BUFORD (MARCUS) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: OCTOBER 2, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001272-MR
MARCUS BUFORD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00292
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND
REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; THOMPSON, JUDGE; BUCKINGHAM,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Marcus Buford appeals from an order of the McCracken
Circuit Court denying his motion for specific performance of his plea agreement
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
or, alternatively, to withdraw his guilty plea. Because Buford pled guilty due to
the trial court’s misinterpretation of a statute, which constituted a material element
of his plea agreement, we reverse and remand.
On December 22, 2000, Buford was indicted on two counts of firstdegree sexual abuse. The indictment was based on allegations that he had
molested two minor girls who were members of a church youth group. The two
alleged incidents of molestation occurred when Buford chaperoned the youth
group overnight on two separate occasions. During the relevant period, Buford
served as the youth minister with the responsibility of supervising the youth group.
During his trial, in addition to evidence relating to the two minors,
substantial testimony was introduced regarding an earlier allegation of sexual
abuse against Buford by his niece. However, significant issues of reliability
surrounded this testimony, including the fact that his niece could not remember her
alleged sexual abuse and believed that she may have been told to make up the
allegation by someone else due to a bitter custody dispute.
Following his jury trial, Buford was found guilty and sentenced to tenyears’ imprisonment. On discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme Court
reversed Buford’s conviction in Commonwealth v. Buford, 197 S.W.3d 66 (Ky.
2006). The Court held that the “prior bad act” evidence regarding Buford’s niece
was improperly admitted because the record failed to demonstrate “the requisite
-2-
striking similarity between the incident involving [the niece] and that involving
[the two girls].” Id. at 71. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
On March 9, 2007, Buford entered a guilty plea to two counts of
sexual abuse in the first degree in open court. At this plea hearing, the prosecutor,
defense counsel, and trial court engaged in a lengthy discussion regarding the
statutory period of Buford’s registration as a sex offender. At the conclusion of
this discussion, the parties agreed that Buford was subject to the ten-year
registration requirement, not the lifetime requirement. After placing Buford under
oath, the trial court engaged in a plea colloquy pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
During the plea colloquy, Buford’s counsel interjected when the issue
of the required registration period was discussed. Defense counsel stated that he
wanted to make the record clear that Buford would be subject to the ten-year
registration rather than the lifetime registration pursuant to statute. Before the
hearing concluded, defense counsel again discussed his concern regarding the
application of the registration laws to his client which the parties resolved.
On May 1, 2007, the trial court issued its final judgment sentencing
Buford to two concurrent sentences of five-years’ imprisonment. After receiving
credit for his presentence confinement, the trial court probated the remaining time
on his sentence for five years. Buford was further ordered to register as a sex
offender for a ten-year period.
-3-
After the judgment was entered, the Secretary of the Justice and
Public Safety Cabinet notified the parties that Buford was required to be a lifetime
sex offender registrant. Buford then filed a motion requesting the trial court to
limit his registration period to ten years as provided in his plea agreement. When
the Commonwealth did not contest, the trial court issued an order limiting Buford’s
registration to the ten-year reporting requirement.
When the Cabinet reaffirmed its position not to modify Buford’s
registration requirement, he filed another motion seeking to change his registration.
The trial court then ruled that Kentucky law, pursuant to KRS 17.520(2)(a)(4),
mandated Buford’s lifetime registration.2 Buford then moved to withdraw his plea.
After the trial court found that Buford’s plea was not constitutionally defective and
denied his motion, this appeal followed.
Buford argues that the trial court was required to enforce the
Commonwealth’s contractual obligation by strictly enforcing the plea agreement.
He contends that the prosecutor, acting as the Commonwealth’s agent, bound the
Commonwealth and its agencies to honor his plea agreement. Therefore, even if it
had to use its contempt powers, he contends that the trial court was required to
limit his sex offender registration to ten years. We disagree.
Notwithstanding Buford’s contentions, our courts cannot ignore the
plain mandate of the statutory language used by the legislature. Kirby v.
2
Buford and the Commonwealth agree that Buford is subject to lifetime registration as a sex
offender as a result of his plea agreement. However, at the time of his plea, both parties and the
trial court believed he was subject to the ten-year registration period.
-4-
Commonwealth, 132 S.W.3d 233, 237 (Ky.App. 2004). Under KRS
17.520(2)(a)(4), “[l]ifetime registration is required for . . . [a]ny person who has
been convicted of two (2) or more felony criminal offenses against a victim who is
a minor[.]” Therefore, because the legislature has directed that lifetime registration
is mandatory for conviction for two felony crimes against a minor, neither the trial
court nor the Commonwealth can provide any lesser requirement. Carpenter v.
Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Ky.App. 2007).
Buford next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. Contending that the parties entered into the plea
agreement by mutual mistake, he argues that he should have been permitted to
withdraw his guilty plea. Because fundamental fairness requires that Buford be
permitted to withdraw his plea, we agree.
“A plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of several fundamental
constitutional rights.” Haight v. Commonwealth, 760 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Ky. 1988).
Because of this significant fact, plea agreements implicate a defendant’s due
process rights. Elmore v. Commonwealth, 236 S.W.3d 623, 626 (Ky.App. 2007).
Consequently, if a material element of a plea agreement cannot be complied with
by operation of law, fundamental fairness requires that a defendant be provided the
opportunity to withdraw his plea if he desires to do so. Commonwealth v. Martin,
777 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Ky.App. 1989).
At his plea hearing, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and trial court
engaged in a discussion regarding the length of Buford’s sex offender registration.
-5-
The prosecutor and defense counsel believed that he was subject to the ten-year
registration requirement, not the lifetime registration requirement. The trial court
agreed and issued its judgment reflecting this consensus. However, this ruling
constituted a misinterpretation of the sex offender registration laws, which was
later identified by the Cabinet, resulting in a detriment to Buford.
While the trial court found that the registration laws were collateral to
his plea and did not constitute punishment, this matter was extensively discussed
during the plea hearing and, thus, was an obviously significant concern to Buford.
The record is clear that Buford’s period of registration was the central issue during
his plea proceedings, and he was misinformed on the law by all. Therefore, unlike
in other sex offender registration cases, the trial court “had reason to know [the
registration period] was an essential element of [Buford’s] agreement to plead
guilty.” Carpenter, 231 S.W.3d at 136. Accordingly, based on these facts,
fundamental fairness requires that Buford be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea
and proceed to trial. Martin, 777 S.W.2d at 238.
For the foregoing reasons, the McCracken Circuit Court’s order is
reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
-6-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Tod D. Megibow
Paducah, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
J. Hays Lawson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.