BACK (HOWARD H.) VS. ROSS (JEFFREY)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001267-MR
HOWARD H. BACK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MAGOFFIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY C. CHILDERS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00088
JEFFREY ROSS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; VANMETER, JUDGE; LAMBERT,1
SENIOR JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Howard Harlow Back appeals from an order of the
Magoffin Circuit Court denying him damages in his suit against Jeffrey Ross.
After carefully reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm.
In 2004, Back filed a complaint alleging that Ross had breached a
contract concerning operation of a liquor store and loss of a liquor license. Ross
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
was provided notice through a warning order attorney, but he did not file any
responsive pleadings. In October 2006, the Magoffin Circuit Court entered a
default judgment in Back’s favor and scheduled a hearing to determine damages.
The first hearing was held on February 22, 2008. Back and Ross both
testified, and neither presented any witnesses – lay or expert. They provided
contradictory information concerning the value of the business and the liquor
licenses. The court requested tax return information from Back and business
records from Ross in order to have some evidence of the damages that Back may
have suffered. The record shows that Ross complied with the court’s request but
that Back never submitted his income tax records.
In May 2008, the court held a supplemental hearing in which it
focused on the ownership of the liquor licenses. Back testified that he had
obtained the licenses from the state in 1986. He relinquished them after being
convicted of a felony in 1990. He has never owned a liquor license since that time.
After his release from prison in 1995, Back owned liquor stores, but the liquor
licenses were owned by the managers, including the one owned by Ross.
Back testified that his felony conviction did not prohibit him from
owning a liquor license. He told the court explicitly that he wanted the benefits of
liquor license ownership without the burdens.
On May 19, 2008, the trial court entered an order holding that Back
was not entitled to receive damages from Ross because he failed to provide the
-2-
court with proof of income from the contract. Furthermore, because he did not
own the liquor license in question, he was not entitled to damages from its loss.
Back appeals.
The trial court’s order recited four reasons as basis for denying
damages to Back: (1) Back did not own the liquor licenses in question and did not
have compensable damages resulting from their transfer; (2) Back failed to provide
the court proof that he received and reported income from the business; (3) Back
failed to prove compensable damages of any kind; and (4) Back is a convicted
felon.
Under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01, we may not
disturb the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. A factual
finding is clearly erroneous only if it is not supported by substantial evidence.
Bailey v. Bailey, 231 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Ky. App. 2007). Substantial evidence is
“that which, when taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient
probative value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.” Id.
Compensatory damages are an issue of fact. Smith v. Carbide and Chemicals
Corp., 226 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Ky. 2007).
The trial court’s finding that Back did not own the liquor licenses is
supported by Back’s own testimony. He unequivocally stated at both hearings that
he had not owned liquor licenses in many years and furthermore that he did not
want the responsibility of owning them. The trial court did not err in this finding.
-3-
The record does not reveal any evidence that Back reported income
from the business to the IRS or the Kentucky Department of Revenue. Therefore,
the trial court did not err in its finding on this point.
Though Back claimed that the business was worth $300,000, the only
evidence presented was his own speculation. Ross provided contradictory
testimony. According to Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01, the trial
court is afforded “due regard” in determining the credibility of witnesses. We will
not disturb its finding without substantial probative evidence to the contrary. O.S.,
Jr. v. C.F., 655 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky. App. 1983). Nothing in the record
substantiates Back’s claims of the business’s value. Therefore, the trial court did
not err.
Finally, Back argues that the trial court erred in denying him damages
because he is a convicted felon. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 243.100 only
prohibits a person who “has been convicted of any felony” from holding a liquor
license “until five (5) years have passed from the date of conviction, release from
custody or incarceration, parole, or termination of probation, whichever is later[.]”
Though Back did not provide proof that he satisfied this requirement, he was
released from prison in 1995 following his conviction in 1990. There is no
evidence of a subsequent felony conviction that would bar his ability to apply
again for a liquor license.
Back’s status as a convicted felon had no bearing on the issue of
damages in this case. Although the court erred on this issue, its error is harmless
-4-
because Back failed to establish his entitlement to damages for the reasons
previously discussed. At the time of his involvement with Ross, Back did not own
the liquor license in question and failed to offer any affirmative evidence of his
alleged financial loss to substantiate a damages claim.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court despite its erroneous recitation that
Back’s status as a felon barred him from damages.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
Lowell E. Spencer
Paintsville, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.