MR
CHAD BECKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRED A. STINE V, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-01556
A. D. COLLINS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON, CLAYTON, AND DIXON, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Chad Becker (Becker) appeals the July 10, 2008, order of
the Campbell Circuit Court, denying his motion to set aside the March 16, 2005,
order dismissing, with prejudice, his lawsuit against A. D. Collins (Collins).
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
On December 28, 2003, Becker was involved in an altercation at a
business located at 525 W. 6th Street, Newport, Kentucky. As a result of the
altercation, Becker allegedly suffered from several injuries. On December 28,
2004, Becker filed a personal injury lawsuit against Collins, alleging that Collins
owned the business where the altercation took place and seeking compensatory and
punitive damages under a theory of respondeat superior. In response, Collins
acknowledged ownership of the property where the business was located, but
denied ownership of the business itself. Collins maintained that the business was
run by another party who leased the property from him. On March 16, 2005, the
trial court entered an order dismissing the action, with prejudice.
On May 20, 2008, Becker filed a motion to set aside the order of
dismissal, pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. Becker
alleged that newly discovered information revealed that Collins was, in fact, the
owner of the business at the time of the altercation, and therefore should be held
liable for Becker’s injuries. The trial court denied Becker’s motion in an order
entered on July 10, 2008. This appeal followed.
A CR 60.02 motion is the process by which a party may move to be
relieved from a final judgment or order based on mistake; inadvertence; excusable
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud; perjury; a void judgment; or any other
reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief. CR 60.02. The rule reads, in
pertinent part:
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[o]n motion a court may, upon such terms as are just,
relieve a party or his legal representative from its final
judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following
grounds: . . . (b) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59.02; . . . or (f) any other
reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and on
grounds (a), (b), and (c) not more than one year after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
CR 60.02.
The rule “is not intended merely as an additional opportunity to
relitigate the same issues which could ‘reasonably have been presented’ by direct
appeal or [Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure] RCr 11.42 proceedings.”
McQueen v. Com., 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997) (quoting RCr. 11.42(3)). Thus,
CR 60.02 relief “is available only to raise issues which cannot be raised in other
proceedings.” McQueen at 416..
Before the movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing,
he must affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify
vacating the judgment and further allege special
circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.
Gross v. Com., 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983).
Whether to grant a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence is largely within the discretion of the
trial judge, and the standard of review is whether there
has been an abuse of that discretion. . . . The evidence
must be of such decisive value or force that it would,
with reasonable certainty, change the verdict or probably
change the result if a new trial was granted.
Caldwell v. Com., 133 S.W.3d 445, 454 (Ky. 2004) (citing Foley v. Com., 55
S.W.3d 809 (Ky. 2000)).
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We first note that Becker has failed to show that the newly discovered
evidence could not have been previously discovered by due diligence, as required
by CR 60.02(b). We further note that Becker’s motion was filed more than three
years after the order dismissing his action and therefore fails to meet the timeliness
requirement of CR 60.02. Accordingly, Becker has failed to meet the threshold for
CR 60.02 relief. Becker has further failed to allege any special circumstances for
which CR 60.02(f) relief is justified.1 We therefore hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in its denial of Becker’s motion. Accordingly, the July 10,
2008, order of the Campbell Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Theodore Knoebber
Newport, Kentucky
Richard G. Johnson
Ft. Thomas, Kentucky
1
The remaining grounds of relief, pursuant to CR 60.02, were not alleged by Becker and
therefore need not be addressed by this Court.
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