TISDALL (THEODORE H.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001280-MR
THEODORE H. TISDALL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00062
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: This appeal is from a final judgment of the Monroe
Circuit Court sentencing Appellant to seven years in prison for sexual abuse in the
first degree. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Appellant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse resulting from
an incident that took place inside the family’s van while stopped at a gas station on
July 12, 2007, at around 9:30 p.m. Suzanne Tisdall, Appellant’s wife, was in the
driver’s seat of the vehicle, and Appellant was seated behind the passenger seat.
The couple’s seventeen-year-old son sat in the front passenger seat, and their threeyear-old daughter sat in the seat behind Ms. Tisdall and next to Appellant. The van
was parked facing the street, and the gas station’s lights reflected through the rear
window of the vehicle.
Before pumping any gas, Ms. Tisdall remained in the car to count
change. As she was counting, the couple’s daughter made a sound, and Ms.
Tisdall turned to look at her. Ms. Tisdall saw Appellant with his right hand
underneath their daughter’s car seat, beneath her right thigh and underneath her
pants and diaper, near her anus or vagina. Ms. Tisdall watched for approximately
two to five seconds. When Appellant saw Ms. Tisdall looking at him, he gasped
and jerked his hand away from their daughter.
Ms. Tisdall became angry and exited the van, but, after determining
that the gas station was not a proper place to deal with the situation, she drove the
family home. When they arrived, Ms. Tisdall examined her daughter for any
injuries and found none. After arguing with Appellant for two to two and one-half
hours, Ms. Tisdall called the police. Officer T.J. Hestand and another officer
arrived and took Ms. Tisdall and her daughter to the hospital for an examination.
-2-
Around 5:00 or 6:00 a.m. that morning, Officer Hestand and a social
worker, Joy Harlan, returned to Appellant’s home. Appellant indicated that he
knew why Officer Hestand was there. Both Officer Hestand and Ms. Harlan
testified that Officer Hestand read Appellant his Miranda rights, while Appellant
testified that he did not remember Officer Hestand reading him his Miranda rights
at his home. Although Officer Hestand testified that he gave Appellant the
Miranda warnings, Officer Hestand stated that, at that time, Appellant was not
under arrest and was free to terminate the interview if he desired.
During the interview, Appellant initially denied any misconduct.
However, approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, he acknowledged touching his
daughter. Officer Hestand stated that Appellant told him he did it for “the thrill of
the moment,” and that he was trying to get a reaction from his daughter.
Thereafter, Officer Hestand arrested Appellant and took him to the Monroe County
Jail.
After Appellant was taken to jail, Ms. Tisdall and her daughter
returned home, and Ms. Tisdall provided a written statement to the police stating
the events that had transpired, and that she had suspected improper behavior from
her husband for approximately a month before the incident. She based this
suspicion on the fact that her daughter did not want to be in the same room with
Appellant, and did not want Ms. Tisdall to change her diapers. She also suspected
Appellant of molesting her daughter in 2006, at which time she threw Appellant
out of the house for three to four months. She did not report anything to the
-3-
authorities, but Appellant testified that the incident in 2006 was investigated by
Child Protective Services and that nothing was uncovered.
Officer Hestand later returned to the jail with Ms. Harlan to get a
written statement from Appellant. Officer Hestand gave Appellant a Miranda
waiver form, which Appellant signed. Appellant then wrote a statement in which
he confessed to fondling his daughter in “the vagina area,” and that it had been an
ongoing problem for the past three to four months.
At trial, Appellant changed his story, stating that he did not
inappropriately touch his daughter. He testified that he was merely playing with
his daughter, and that although he touched his daughter on her side and tickled her
arm, he never touched her on the thigh. Appellant also testified that, at the time of
the incident, he and Ms. Tisdall were having marital problems, involving
arguments about their financial situation and other matters not revolving around
the sexual abuse accusations. Appellant felt that his wife accused him of the
inappropriate touching in order to remove him from the house.
The jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree sexual abuse, and
recommended a sentence of seven years in the penitentiary. This sentence was
ultimately imposed by the trial court.
Other facts will be given as they become relevant to each of
Appellant’s arguments.
ANALYSIS
-4-
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred when it failed to grant
defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial when Officer Hestand testified that
Appellant had gone to “KCPC,” or the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center,
to be evaluated for his competency to stand trial. Appellant claims the
consequential implication that Appellant was “crazy” or “unstable” violated his
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution and Sections Two, Seven, and Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution.
During the trial, Officer Hestand stated, in response to a question as to
whether he made any promises of aid to Appellant, that:
I told him that we would see about getting him some
help, and you know I’m not a . . . not trying to be smart
or anything, but I’m not a psychiatrist. I can’t evaluate
him, and he did go for some evaluation to KCPC.
There was an immediate objection from both counsel. The trial court sustained the
objection and admonished the jury not to consider the statement for any purpose.
Thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the
motion, but offered to further admonish the jury, which both parties declined. In
denying the motion for a mistrial, the trial court noted that there was a joint
objection to the statement, the objection had been sustained, the statement was
limited in its effect, the jury had been admonished, and the trial court had offered
to further admonish the jury.
A trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant a mistrial,
and its ruling will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.
-5-
Bray v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 741, 752 (Ky. 2005) (citing Woodard v.
Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky. 2004)). Granting a mistrial is “an
extreme remedy and should be resorted to only where there appears in the record a
manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity.” Id. (citing
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Ky. 1985)). Moreover, “the error
must be ‘of such character and magnitude that a litigant will be denied a fair and
impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way [except by
grant of a mistrial].’” Id. (quoting Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc., 929 S.W.2d 734,
738 (Ky. 1996)).
Kentucky courts have further held that “[a] jury is presumed to follow
an admonition to disregard evidence; thus, the admonition cures any error.”
Combs v. Commonwealth, 198 S.W.3d 574, 581 (Ky. 2006) (citing Mills v.
Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 485 (Ky. 1999)). There are only two situations
in which the presumption of the effectiveness of an admonition fails:
(1) when there is an overwhelming probability that the
jury will be unable to follow the court’s admonition and
there is a strong likelihood that the effect of the
inadmissible evidence would be devastating to the
defendant; and (2) when the question was asked without
a factual basis and was “inflammatory” or “highly
prejudicial.”
Combs, 198 S.W.3d at 581-582 (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d
430, 441 (Ky. 2003)).
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that recurring prejudicial
remarks made by a sheriff during trial, including the statement that the defendant
-6-
“lied to us like a dog,” could not be cured with an admonition. Brison v.
Commonwealth, 519 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Ky. 1975). Further, in Brown v.
Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Ky. 1995), the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that an admonition to the jury not to consider hearsay evidence implicating
defendant in a crime was “insufficient to cure the prejudicial impact.”
Given the stringent standard for granting a mistrial and the curative
admonition given to the jury, the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion. Appellant claims this case falls under both situations
described in Combs. This claim fails. The average lay juror is most likely not
familiar with the term “KCPC,” and therefore, in all probability, the jury did not
realize what Officer Hestand meant when he stated Appellant went for an
evaluation there. Officer Hestand never stated the words “Kentucky Correctional
Psychiatric Center.” Moreover, the statement was not in response to questioning
regarding Appellant’s competency, and did not allude to the type of evaluation that
took place.
Further, this is not a situation involving the introduction of recurring
inflammatory remarks or a substantial amount of prejudicial evidence against
Appellant. Unlike in Brison, Officer Hestand’s statement was in passing, was only
said once, and was likely not entirely understood by the jury. The hearsay
evidence in Brown implicated the defendant in a crime and was easily understood
by the jury. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant’s motion for a mistrial.
-7-
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred when it admitted a
Miranda waiver form signed by Appellant before making his written statement at
the jail when the Commonwealth did not provide defense counsel with the waiver
until the morning of the trial. The Commonwealth explained that the copy of the
waiver had unintentionally been left out of the discovery materials, and that the
mistake had only been realized that morning. Officer Hestand’s police report,
which was timely included with the other discovery material, indicated that a
waiver had been executed. Defense counsel objected to the waiver’s late
admission. The trial court ruled that the waiver could be introduced, given that
there was no improper motivation behind the Commonwealth’s failure to produce
the document and that Officer Hestand’s police report had made reference to the
waiver’s existence and execution. Defense counsel did not ask for a continuance
or for additional time to examine the Miranda waiver.
The standard of review for a court’s ruling on these issues is whether
the trial court abused its discretion. Penman v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 237,
249 (Ky. 2006) (citing Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196, 202 (Ky. 2003)).
The test for abuse of discretion is whether a trial court’s decision is “arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth
v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).
A discovery violation does not automatically mandate that evidence
be excluded or that a trial should be continued. In Penman, 194 S.W.3d at 249, the
Kentucky Supreme Court determined that trial courts may use their own judgment
-8-
under Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 7.24(9) to cure discovery
violations. That rule states:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is
brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed
to comply with this rule or an order issued pursuant
thereto, the court may direct such party to permit the
discovery or inspection of materials not previously
disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from
introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it
may enter such other order as may be just under the
circumstances.
(Emphasis added).
Appellant cites Barnett v. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Ky.
1989), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction
in part for the Commonwealth’s failure to provide certain discovery before the
trial. A key witness testified to seeing the defendant and the defendant’s vehicle at
the crime scene on several occasions before the crime. The Commonwealth,
however, omitted the witness’s name and statement from the discovery provided to
defense counsel. Defense counsel only became aware of the witness five days
after the trial started. Defense counsel claimed a breach of pre-trial discovery
orders and procedures. The Court noted that “[t]his is a case where the jury first
reported that it was deadlocked, and only returned a verdict after it was directed by
the court to resume deliberation and ‘try’ to reach a verdict.” Id. at 123.
Therefore, the Court could not “say that failure to discover [the witness’s]
statement until the fifth day of trial . . . did not result in the guilty verdict.” Id.
-9-
Although in this situation a discovery violation did occur, we cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the waiver form into
evidence. Appellant argues that, as in Barnett, the late disclosure interfered with
his right to present a defense and had an impact on his defense strategy, and denied
him the right to adequately prepare for cross-examination. Unlike Barnett,
however, the omission did not involve discovery as vital as an eyewitness’s
incriminating statement. In addition, the late disclosure had little impact on the
defense strategy. Whether the waiver was admitted or not, defense counsel would
have presented essentially the same defense theories – that Ms. Tisdall made up the
accusation because of the couple’s marital discord, that Appellant was not given
the Miranda warnings before his oral confession at his residence, that the
confession at his residence was not voluntary, and that the written statement later
given at the jail should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
Moreover, although Appellant may have had to cross-examine Officer
Hestand differently at trial than he had at the suppression hearing that morning, the
Constitution “guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish.” Barroso v. Commonwealth, 122 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Ky. 2003)
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40
(1987)).
Finally, unlike in Barnett, it cannot be said that the omission of the
waiver resulted in the guilty verdict. The jury deliberated a mere ten minutes
-10-
before returning the verdict. Even if the waiver had been excluded, Appellee could
still have introduced the testimony of Ms. Tisdall regarding the events of that
night, as well as the testimony of Officer Hestand and Ms. Harlan regarding
Appellant’s oral confession at the residence. Therefore, the trial court did not err
when it admitted the Miranda waiver at trial.
Appellant’s final argument is that the trial court erred when it did not
suppress his oral statements to police made at his residence because the statement
was involuntarily given.2 At trial, Appellant asserted that he felt intimidated by
Officer Hestand’s tone of voice, body language, and facial expressions at his
house, and that he did not feel free to leave because Officer Hestand stood in front
of the exit. Appellant further testified that, at one point, Officer Hestand would not
let him leave to go to his bedroom. He also indicated that he had had little sleep
before he was interviewed by the officer, and that Officer Hestand said he wanted
to help him, and told him “you don’t need prison.” Appellant testified that he did
not want to jeopardize the deal, and by confessing at his home, signing the
Miranda warning waiver, and writing the statement at the jail, he was trying to
cooperate with law enforcement. He stated that nothing in the statement was true.
2
Appellant states in his brief that the trial court failed to specifically rule on whether Appellant
was given Miranda warnings prior to making the oral confession in his residence. However, in
ruling on the motion to suppress the statements, the trial court underscored the fact that Officer
Hestand testified to giving Appellant the Miranda warnings. The trial court’s inclusion of this
evidence in the ruling is the equivalent of making such a finding. Further, the trial court’s
finding that Appellant was given the Miranda warnings was supported by substantial evidence,
as both Officer Hestand and Ms. Harlan testified that the warnings were given before Appellant
made any statements.
-11-
Officer Hestand testified that Appellant agreed to talk after hearing
the Miranda warnings, and that Appellant did not ask for an attorney. He further
testified that Appellant was free to terminate the interview or leave the room. It
was only after Appellant confessed that Officer Hestand refused to allow him into
the bedroom, as he was concerned for the safety of Ms. Harlan and himself.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The court
found that the statement was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances as
there was no evidence of coercive tactics, intimidation, or threatening.
A trial court’s determination that a statement is voluntary can only be
overturned on appeal if the ruling is clearly erroneous. Allee v. Commonwealth,
454 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Ky. 1970). The trial court’s findings of fact cannot be
disturbed “[i]f supported by substantial evidence.” RCr 9.78.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow
the admission of confessions if a defendant’s “will has been overborne and his
capacity for self-determination critically impaired.” Bailey v. Commonwealth, 194
S.W.3d 296, 300 (Ky. 2006) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). The court must analyze the
totality of the circumstances when looking at the voluntariness of a confession.
Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 847 (Ky. 2004). The Kentucky Supreme
Court has recognized three elements in reviewing the voluntariness of a
confession:
-12-
1) whether the police activity was ‘objectively coercive’;
2) whether the coercion overbore the will of the
defendant; and 3) whether the defendant demonstrated
that the coercive police activity was the ‘crucial
motivating factor’ behind the defendant’s confession.
Henson v. Commonwealth, 20 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Ky. 1999).
Because the trial court was faced with contradictory testimony as to
the circumstances surrounding the confession, we will give due deference to its
opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, and find that the trial
court’s determination was supported by substantial evidence. Even if Appellant
felt intimidated by Officer Hestand, the police activity must be objectively
coercive. Looks, body language, and Officer Hestand’s statement that he would
try to get Appellant help somewhere down the line are not objectively indicative of
coercive police activity. The trial court’s determination that Appellant’s
confession was voluntary is supported by substantial evidence and is therefore
affirmed.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Monroe Circuit Court
is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-13-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven Buck
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
John Paul Varo
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-14-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.