BIGGS (MARK OWEN) VS. BIGGS (AMY SUE)
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 4, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001219-ME
MARK OWEN BIGGS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA N. FARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 99-CI-00351
AMY SUE BIGGS, NOW NICHOLS
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; WINE, JUDGE; GRAVES,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: Mark Biggs appeals the dismissal of his motion to
modify custody by the Henderson Circuit Court. After our review, we vacate and
remand.
Mark Biggs (Mark) and Amy Nichols (Amy) divorced in 1999. At
that time, their son, Jesse, was three years of age. The Henderson Circuit Court
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Senior Judge John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
ordered joint custody with Amy designated as the primary care provider. In 2007,
Amy, her new husband, and Jesse moved to Colorado. Mark was deployed to
Afghanistan. Mark filed a motion in Henderson Circuit Court to prevent Amy
from taking Jesse to Colorado. The court denied the motion because of Mark’s
deployment but advised him to file another motion once he was “available” –
presumably meaning upon his return to Kentucky.
In 2008, Mark filed a motion to modify custody. Citing lack of
jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the motion in April 2008, finding that
Kentucky was no longer Jesse’s home state. Mark now appeals the trial court’s
denial of his motion to reconsider. After examining the record and the applicable
law, we are persuaded that the trial court erred in its order declining to exercise
jurisdiction in this matter.
Kentucky adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in 2004. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.800,
et seq. The UCCJEA was intended to bring states’ laws into compliance with the
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA). UCCJEA Prefatory Note
(1999).
UCCJEA directs that an initial custody determination should be made
by a court in the child’s home state – defined as the state in which the child has
resided for six months. KRS 403.800(7). In this case, neither party disputes that
the Henderson Circuit Court properly made the initial custody determination under
KRS 403.822. Therefore, the issue before us is whether it properly declined to
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exercise continuing jurisdiction in modification matters. Whether a trial court acts
within its jurisdiction is a question of law; therefore, our review is de novo.
Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 810 (Ky. 2004).
The trial court relied on KRS 403.824(1), which provides that the
state making an initial custody determination retains jurisdiction unless:
(a) A court of this state determines that neither the child,
nor the child and one (1) parent, nor the child and a
person acting as a parent have a significant connection
with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer
available in this state concerning the child’s care,
protection, training, and personal relationships[.]
“Significant connection” is explained by the following comment to UCCJEA §
202:
[E]ven if the child has acquired a new home State, the
original decree State retains exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction . . . If the relationship between the child and
the person remaining in the State . . . becomes so
attenuated that the court could no longer find significant
connections and substantial evidence, jurisdiction would
no longer exist.
As Kentucky law is sparse in construing our counterpart of the
UCCSEA, we have looked to sister states for guidance. Michigan has also adopted
the UCCJEA, and its Court of Appeals recently found that a significant connection
exists if “one parent resides in the state and exercises at least some parenting time
in the state.” White v. Harrison-White, 760 N.W.2d 691, 697 (Mich. Ct. App.
2008). The Court of Appeals of Tennessee has explained that under the principles
of the PKPA and the UCCJEA, “continuing jurisdiction trump[s] ‘home state’
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jurisdiction.” Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d 532, 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)
(quoted by Wallace v. Wallace, 224 S.W.3d 587, 589-90 (Ky. App. 2007)).
Our Supreme Court has recently held that a new state may not
exercise jurisdiction for purposes of custody unless a Kentucky court first
determines that the new state would be a more convenient forum according to the
factors listed in KRS 403.834. Mauldin v. Bearden, 293 S.W.3d 392, 401
(Ky.2009).
In the case before us, the trial court’s order observed that Jesse attends
school and that he participates in extracurricular activities in Colorado.
Additionally, it found that “neither the child, nor the child and one (1) parent, have
significant connection with [Kentucky] and substantial evidence is no longer
available in [Kentucky] concerning the child’s care, protection, training and
personal relationships.” However, it did not apply the factors mandated by KRS
403.834(2):
(a) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely
to continue in the future and which state could best
protect the parties and the child;
(b) The length of time the child has resided outside this
state;
(c) The distance between the court in this state and the
court in the state that would assume jurisdiction;
(d) The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(e) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should
assume jurisdiction;
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(f) The nature and location of the evidence required to
resolve the pending litigation, including testimony of the
child;
(g) The ability of the court of each state to decide the
issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to
present the evidence; and
(h) The familiarity of the court of each state with the
facts and issues in the pending litigation.
KRS 403.834(3) also instructs that if a trial court has declined to exercise
jurisdiction, it must “stay the proceedings upon condition that a child custody
proceeding be promptly commenced in another designated state.” Thus, a child is
not left without the continuity of the protective oversight of a court by slipping
through the cracks of disputed jurisdictions. The record does not indicate that the
trial court complied with this directive to assure continuity of a proceeding
initiated in Colorado.
We conclude that the trial court erred when it did not follow the
analysis and procedures mandated by the UCCJEA. Again, authority is sparse, and
there is no caselaw construing the statute to provide guidance for trial courts
navigating this relatively new and uncharted course. Although Kentucky’s caselaw
for the UCCJEA is still developing, other jurisdictions that have adopted the
UCCJEA consistently require their courts to apply rather meticulously the factors
in the statutes that correspond to KRS 403.834(2). See Krebs v. Krebs, 960 A.2d
637 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Meyeres v. Meyeres, 196 P.3d 604 (Utah Ct. App.
2008); In re Adoption of Baby Boy M., 193 P.3d 520 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008);
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Malissa C. v. Matthew Wayne H., 193 P.3d 569 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); Ramsey v.
Ramsey, 995 So.2d 881 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008).
Additionally, the trial court erred in its determination that neither
Jesse nor one of his parents had significant connections to Kentucky. Though
Jesse has resided in Colorado for one year, it is not necessary for a child to reside
in the Commonwealth in order for Kentucky to retain jurisdiction. Goff v. Goff,
172 S.W.3d 352, 358 (Ky. 2005). While Jesse has been in Colorado, his father
remained a Kentucky resident. The record reveals that Jesse had lengthy visits
with Mark in Kentucky during that year. Jesse’s younger half-sister, grandparents,
and other relatives also reside in Kentucky.
In its determination of whether it retains jurisdiction, a trial court is
required to consider what – if any – other courts might be appropriate. KRS
403.834(2)(g) & (h). In this case, Jesse’s mother was preparing to move him from
Colorado to Indiana. The record shows that the trial court acknowledged that its
decision had caused Jesse to be in a state of limbo, an inevitable but regrettable
result of life in today’s mobile society bearing the obvious danger of repetition.
This limbo-like state is the very consequence that the UCCJEA has sought to
eliminate. See Melinda H. Eitzen et al, Annual Survey of Texas Law Articles,
Family Law: Parent and Child, 56 SMU L. Rev. 1707 (2003); Julie A. Morley, A
Silver Lining in Domestic Turmoil: A Call for Massachusetts to Adopt the
UCCJEA’s Emergency Jurisdiction Provision, 43 New Eng. L. Rev. 135 (2008).
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In summary, the trial court did not apply the necessary statutory
factors and erred in its finding that neither Jesse nor Mark has significant
connections with the state of Kentucky. Therefore, we vacate the order of the
Henderson Circuit Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Susie H. Moore
Henderson, Kentucky
William B. Norment, Jr.
Henderson, Kentucky
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