CITY OF PIKEVILLE (), ET AL. VS. PIKE COUNTY, KY. , ET AL.
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RENDERED: MARCH 20, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-001056-MR
CITY OF PIKEVILLE; FRANK E. JUSTICE;
AND DONOVAN BLACKBURN
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-01482
PIKE COUNTY, KENTUCKY;
ANNE THOMPSON CASSADY;
AND BALLARD W. CASSADY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: The City of Pikeville, its Mayor, Frank E.
Justice, and its City Manager, Donovan Blackburn, appeal from an order of the
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Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Pike Circuit Court that granted a motion to dismiss their petition for a declaration
of rights and their statutory action. The issue is whether the City has a statutory or
equitable right to challenge a vote against the annexation of property belonging to
the appellees, Ballard W. and Anne Thompson Cassady. The trial court concluded
that the City did not, and we affirm.
On June 7, 2006, the City enacted Ordinance No. 0-006-010 which
stated its intent to annex certain unincorporated territory in accordance with KRS
81A.420(1), which states:
When a city desires to annex unincorporated territory, the
legislative body of the city proposing to annex shall enact
an ordinance stating the intention of the city to annex.
The ordinance shall accurately define the boundary of the
unincorporated territory proposed to be annexed, and
declare it desirable to annex the unincorporated territory.
Id. The area that the ordinance proposed to annex included part of a tract of
property owned by the Cassadys, although it did not include the portion on which
their house and outbuildings are located.
The statutory framework for challenging such annexation ordinances
is contained in KRS 81A.420(2), which provides that a question on the annexation
may be placed on the next election ballot. The statute states in pertinent part:
If following the publication of the annexation ordinance
pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and within sixty
(60) days thereof, . . . fifty percent (50%) of the resident
voters or owners of real property within the limits of the
territory proposed to be annexed petition the mayor in
opposition to the proposal, an election shall be held at the
next regular election if the petition is presented to the
county clerk and certified by the county clerk as
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sufficient not later than the second Tuesday in August
preceding the regular election:
(a) The mayor of the city shall deliver a certified
copy of the ordinance to the county clerk of the
county in which the territory proposed to be
annexed is located, who shall have prepared to be
placed before the voters in each precinct embraced
in whole or in part within the territory proposed to
be annexed the question: “Are you in favor of
being annexed to the City of..........?” If only a part
of any precinct is embraced within the territory
proposed to be annexed only persons who reside
within the territory proposed to be annexed shall
be permitted to vote. The clerk shall cause the
sheriff or sheriffs to deliver to the election officers
in each precinct in the appropriate counties copies
of the ordinance proposing to annex;
(b) If less than fifty-five percent (55%) of those
persons voting oppose annexation, the
unincorporated territory shall become a part of the
city; and
(c) If fifty-five percent (55%) or more of those
persons voting oppose annexation, the ordinance
proposing annexation shall become ineffectual for
any purpose.
Id.
A petition in opposition to Ordinance No. 0-006-010 was delivered to
the Mayor and to the County Clerk, requesting that they take all necessary actions
required by KRS 81A.420 to ensure that a public question on the annexation would
be placed on the ballot at the next general election. On August 8, 2006, the County
Clerk issued a certificate of sufficiency declaring that
[p]ursuant to KRS 81A.420, it is hereby certified that the
petition opposing the annexation is sufficient since it is
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signed by more than fifty (50%) of the property owners
of the territory affected. Pursuant to KRS 81A.420, the
question on annexation will be placed on the ballot for
the November General Election to be held November 7,
2006.
As we have noted, the area that the City planned to annex included
part of a tract of property owned by the Cassadys, but not the part on which their
residence is actually located. The County Clerk questioned the eligibility of the
Cassadys to vote on the annexation question because KRS 81A.420(2)(a) provides
that “[i]f only a part of any precinct is embraced within the territory proposed to be
annexed only persons who reside within the territory proposed to be annexed shall
be permitted to vote.”
The Cassadys, who are registered voters in the Coal Run Precinct,
submitted affidavits of residency stating that they resided upon property located
within the territory to be annexed.2 The County Clerk thereafter allowed the
Cassadys to vote on the question. The Cassadys were the only voters to vote on
the annexation question, and they both voted “no.” Under the terms of KRS
81A.420(2)(c), the ordinance was thereby rendered “ineffectual for any purpose”
since more than 55 percent of those persons voting opposed annexation.
The City, the Mayor, and the City Manager thereafter filed a “Petition
Demanding Recount of Election Ballots and to Determine Legality of Votes; and
Petition for Declaration of Rights,” naming the County3 and the Cassadys as
2
The affidavits are not in the record.
The County was named in accordance with the terms of KRS 120.250(1), which requires the
petition contesting the election to be filed against “the county, city or district in which the
election was held[.]”
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defendants. The petition sought relief pursuant to KRS 120.250, which governs
contests and recounts of public elections, and KRS 418.040, the Declaratory
Judgment Act. It was the position of the City that the Cassadys were ineligible to
vote on the annexation question because they do not reside within the territory that
the City proposed to be annexed. The County refused to take a position on the
issue, but it requested the court to make a judicial determination concerning the
legal issues raised by the petition so that the County and County Clerk would have
a basis for future decisions.
The Cassadys filed an answer and counterclaim and a motion to
dismiss the petition pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02(f)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. They argued that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an action under KRS 120.250 and that
declaratory relief was also unavailable because the election was not void. After
conducting a hearing, the circuit court granted the Cassadys’ motion to dismiss.4
This appeal followed.
The appellants contend that they were entitled to bring an action to
contest the election pursuant to KRS 120.250(1). That statute provides in pertinent
part as follows:
Any elector who was qualified to and did vote on any
public question, other than a constitutional amendment or
a question of local option under KRS Chapter 242,
submitted to the voters of any county, city or district for
their approval or rejection may contest the election or
demand a recount of the ballots by filing a petition,
4
The circuit court’s order did not state reasons for granting the Cassadys’ motion.
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within thirty (30) days after the election, with the clerk of
the Circuit Court of the county in which the election was
held, which court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and determine all matters in such cases. The petition
shall be against the county, city or district in which the
election was held, and shall set forth the grounds of
contest or reason for requesting a recount. The grounds
of contest may be the casting of illegal votes, the
exclusion of legal votes, the unfair or illegal conduct of
the election, tampering with the returns, the alteration of
the certificates of the results, bribery, fraud, intimidation
or corrupt practices, or any conduct or practice tending to
frustrate, obstruct or interfere with the free expression of
the will of the voters.
Id.
It is undisputed that none of the appellants is an elector who was
qualified to vote and did vote on the public question of the proposed annexation.
The appellants have nonetheless argued that they should have been allowed to
proceed because, they claim, on a previous occasion this Court gave tacit approval
to the Attorney General to proceed with an action under KRS 120.280 (a parallel
statute to KRS 120.250 concerning constitutional amendments) even though he
was not an elector. See Chandler v. City of Winchester, 973 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. App.
1998). But in that case, as the Cassadys have pointed out, this Court determined
that the Attorney General’s petition was barred by the 15-day limitations period
contained in the statute and therefore never addressed the issue of his standing to
bring the suit. Chandler, 973 S.W.2d at 82.
The appellants have also argued that barring them from bringing an
action pursuant to KRS 120.250 would lead to an inequitable and absurd result and
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that the statute was not intended to prevent cities and city officials from contesting
allegedly improper voting. They have relied on cases from other jurisdictions to
support their contention that the circuit court was free to intervene in spite of the
requirements of KRS 120.250. We have reviewed these cases and find the facts in
each to be distinguishable. Furthermore, our case law is clear that
[a]n election contest is a purely statutory proceeding,
special and summary in its nature. It is without doubt
within the authority of the Legislature to prescribe by
whom and under what conditions a contest may be
maintained.
Payne v. Blanton, 312 Ky. 636, 229 S.W.2d 438, 440 (1950) (citations omitted).
We thus conclude that the appellants were precluded from contesting the election
pursuant to KRS 120.250 because the statute gave only “elector(s)” who were
qualified to and did vote in the election the right to contest it.
The appellants also contend that they had the right to contest the
election by bringing an action for declaratory relief independently and apart from
the statutory claim. However, “[c]ourts are in general agreement that a declaratory
judgment act is not a substitute or alternative for such actions as are particularly
provided for, to be brought in a particular way.” Sullenger v. Sullenger’s Adm’x,
287 Ky. 232, 152 S.W.2d 571, 574 (1941). Likewise, in Cox v. Howard, 261
S.W.2d 673 (Ky. 1953), the court held that the procedure for a recount and for
contesting a primary election was “purely statutory” and that “[s]uch procedure
cannot be changed or obviated by incorporating grounds for a recount or a contest
proceeding in a declaratory action.” Id. at 675.
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Nevertheless, such a cause of action is available in election cases but
only when the suit alleges that the election was void. The controlling case is
Robinson v. Ehrler, 691 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1985), which sets forth the general rule
that:
As a general rule, when a party with standing challenges
compliance with the statutory requirements for calling
the election, rather than merely challenging conduct of
the election, that party has the right, apart from statutes
authorizing an “election contest,” to maintain an action to
have the election declared void.
There is a caveat to this rule which, perhaps, creates
some confusion. It is that where the election is not void
on its face because of failure to comply with statutory
preconditions, but, rather, the defect is a latent one, and
the election is only voidable upon proof of underlying
facts, the rule has no application.
Id. at 204-05 (citation omitted).
Under Robinson, therefore, the appellants may only proceed with a
declaratory judgment action if they can show that the election was void, rather than
merely voidable. Any allegations of error that fall within the parameters of KRS
120.250 must be brought in an action pursuant to that statute.
An election contest action which does not attack the
election as void is justiciable under KRS Chapter 120,
Election Contests, or under other specific statutory
authorization, or not at all.
Robinson, 691 S.W.2d at 205.
There is no dispute that the statutory preconditions to the election as
set forth in KRS 81A.420(1) and (2) were complied with in this case: the ordinance
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was properly published, the petition in opposition to the ordinance was properly
filed, and the question was properly placed on the ballot. The appellants
nonetheless argue that under Taylor v. Betts, 141 Ky. 138, 132 S.W. 162 (1910),
the entire election is void because the only voters who voted on the question were
not legally entitled to do so and should not have been permitted to do so by the
County Clerk and election officers.
In Taylor, a case that was decided well before the passage of KRS
120.250, the appeals court ruled that an election was void because of “the failure of
the county judge to fix the time of the special registration on a day not less than
five days prior to the election” as required by a statute. Id. at 163. The court also
held that the election could not be upheld because almost two-thirds of the voters
had not presented their registration certificates prior to voting as required by a
statute. Id. at 164.
We note several differences between this case and the Taylor case.
First, Taylor was decided nearly 100 years ago and before the enactment of KRS
120.250 that provides a statutory procedure for elections contests. Further, the
Taylor court declared the election void from the outset because the county judge
had not fixed the time of the special registration on a day not less than five days
before the election. Id. at 163. In addition, the Taylor court did not specifically
state that the failure of many voters to present their registration certificates prior to
voting rendered the election void. It merely stated, after having already declared
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the election void for another reason, that under those circumstances the election
could not be upheld. Id. at 164.
The claim of the appellants that the Cassadys submitted a possibly
untruthful affidavit in order to be allowed to vote on the annexation question falls
squarely within the purview of KRS 120.250(1), which permits as grounds for a
contest
the casting of illegal votes, the exclusion of legal votes,
the unfair or illegal conduct of the election, tampering
with the returns, the alteration of the certificates of the
results, bribery, fraud, intimidation or corrupt practices,
or any conduct or practice tending to frustrate, obstruct or
interfere with the free expression of the will of the voters.
Id. In fact, the appellants themselves describe the alleged conduct of the Cassadys
as the “mischief” that KRS 120.250 is intended to remedy.
Although the appellants are thereby left without a remedy, the
situation is not unprecedented in our case law. This point was made in North East
Coal Co. v. Johnson County Fiscal Court, 284 Ky. 121, 143 S.W.2d 1061 (1940),
in which a corporation tried to challenge the outcome of a vote on a levy and tax
collection, arguing that certain persons who had voted on the question, including a
Mrs. Gamble, were not legal voters. The court ruled that corporations, not being
electors, had no right to contest an election in the absence of statutory authority
and that
to determine whether or not Mrs. Gamble voted for or
against the tax, and to determine whether or not the
persons named in the petition were qualified or legal
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voters, and as to how they voted, would of necessity
require a court of equity to hear an election contest.
Id. at 1062-63. Concluding that the court below had properly dismissed the case
because it did not have jurisdiction to hear the suit, the court stated
The legislature has not seen fit to confer the power on the
plaintiffs to contest this election, nor can a court of equity
in a suit to enjoin the levy and collection of this tax pass
on the questions raised as to whether or not certain
persons were legal voters, and as to how they voted, or
pass on the question as to whether or not Mrs. Gamble
cast her vote for or against the tax. Such questions are
for the decision of courts with jurisdiction to try election
contests.
Id. at 1063.
Faced with a similar factual pattern, the circuit court in this case
properly dismissed the suit. Its order is therefore affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANTS:
Russell H. Davis, Jr.
Pikeville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
William M. Lear, Jr.
Hanly A. Ingram
Lynn Sowards Zellen
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES, ANNE THOMPSON
CASSADY AND BALLARD W.
CASSADY:
Hanly A. Ingram
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR PIKE
COUNTY, KENTUCKY:
Roland Case
Pikeville, Kentucky
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