WAGONER (ROBIN) VS. BRADLEY (KATRINA), ET AL.
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001179-MR
ROBIN WAGONER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM B. MAINS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-90030
KATRINA BRADLEY,
AND DANNY MORAN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND STUMBO, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Robin Wagoner appeals from the Rowan Circuit Court’s
order dismissing her case with prejudice for failure to comply with the applicable
statute of limitations. After careful review, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580
Wagoner filed a complaint in the Rowan Circuit Court on January 23,
2008, alleging that she had a single-car accident at the intersection of KY 158 and
KY 32 on November 14, 2006. According to Wagoner, she crashed her car into an
embankment because she did not see a stop sign in time. Wagoner alleged that the
defendants in the underlying action, Katrina Bradley and Danny Moran, were
negligent in erecting the stop sign in the wrong place. In response to the suit,
Bradley and Moran filed a motion to dismiss Wagoner’s action on February 18,
2008.
On April 22, 2008, the trial court entered an order dismissing
Wagoner’s suit pursuant to KRS 44.110(1), which requires that suits filed with the
Board of Claims be filed within a one-year statute of limitations. Because
Wagoner waited until January 2008 to file suit for a November 2006 accident, the
trial court dismissed her claims. This appeal follows.
We review a trial court’s order dismissing a complaint de novo.
James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883-84 (Ky.App. 2002). It is well established
that a court should not grant a motion to dismiss a complaint “unless it appears the
pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be
proved in support of his claim.” Pari-Mutuel Clerks' Union v. Kentucky Jockey
Club, 551 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. 1977).
On appeal, Wagoner argues the trial court incorrectly applied the oneyear statute of limitations in KRS 44.110(1) and should have applied the two-year
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statute of limitations found in the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA),
because this is a motor vehicle case filed in circuit court. In support of that
argument, Wagoner contends the placement of the stop sign involves Bradley and
Moran’s ministerial duties, which she claims are not bound by the Board of Claims
cases.
Bradley and Moran argue that the trial court properly dismissed the
complaint as violating the applicable one-year statute of limitations under KRS
44.110(1), relying on Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet Dept. of Highways v. Abner,
810 S.W.2d 504 (Ky. 1991). The trial court found that under Abner, “whenever
negligence is alleged against the Commonwealth or one of its employees, the
statute of limitations is one year. Filing this case in Circuit Court does not extend
the statute of limitations beyond one year.” We agree with the trial court.
In Abner, the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a
vehicle owned by the Commonwealth of Kentucky Department of Highways. Like
Wagoner in the instant case, the plaintiff in Abner filed his case more than one
year from the date the action accrued. The Board of Claims dismissed Abner’s
case as being untimely filed pursuant to KRS 44.110(1). Abner appealed to the
circuit court, which reversed the dismissal applying the two-year statute of
limitations found in the MVRA. This Court affirmed the circuit court’s holding
but was reversed by a unanimous decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Justice Wintersheimer, writing for the Supreme Court, noted:
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Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that
the General Assembly can direct in what manner and in
what court suits may be brought against the
Commonwealth . . . for its negligence pursuant to KRS
44.070 through KRS 44.160 which creates the Board of
Claims. KRS 44.110(1) provides that all claims must be
filed within one year from the time the claim for relief
accrued.
The Board of Claims Act is a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity. KRS 44.110 is part of the grant of the right to
sue the Commonwealth and establishes a condition
precedent to bringing an action and it must be complied
with or the action is barred by sovereign immunity.
Abner, 810 S.W.2d at 504. (Emphasis added). Justice Wintersheimer also pointed
out that the Board of Claims Act was enacted in 1946, and the MVRA was enacted
in 1974. When the General Assembly met and amended KRS 44.110 in 1986, it
did not change the one-year statute of limitations. Given every opportunity to
change the statute of limitations in the Board of Claims Act, it is clear that the
General Assembly did not wish to extend its waiver of sovereign immunity to
include a two-year statue of limitations. Id. at 505.
We find Abner to be squarely on point with the case at bar. The fact
that this case was originally filed in circuit court has no bearing on the statute of
limitations, just as the fact that Abner refiled his case in circuit court had no
bearing on the statute of limitations in Abner. Absent the General Assembly’s
limited waiver of sovereign immunity, there could be no action against the
Commonwealth or its employees. Contrary to Wagoner’s assertion, the MVRA
does not extend the one-year statute of limitations contained in KRS 44.110(1).
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Also contrary to Wagoner’s assertion that this case involved Bradley’s and
Moran’s ministerial duties, the same statute of limitations applies to the
Commonwealth and its employees, regardless of whether the alleged negligence
involved discretionary or ministerial acts.
Accordingly, because this case was filed outside the one-year statue of
limitations as codified in KRS 44.110(1), the trial court correctly dismissed this
case. Therefore, we affirm the April 22, 2008, order of the Rowan Circuit Court
dismissing this case with prejudice.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Roy J. Downey
Pikeville, Kentucky
Jon H. Johnson
Flemingsburg, Kentucky
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