HOPPENJANS (THOMAS R.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 25, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001388-DG
THOMAS R. HOPPENJANS
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN L. BATES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-XX-00002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: STUMBO, THOMPSON, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: Following a jury trial in the Carroll District Court, Thomas R.
Hoppenjans (“Hoppenjans”) was convicted of one count of operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of alcohol, first offense (“DUI”). He appealed to the
circuit court, arguing that he was entitled to a mistrial after the arresting officer
testified that Hoppenjans had refused to take a preliminary breath test (“PBT”).
The circuit court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s admonishment to the jury
was sufficient to cure the error. This Court granted discretionary review of the
circuit court’s order. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
There is no question in this case that the testimony by the arresting
officer was improper. Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 189A.100(1) clearly
provides that “[a] person’s refusal to take a preliminary breath test shall not be
used against him in a court of law or in any administrative proceeding.” Similarly,
KRS 189A.104(2) prohibits the introduction of any breath analysis by an
instrument other than stationary machine installed, tested, and maintained by the
Commonwealth for that specific purpose. The parties also agree that Hoppenjans
made a timely objection to the officer’s testimony and requested a mistrial.1 The
trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, but admonished the jury to disregard
the testimony. Hoppenjans contends that a mistrial was necessary due to the
unfairly prejudicial effect of the testimony.
We disagree. A mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted
to only when there appears in the record a manifest necessity for such an action or
an urgent or real necessity. Bray v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Ky.
2005). Furthermore, a jury is presumed to follow an admonition to disregard
evidence; thus, the admonition cures any error. Mills v. Commonwealth, 996
S.W.2d 473, 485 (Ky. 1999).
Hoppenjans argues that the admonition served only to reinforce the
testimony about his refusal to take the PBT. However, there are only two
1
Although the prosecutor alluded to this comment in his opening statement, there was no
objection by counsel.
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circumstances in which the presumptive efficacy of an admonition falters: (1)
when there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow
the court's admonition and there is a strong likelihood that the effect of the
inadmissible evidence would be devastating to the defendant; or (2) when the
question was asked without a factual basis and was “inflammatory” or “highly
prejudicial.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003).
Hoppenjans has made neither showing. The testimony, while clearly
improper, was only a small part of the evidence. As the Commonwealth correctly
points out, there was other evidence which established guilt by a substantial
degree. Hoppenjans failed or stumbled through each field sobriety test
administered by the arresting officer. Additionally, the jury heard testimony that
Hoppenjans refused to submit to a breath test. Such a refusal is admissible
pursuant to KRS 189A.105(2)(a)(1); Commonwealth v. Hager, 702 S.W.2d 431,
432 (Ky. 1986).
Furthermore, we find no indication in the record that the prosecutor
intentionally elicited the improper testimony. During direct examination, the
prosecutor asked the arresting officer to describe the traffic stop of Hoppenjans.
After discussing Hoppenjans’s performance on various coordination tests, the
prosecutor then asked “What did you do next?” The officer then discussed the
PBT and Hoppenjans’s refusal to take the test.
For the purpose of appellate review, the trial judge is always
recognized as the person best situated to properly evaluate the circumstances as to
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when a mistrial is required. Kirkland v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Ky.
2001). Consequently, the decision to grant a mistrial is within the trial court's
discretion, and such a ruling will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of
that discretion. Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky. 2004).
Hoppenjans has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his motion for a mistrial.
We will add, however, that our holding on this matter should not be
construed as an approval of the admission of this type of evidence. As Hoppenjans
correctly points out, KRS 189A.100(1) and 189A.104(2) clearly prohibit the
introduction of any evidence about the PBT during the guilt or sentencing phase of
the trial. See also Greene v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. App. 2008).
These statutes have been in effect since 2000. At this point, prosecutors and police
officers participating in DUI cases should be fully aware of these rules. While an
admonition was sufficient to cure the error in this case, this type of error should be
easily avoidable with proper preparation of witnesses. Further, in a case with more
questionable proof, we would be more likely to reverse and remand with
instruction to conduct a new trial.
Accordingly, the order of the Carroll Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Harry P. Hellings, Jr.
Covington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Monk
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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