JOHNSON (MARK) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001093-MR
MARK JOHNSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. STARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CR-00212
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: Mark Johnson brings this appeal from an order of the
Graves Circuit Court revoking his conditional discharge for the offense of flagrant
nonsupport. We vacate and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Senior Judge John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
On December 12, 2006, a sentence of five years was imposed on
Johnson for the felony charge of Flagrant Nonsupport but probated on condition,
inter alia, that he pay his current child support pursuant to a previous court order,
with an additional $158.75 per month for 60 months to pay off arrears totaling
$9524.66. On January 18, 2008, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke
Johnson’s conditional discharge. The Commonwealth maintained Johnson failed
to comply with the terms of the conditional discharge, specifically stating that the
last payment made was $25.00, paid on March 6, 2007.
On May 12, 2008, a probation revocation hearing was conducted for
Johnson’s failure to pay child support, a condition of his probation. A short
hearing was held; the sole issue was whether or not the child support had been
paid. The court found that Johnson had violated his probation and imposed the
five-year sentence. This appeal followed.
Johnson argues that he was denied Due Process of Law under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by having his conditional
discharge revoked merely because he could not pay the child support ordered by
the court. Johnson maintains that he was denied Due Process “because of his
poverty and his inability to obtain a job, which resulted in his inability to pay the
required child support.” The Commonwealth argues that the trial court properly
revoked Johnson’s probation.
After review of the record, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable
law, we believe Johnson was entitled to a probation revocation hearing wherein he
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could have presented evidence that, post-plea, his financial position had changed in
such a way that he could not make the payments, whether as to the amount or
frequency.
At the outset, we note that the standard of review of the circuit court’s
decision to revoke probation is whether the circuit court abused its discretion.
Lucas v. Commonwealth, 258 S.W.3d 806 (Ky.App. 2008)(citing Tiryung v.
Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky.App. 1986)). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the “decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles.” Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Ky.
2004)(quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581
(Ky. 2000)). With this in mind, we turn to our established jurisprudence on
probation revocation.
In reviewing the cases of Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct.
2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983); Clayborn v, Commonwealth, 701 S.W.2d 413
(Ky.App. 1985); Polk v. Commonwealth, 622 S.W.2d 223 (Ky.App. 1981); and
Mauk v. Commonwealth, 700 S.W.2d 803 (Ky.App. 1985), we note that various
results were reached. Given the dissimilarity in results, we undertake a review of
the aforementioned cases.
First, in Bearden, supra, the issue was whether the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state from revoking an indigent defendant’s probation for
failure to pay a fine and restitution. The Supreme Court held that a sentencing
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court must inquire into the reasons for failure to pay in revocation proceedings for
failure to pay a fine or restitution. The Court said:
By sentencing petitioner to imprisonment simply because
he could not pay the fine, without considering the reasons
for the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the
fine or extending the time for payments or making
alternative orders, the court automatically turned a fine
into a prison sentence. . . .If, upon remand, the Georgia
courts determine that petitioner did not make sufficient
bona fide efforts to pay his fine, or determine that
alternate punishment is not adequate to meet the State’s
interests in punishment and deterrence, imprisonment
would be a permissible sentence.
Bearden at 674.
Second, in Clayborn, supra, the issue was whether Clayborn was
entitled to present evidence of his inability to pay restitution to a victim at a
probation revocation hearing, with said restitution being a condition of probation
which required the payment of a definite amount of money over a period of
months. Our Court decided Clayborn was entitled to present evidence of his
inability to pay restitution as a condition of probation and that the trial court must
consider alternative sentencing. Id. at 415.
Third, in Polk, supra, the main issue was whether Polk was entitled to
present evidence that he was indigent at a probation revocation hearing. Polk was
required, as a condition of probation, to pay restitution to a victim. Our Court
decided he was not entitled to present evidence of his indigency and held:
[I]n the case at bar, the appellant made a firm
commitment as a condition to his probation that a certain
sum would be paid rather than his going to prison. This
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is a different situation from a fine imposed by a court. It
was the understanding of all parties concerned that if the
conditions of probation were not met, the probation
would be revoked. Indigency has no application here.
Polk at 225.
In Mauk, supra, the issue was whether Mauk was entitled to a hearing
where she could present evidence of her indigency for failing to pay fines and
court costs. Our Court decided that she was entitled to present evidence and that
alternative sentencing must be considered. Mauk at 804.
It is clear that a probation revocation proceeding must conform to the
minimum requirements of due process of law. Rasdon v. Commonwealth, 701
S.W.2d 716, 718 (Ky.App. 1986). The United States Supreme Court has set forth
the minimal due process requirements applicable to a probation revocation
proceeding:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c)
opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not
allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached”
hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members
of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f)
a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d 484
(1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973),
quoting Morrissey.
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The May 12, 2008, order revoking Johnson’s conditional discharge
reads:
This matter is now before the Court on motion of the
Commonwealth to revoke the defendant’s conditional
discharge on grounds of violation of the terms of his
conditional discharge by his failure to appear for show
cause why his conditional discharge should not be
revoked and for his failure to keep his child support
payments current.
A review of the May 12, 2008, order reveals that the circuit court
failed to make findings of fact specifying the evidence relied upon to support its
decision to revoke Johnson’s conditional discharge. We believe, based on our
caselaw, that Johnson should have been given the opportunity to present evidence
arising post-plea of his inability to make payments. The “post-plea” aspect must
necessarily be considered and as such requires explanation.
Johnson pled guilty to the felony and agreed to make the payments as
ordered by the court. It would have been disingenuous of Johnson to consider
probation conditions and enter a plea knowing that, based on his current
circumstances, he could not comply with the terms of probation for the payment of
money.
The payment of money, as a probation condition, is certainly different
from many conditions oft imposed which merely require adherence by controlling
one’s conduct. Income is often not wholly dependent upon one’s desire to acquire
it; the desire may be great but the ability or opportunity may be lacking.
Regardless, Johnson knew at the time of his plea of both his current and prior
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ability to earn income and to make the required payments. Thus, the only
consideration for the trial court is whether, post-plea, financial conditions beyond
Johnson’s control lessened or wholly negated his ability to comply with the
probation condition requiring the payment of money.
Accordingly, the order of the Graves Circuit Court is vacated and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent.
Johnson was indicted for flagrant nonsupport. He pled guilty to the charge and
received a sentence of five years’ imprisonment, which was conditionally
discharged on the grounds that Johnson pay past and current child support. The
trial court entered judgment in accordance with the plea agreement on December
13, 2006. On January 18, 2008, the Commonwealth moved to revoke Johnson’s
conditional discharge because of his continued failure to satisfy his child support
obligations. After twice failing to appear for a hearing, Johnson was apprehended.
The trial court held a hearing and ultimately revoked the conditional discharge and
ordered Johnson to serve the remainder of his sentence in accordance with the plea
agreement. This appeal followed.
Johnson argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that his
inability to pay was intentional and that the trial court failed to consider alternative
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measures of punishment. He cites Clayborn v. Commonwealth, 701 S.W.2d 413
(Ky. App. 1985), and Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76
L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), in support of his argument.
First, Johnson pled guilty to the offense and therefore admitted to
every element of the crime. Whitworth v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 731 (Ky.
1969). The revocation of probation is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
standard. Ridley v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 156 (Ky. 1956). Johnson’s
reliance on Clayborn and Bearden is misplaced. Those cases dealt with the
nonpayment of fines and restitution. Johnson was incarcerated for the nonpayment
of child support. There is no legal authority requiring the trial court to inquire into
the reason for nonpayment or to consider alternative methods of punishment when
revoking Johnson’s conditional discharge for nonpayment of child support.
Johnson voluntarily entered into a plea agreement and received its benefit, but did
not abide by its terms. There is ample evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s decision. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Wm. Robert Long
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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