MORGAN (BRIAN) VS. MORGAN (STEPHANIE)
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RENDERED: MARCH 27, 2009; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000859-ME
BRIAN MORGAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY E. FEELEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-501439
STEPHANIE MORGAN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON, KELLER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Brian Morgan appeals from a judgment of the Oldham Circuit
Court,1 modifying custody, modifying visitation, and establishing child support for
his two children with his ex-wife, Stephanie Morgan.
1
After the judgment was rendered, Judge Feeley transferred the case from Oldham Circuit Court
to Jefferson Circuit Court.
In April 2006, Brian filed a petition seeking sole custody of his
children in Oldham Circuit Court. At that time, Stephanie lived in Strawberry
Plains, Tennessee, and the children resided with Brian in Oldham County.2 The
lengthy record reflects that an acrimonious relationship existed between the parties
during the litigation. On April 26, 2006, the court granted Brian temporary
custody of the children and allowed Stephanie supervised visitation.
In October 2006, the court ordered a custody evaluation of both
parties and modified the custody arrangement to allow joint custody with Brian as
the primary residential custodian. Thereafter, in April 2007, the court modified the
visitation arrangement after Brian alleged the children had been abused while
visiting Stephanie in Tennessee. The court restricted Stephanie’s visitation with
the children to supervised visits in Oldham County. In October 2007, the court
granted Brian’s motion for a permanent custody order. The court awarded Brian
sole custody of the children and allowed Stephanie to continue restricted,
supervised visitation in Oldham County. Stephanie did not appeal the final
custody order.
In December 2007, Brian renewed an earlier motion for child support,
and the court held an evidentiary hearing on December 21, 2007. Stephanie,
whose attorney had withdrawn, appeared pro se at the hearing. Stephanie
complained that she had not seen her children in two months. The court set child
2
The parties were married at the time the petition was filed. Brian filed for divorce in Knox
County, Tennessee, and the final judgment of divorce was rendered in September 2007, during
the pendency of the custody action.
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support at $305.00 per month, retroactive to October 16, 2007. The court also set a
future hearing date to address Stephanie’s concerns regarding visitation.
The court held a hearing on February 29, 2008, and heard testimony
regarding child support and visitation. The court rendered an order March 17,
2008, noting that it had reviewed a report tendered by the custodial evaluator, Dr.
Cebe. The court ordered Brian and Stephanie to share joint custody of the
children, with Brian serving as primary residential custodian. The court further
ordered that Stephanie could have three days of supervised visitation per month, in
Tennessee. The court also left in place its previous order on child support, which
required Stephanie to pay $305.00 per month.
Brian filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, arguing the court
impermissibly modified custody and visitation and erroneously established the
retroactive date for child support. The court denied Brian’s motion, and this appeal
followed.
I. Custody
We recognize that the trial court enjoys broad discretion in resolving
matters relating to child custody. Reichle v. Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky.
1986). Accordingly, this Court will not set aside those findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. Id.
Brian contends the court impermissibly modified a permanent custody
decree without following the relevant statutory procedure. Brian points out that the
trial court rendered an order on October 19, 2007, which awarded Brian sole
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custody of the children. That order was final and appealable, though Stephanie
took no appeal. Thereafter, in March 2008, the court rendered an order awarding
Brian and Stephanie joint custody of the children. After thoroughly reviewing the
record, we agree with Brian that the court committed reversible error.
Modification of a custody decree “falls exclusively within the purview
of KRS 403.340 and 403.350[.]” Robinson v. Robinson, 211 S.W.3d 63, 70 (Ky.
App. 2006). KRS 403.350 states:
A party seeking . . . modification of a custody decree
shall submit together with his moving papers an affidavit
setting forth facts supporting . . . modification . . . . The
court shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate
cause for hearing the motion is established by the
affidavits, in which case it shall set a date for hearing on
an order to show cause why the requested order or
modification should not be granted.
KRS 403.340 provides, in relevant part:
(2) No motion to modify a custody decree shall be made
earlier than two (2) years after its date, unless the court
permits it to be made on the basis of affidavits that there
is reason to believe that:
(a) The child's present environment may endanger
seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional
health; or
(b) The custodian appointed under the prior decree has
placed the child with a de facto custodian.
Together, the statutes require that two affidavits must accompany a
motion to modify custody if it is within two years of a prior custody order. Petrey
v. Cain, 987 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky. 1999). In the case at bar, the record reveals that
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Stephanie neither filed a motion to modify custody, nor submitted affidavits
supporting a modification. Rather, at the child support hearing in December 2007,
Stephanie complained she had not visited with her children in two months.
Thereafter, on February 29, 2008, the court held a hearing to address
Stephanie’s concerns as to visitation. Following the hearing, and despite
Stephanie’s failure to meet the statutory requirements for modifying custody, the
court rendered an order on March 17, 2008, awarding joint custody to the parties
and reinstating Stephanie’s out-of-state visitation.
In Gladish v. Gladish, 741 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. App. 1987), this Court
stated that, where the mandates of KRS 403.340 were not followed, “the trial court
was without authority to modify the custody decree . . . on its own motion.” Id. at
661. Further, in Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759 (Ky. 2008), our Supreme
Court recently noted “that a trial court's sua sponte review and modification of a
custody order within the two year period was in error.” Id. at 767, citing Chandler
v. Chandler, 535 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Ky. 1976).
Here, as in Gladish, supra, not only were the statutory requirements
ignored by the court, there was no evidence that Stephanie wanted to modify the
custody decree. Id. The record reveals only that Stephanie was dissatisfied with
the visitation restrictions. Since the issue before the court concerned only
visitation, the court clearly erred by modifying its prior permanent custody order,
sua sponte. Id. Consequently, as there was “no semblance of compliance with”
the relevant statutes, Chandler, 535 S.W.2d at 72, we vacate that portion of the
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court’s March 17, 2008, order awarding joint custody and remand this case with
instructions to reinstate the October 19, 2007, order awarding Brian sole custody of
the children.
II. Visitation
Brian next argues that the court improperly modified visitation
without making a finding that it was in the best interests of the children. We
disagree.
Pursuant to KRS 403.320(3), “[t]he court may modify an order
granting or denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best
interests of the child.”
It is well-settled that “this Court will only reverse a trial court's
determinations as to visitation if they constitute a manifest abuse of discretion, or
were clearly erroneous in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Drury
v. Drury, 32 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Ky. App. 2000).
In the case at bar, the trial court held a hearing, heard testimony, and
accepted evidence from the parties. See CR 52.01. Additionally, the court relied
on Dr. Cebe’s custodial evaluation, which was prepared after Dr. Cebe interviewed
Stephanie and Brian.
After thoroughly reviewing the record, it is apparent that the court’s
order supports a conclusion that the modification of visitation was in the best
interests of the children. The court was clearly concerned for the children to have
opportunities to bond with their mother, and the court cautiously set forth
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additional restrictions on Stephanie’s parenting time while allowing three days of
visitation in Tennessee. Under the facts presented here, we are not persuaded that
the trial court abused its discretion by modifying Stephanie’s visitation rights.
III. Child Support
Finally, Brian raises two issues relating to child support. He contends
the court incorrectly calculated the amount of child support and erroneously
established the retroactive date.
Brian’s argument as to the amount of child support is not preserved
for our review. At the child support hearing in December 2007, Brian opined that
he was entitled to $977.50 per month based on the needs of the children. See KRS
403.211(5). The court disagreed and instead imputed minimum wage to Stephanie
and set child support at $305.00.
Thereafter, at the hearing on February 29, 2008, Brian argued he was
entitled to $426.74 in monthly support. The court again disagreed with Brian and
concluded $305.00 per month was the appropriate amount of child support.
Brian now contends that the court erroneously calculated child
support and that he is actually entitled to $977.50 per month. However, Brian
neither challenged the court’s calculation in his CR 59.05 motion to amend, nor
requested specific findings from the court as to its calculation. Consequently, any
error is waived, and we decline to consider this argument on appeal. Cherry v.
Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982); See also Johnson v. Johnson, 232
S.W.3d 571, 575 (Ky. App. 2007).
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Brian also challenges the retroactive date established by the court for
child support. KRS 403.160(2)(b) provides that, a “child support order entered
following [a] hearing shall be retroactive to the date of the filing of the motion for
temporary support unless otherwise ordered by the court.” Brian opines that he
first filed a motion requesting child support on July 14, 2006; however, child
support was never awarded. More than one year later, Brian renewed his request
for child support in a motion tendered October 16, 2007. In consideration of
Brian’s renewed motion, the court held that, upon receipt of Stephanie’s wage
information, child support would be established retroactive to July 14, 2006.
Thereafter, on December 12, 2007, Brian filed a third motion
requesting child support, and the court held an evidentiary hearing on December
21. The court rendered an order establishing child support of $305.00 retroactive
to October 16, 2007, the date Brian renewed his motion for child support.
Brian contends the court clearly erred by contradicting its prior order
and establishing October 16, 2007, as the retroactive date for support. We
disagree.
The trial court enjoys broad discretion in establishing child support.
Van Meter v. Smith, 14 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Ky. App. 2000). As a reviewing court,
we defer to the trial court’s discretion as long as its decision was not “arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Downing v.
Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Ky. App. 2001). Likewise, we are mindful that the
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lower court had the opportunity to weigh the evidence and determine the
credibility of the testimony. CR 52.01; Reichle, 719 S.W.2d at 444.
Under the circumstances presented here, we are not persuaded that the
court abused its discretion in establishing the retroactive date for support.
Although KRS 403.160(2)(a) provides that support “shall” be retroactive to the
date the motion was filed, the statute also vests the court with authority to order a
different date for support to commence. Here, the court heard testimony from
Stephanie regarding her employment history and her ability to pay support. In
light of the evidence and testimony presented, we conclude the court did not abuse
its discretion by establishing October 16, 2007, as the retroactive date for support.
For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the portion of the order
modifying custody and remand with instructions to reinstate the October 19, 2007,
order awarding Brian sole custody of the children. We affirm the remaining
portions of the order relating to visitation and child support.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jonathan O. Wells
LaGrange, Kentucky
Christina M. Tobin
Louisville, Kentucky
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