BOBO (MORRIS), ET AL. VS. NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES , ET AL.
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 20, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000892-MR
MORRIS BOBO AND
MILDRED BOBO
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00048
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES;
BADHAM INSULATION; HENRY A.
PETTER SUPPLY COMPANY; 4520
CORPORATION; GEORGIA-PACIFIC
CORPORATION; ROBERTSONCECO CORPORATION; WESTINGHOUSE
ELECTRIC; GENERAL ELECTRIC
COMPANY; RAPID AMERICAN;
GENERAL REFRACTORIES; CERTAINTEED
CORPORATION; FLEXITALLIC;
GARLOCK, INC; ANCHOR PACKING
COMPANY; JOHN CRANE; METROPOLITAN
LIFE; BRAUER SUPPLY COMPANY;
DRESSER INDUSTRIES; PLIBRICO FLINTKOTE
COMPANY; PITTSBURGH CORNING; UNITED
STATES MINERAL PRODUCTS; ARMSTRONG
WORLD INDUSTRIES; UNITED STATES
GYPSUM; W.R. GRACE; A.P. GREEN;
AC & S, INC.; KAISER ALUMINUM; AND
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION
APPELLEES
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OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, KELLER, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Morris and Mildred Bobo appeal from an order of the
McCracken Circuit Court dismissing without prejudice their personal injury action
against numerous bankrupt and non-bankrupt defendants. The Bobos argue that a
bankruptcy stay rendered in United States Bankruptcy Court divested the
McCracken Circuit Court of jurisdiction, thus barring it from dismissing the action
as against the bankrupt defendants. The Bobos also contend that the court erred in
applying the factors set out in Ward v. Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. App.
1991), as a basis for dismissing the action against both the bankrupt and nonbankrupt defendants. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the order on appeal.
The facts are not in dispute. On January 17, 2002, the Bobos filed the
instant action against 24 defendants in McCracken Circuit Court alleging that Mr.
Bobo contracted an asbestos-related disease as a result of his occupational
exposure to products allegedly manufactured and/or sold by the defendants. The
action languished in circuit court for several years, during which time many of the
defendants filed petitions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in United States
Bankruptcy Court. The filing of the petitions resulted in the issuance of automatic
stays which barred further action in state court against the bankruptcy petitioners.
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On February 29, 2008, the McCracken Circuit Court rendered a sua
sponte Notice to Show Cause pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
77.02 as to why the action should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution. After
the Bobos filed a response, the court rendered an order dismissing the action as to
all defendants. The Bobos then filed a Motion to Reconsider, arguing that their
inaction as against the bankrupt defendants resulted from the automatic stays
rendered by the bankruptcy court. As to both the bankrupt and non-bankrupt
defendants, the Bobos argued that the factors set out in Ward v. Housman, 809
S.W.2d 717 (Ky. App. 1991), required the state court action to continue. That
Motion to Reconsider was overruled, and this appeal followed.
The Bobos now argue that the McCracken Circuit Court erred in
dismissing the action as against both the bankrupt and non-bankrupt defendants.
As to the bankrupt defendants, the Bobos direct our attention to 11 U.S.C. §362,
which they contend provides that the filing of a petition under the bankruptcy code
operates as a stay against further proceedings against the bankruptcy petitioners in
state court. They maintain that because the automatic stay was not lifted, the
McCracken Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to decide all issues related to the
bankrupt Appellees, including whether to dismiss the state court action due to lack
of prosecution. And while acknowledging that there is no Kentucky or Sixth
Circuit published opinion on the issue, they point to Pope v. Manville Forest
Products Corporation, 778 F. 2d 238 (5th Cir. 1985), in support of their claim that a
bankruptcy stay prohibits the dismissal of a state court proceeding against a
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bankrupt defendant. The Bobos also argue that the factors set out in Ward, supra,
which provide for dismissal for lack of prosecution, are not applicable in the
instant case as against either the bankrupt or non-bankrupt defendants. They seek
an order reversing the trial court’s dismissal and remanding the matter for further
proceedings.
Having studied the written arguments, the record and the law, we find
no error in the trial court’s dismissal without prejudice of the bankrupt defendants.
Title 11 U.S.C. §362(a) provides in relevant part that,
. . . a petition filed under [the bankruptcy code] operates
as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance
or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or
other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or
could have been commenced before the commencement of
the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title . . . .
Title 11 U.S.C. §362(b) sets out a comprehensive list of exceptions to
the stay, allowing for – among many other proceedings - the prosecution of
criminal actions, family law matters and tax collection proceedings. Our research
has not revealed, nor have the Bobos so cited, any provision of the federal statute
either expressly barring the dismissal of state court proceedings against
debtors/petitioners, or allowing for them under the laundry list of exceptions to the
automatic stay.
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Similarly, neither Kentucky statutory law nor case law addresses the
question of whether a bankruptcy stay divests a state court of jurisdiction to
dismiss a claim against petitioner-defendants. The Bobos acknowledge the nonexistence of any published Kentucky or 6th Circuit case addressing this issue.
In the absence of any Kentucky or 6th Circuit case law on point, our
resolution of the issue at bar turns on two factors: first, the legislative purpose of
the automatic stay, and second, our recognition that the Bobos bear the burden of
demonstrating the existence of error arising in the circuit court. As to the first
factor, the Legislative Report of the 1978 Acts notes that, “[T]he automatic stay is
one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It
gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts,
all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a
repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.” See House Report for the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, H.R.Rep. 95-595, 95th Congress, 2d Session 340, U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1978, p. 5787. Similarly, legislative commentary appended to a
subsequent amendment to the Code states that, “[S]ection 362(a)(1) of the House
amendment adopts the provision contained in the Senate amendment enjoining the
commencement or continuation of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding to
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case.” (Emphasis added). See annotations to 11 U.S.C. §362.
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It is readily apparent from the legislative history of the Code that the
primary purpose of the automatic stay is to give “the debtor a breathing spell from
his creditors” and to protect the debtor from proceedings to recover claims.1 The
question then is whether the dismissal without prejudice of a petitioner-defendant
from state court action thwarts the legislative purpose of protecting the debtor. We
must conclude that it does not. To the contrary, the dismissal of a bankruptcy
petitioner from a state court action would further the goal of protecting the
petitioner from “the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.” House
Report, supra. Similarly, the dismissal of a state court action against a bankrupt
defendant is not “the commencement or continuation of a judicial, administrative,
or other proceeding to recover a claim against the debtor” which the Legislature
sought to enjoin by the enactment of the automatic stay provision. (Emphasis
added). See generally the commentary to the 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1) amendment.
The Bobos’ reliance on the extra-jurisdictional case of Pope v. Manville Forest
Products Corporation, 778 F. 2d 238 (5th Cir. 1985), does not alter this conclusion.
It is also worth noting that the automatic stay does not divest the state
court of jurisdiction; rather, it merely limits the type and scope of actions which
may be prosecuted against the bankruptcy petitioner. This is evidenced by the long
list of exceptions to the stay which are set out in 11 U.S.C. §362(b). “While the
filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of claims against the bankrupt
1
The automatic stay provision is also intended to protect creditors by removing the impetus for
them to “race to the courthouse” to protect their pecuniary interests before the debtor’s assets are
dissipated. See generally, 11 U.S.C. §362(b).
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debtor, the courts retain jurisdiction.” Parker v. Henry A. Petter Supply Company,
165 S.W.3d 474, 477 (Ky. App. 2005). As such, we are not persuaded that the
McCracken Circuit Court lacked the jurisdiction to dismiss the bankrupt
defendants.
As to both the bankrupt and non-bankrupt defendants, Ward, supra, is
controlling. As the parties are well aware, Ward established a set of factors to be
considered when ruling on the question of whether involuntary dismissal was
appropriate under CR 41.02(1). Those factors are 1) the extent of the party’s
personal responsibility, 2) the history of dilatoriness, 3) whether the attorney’s
conduct was willful or in bad faith, 4) the merit of the claim, 5) the prejudice to the
other party, and 6) alternative sanctions.
In the matter at bar, the circuit court expressly found that the factors
set out in Ward warranted the dismissal of the claims against all defendants. In its
ruling rendered on April 18, 2008, and styled Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to
Reconsider The Court’s Order of Dismissal, the circuit court adopted the rationale
set out in Defendant/Appellee General Electric’s response to the Bobos’ motion to
reconsider. In examining the Ward factors, General Electric first noted that the
Bobos were represented by experienced counsel and bore the non-delegable duty to
remain apprised of the progress of the case and to take reasonable steps to bring it
to fruition. See generally, Gorin v. Gorin, 167 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. 1942). As for the
second Ward factor, i.e., the history of dilatoriness, General Electric claimed that
the action remained dormant for over six years without any affirmative step made
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by the Bobos to move it forward.2 While General Electric did not contend that the
Bobos’ counsel acted in bad faith, it claimed that the lengthy delay in prosecuting
the case amounted to willful neglect.
As to the fourth Ward factor – the merit of the claim – General
Electric claimed that the Bobos failed to propound any written discovery or to take
any deposition, and after six years, produced no evidence that Mr. Bobo was
exposed to the defendants’ products, much less injured by them. The fifth Ward
factor is the prejudice to the defendants, and in this case, General Electric contends
that the dilatory nature of the Bobos’ action severely prejudiced the defendants’
ability to defend the case and resulted in considerable costs. On this issue, General
Electric maintained that over the course of the many years in which this action has
remained dormant, witnesses’ recollections inevitably diminish, some witnesses
may no longer be available and documentary and other evidence becomes more
difficult to produce resulting in substantial prejudice to the defending parties. And
lastly, General Electric maintains that alternative sanctions are not available. It
notes that the Bobos have not engaged in a one-time dilatory act, but that they have
failed to meet their burden of prosecuting their claim and moving the action
forward for a period of years.
2
The record does not reveal that any action was taken by the Bobos between the December 13,
2004, filing of Mr. Bobo’s deposition and the court’s sua sponte Notice to Show Cause rendered
on February 29, 2008. Further, the record is bare of any activity by any of the 26 parties between
October 24, 2005, and the February 29, 2008, Notice to Show Cause.
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We are also compelled to recognize that because the action was
dismissed without prejudice, the dismissal does not constitute a “death sentence” to
the Bobos’ claim. As such, the Bobos may re-institute the action at such time they
are prepared to move the action forward, subject to any applicable statute of
limitations and the outcome of the bankruptcy proceeding. The burden rests with
the Bobos to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the
action for lack of prosecution. Jenkins v. City of Lexington, 528 S.W.2d 729 (Ky.
1975) (“Thus, the sole question in this appeal is whether the circuit court abused its
discretion in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute.”). “[T]he test for abuse
of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d
909, 914 (Ky. 2004). The Bobos have not demonstrated that the McCracken
Circuit Court abused its discretion in dismissing without prejudice an action over
which it retained jurisdiction and which had languished in complete dormancy for
several years. When the record is viewed in its entirety, coupled with the circuit
court’s application of the Ward factors to the record, we find no basis for
concluding that the circuit court erred in dismissing the action as to both the
bankrupt and non-bankrupt defendants. Accordingly, we find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order of Dismissal of the
McCracken Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
Rick A. Johnson
Paducah, Kentucky
Kenneth L. Sales
Joseph D. Satterley
Paul J. Kelley
Louisville, Kentucky
JOINT BRIEF FOR NONBANKRUPT APPELLEES:
NATIONAL SERVICE
INDUSTRIES; 4520
CORPORATION; ROBERTSONCECO CORP.; GEORGIA-PACIFIC
CORPORATION; JOHN CRANE;
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY;
CERTAINTEED CORPORATION;
GARLOCK, INC.; ANCHOR
PACKING COMPANY; HENRY A.
PETTER SUPPLY COMPANY;
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC;
AND RAPID-AMERICAN
Ben T. White
William P. Swain
John B. Moore
Louisville, Kentucky
M. Denise Moretz
Knoxville, Tennessee
Max S. Hartz
Owensboro, Kentucky
Eric A. Ludwig
Atlanta, Georgia
Rebecca F. Schupbach
Louisville, Kentucky
Scott T. Dickens
Gregory Scott Gowen
Louisville, Kentucky
Berlin Tsai
John K. Gordinier
Louisville, Kentucky
Rania M. Basha
Louisville, Kentucky
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Albert F. Grasch, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
NO BRIEF WAS FILED FOR THE
BANKRUPT APPELLEES
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