FUSTON (RICHARD) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CORRECTED: OCTOBER 2, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY SUPREME COURT:
JANUARY 13, 2010
(FILE NO. 2009-SC-0590-D)
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000819-MR
RICHARD FUSTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00102
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL, STUMBO, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: Richard Fuston (“Richard”) appeals from an order of the Whitley
Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief under Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42 from his conviction for first-degree manslaughter. The
trial court originally denied relief and Richard appealed to this Court. This Court
affirmed in part and remanded in part for an evidentiary hearing. On remand, an
evidentiary hearing was held, and the trial court again ruled against Richard. We
now review the issues in Richard’s RCr 11.42 motion; namely, whether the
domestic violence exception to the violent offender statute should apply to him as a
matter of law; whether his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move the trial
court to apply the domestic violence exception to the violent offender statute; and
whether the trial court erred by refusing to qualify his expert in domestic violence
at the hearing. We reverse and remand, with direction to the trial court to apply the
domestic violence exception to the violent offender statute.
Background
In 2001, Richard and several of his family members resided in the
Mount Morgan Apartment Complex in Williamsburg, Kentucky. Richard’s
youngest sister, Tammy, also lived in the Mount Morgan Apartment Complex.
Tammy and her boyfriend, Kevin Brown (“Brown”), had an ongoing, yet
frequently troubled, relationship. Tammy and Brown often cohabitated, but their
relationship was “on-again, off-again.”
On July 14, 2001, Tammy was staying at her parents’ house because
she and Brown were having some problems. She went by the apartment to pick up
some clothes and laundry. Brown arrived shortly thereafter and began to be
violent with Tammy. He pulled her to the ground by her hair and burned her neck
with a cigarette. Tammy managed to get free, ran to the balcony, and asked
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neighbors to call the police. By the time Williamsburg Police arrived at the scene,
Brown had already left. Tammy obtained an emergency protective order (“EPO”)
and a warrant against Brown upon advice of the police. She then went to the
hospital to receive treatment for her injuries.
While Tammy was in the hospital, her brothers, Richard and Scottie,
drove to Jellico, Tennessee, to pick up some beer. While there, Richard and
Scottie observed Brown’s truck in the parking lot of the Starlight Tavern.
Thereafter, Richard drove to the Jellico Police Department and informed them that
there was a warrant out for Brown’s arrest. The Jellico Police Department called
the Williamsburg Police and confirmed there was a warrant out for Brown’s arrest.
Richard and Scottie drove back to their parents’ home in Williamsburg.
Thereafter, Richard and Scottie returned to Tammy’s apartment to
repair her phone, which had been damaged in the struggle that had taken place
earlier. Apparently, fixing the phone was an important task as Tammy was
supposed to call the apartment for a ride home from the hospital and the other
members of the family didn’t have individual phone service. Richard took his
father’s gun with him to the apartment when he went. He was eventually joined by
his sister-in-law, Rachel, and Rachel’s friend, Cherish.1 Tammy was not at the
apartment at the time. At approximately 1:30 a.m., the party heard a thump on the
door. Cherish went to the door to look through the peephole, but the peephole was
1
Cherish was fourteen years old at the time. Rachel brought Cherish by the apartment to use
Tammy’s telephone so that she could check in with her mother, as Rachel and Scottie did not
have a telephone.
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blocked – as if being covered by someone. Immediately thereafter, Brown walked
in the door. The members of the party each individually asked Brown to leave.
However, Brown continued to advance into the apartment.
As Brown advanced, Richard picked up his gun and cocked it. While
pointing the gun at the floor, Richard again asked Brown to leave the apartment.
Rachel and Cherish continued to yell at Brown, begging him to leave. According
to Richard, Brown threatened to kill him – although the other members of the party
do not recall hearing this statement. All members did agree, however, that Brown
continued to advance upon Richard. When Brown was within a few feet of
Richard, he reached for Richard’s gun with his left hand and began reaching
toward his back pocket with his right hand. Richard then fired the gun, shooting
Brown a total of seven times. Brown staggered out of the apartment and died
shortly thereafter. No weapon was found on Brown – only a cell phone was found
in his back pocket. His blood alcohol concentration was shown to be 0.144.
The Commonwealth’s theory of the case at trial was that Richard shot
Brown in retaliation for the acts of domestic violence committed upon his sister
earlier that night. The defense’s theory was self-defense. The jury convicted
Richard of first-degree manslaughter and recommended a sentence of seventeen
years. Under the violent offender statute, Richard is required to serve 85% of that
sentence before becoming eligible for parole. The domestic violence exception to
the violent offender statute found in Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”)
439.3401(5) was never raised at sentencing.
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Procedural History
Richard filed a direct appeal wherein this Court affirmed the judgment
of the trial court on October 10, 2003. Fuston v. Commonwealth, 2003 WL
22319397 (Ky. App. 2003). Discretionary review was denied by the Kentucky
Supreme Court. Richard later filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion which raised
numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied that
motion and Richard appealed to this Court. On March 2, 2007, another panel of
this Court held that material issues of fact existed concerning whether Richard was
eligible for the domestic violence exemption to the violent offender statute.
Fuston v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 892 (Ky. App. 2007). Specifically, the
Court found that Richard was Tammy’s brother, and therefore, clearly a family
member as defined in KRS 403.720(2). However, the panel also noted that other
material facts were not clear, such as (1) whether Brown and Tammy were
members of an “unmarried couple” under KRS 403.720(3); (2) whether the alleged
violence between Brown and Tammy was “domestic violence” under KRS
403.720(1); and (3) “whether the requisite connection existed between any history
of domestic violence and the actions [Richard] took against Brown.” Id. at 898.
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. Richard’s trial
attorneys, Warren Scoville and Paul Croley, testified at the first part of the hearing
on August 6, 2007. Both attorneys argued that they felt the domestic violence
exception was inapplicable because it would have conflicted with Richard’s theory
of self-defense. At the second portion of the hearing, on January 11, 2008, Tammy
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also testified. She testified to prior domestic violence between her and Brown.
She stated that she had taken out two prior EPO’s against Brown and had obtained
a domestic violence order (“DVO”) specifying that there be no violent contact.
Her brother Scottie also testified that he was aware of the violence between
Tammy and Brown.
Tammy further testified that Brown’s name was not on the lease
because it would disqualify her from the low-income housing where she resided.
Despite this fact, she testified that she put her money into his bank account to pay
bills and that he helped her to pay bills. Another witness, LeTonia Jones of the
Kentucky Domestic Violence Association, was not permitted to testify because the
trial court would not qualify her as an expert in domestic violence. The trial court
also refused to permit defense counsel to enter Jones’ testimony by avowal during
the hearing. However, Jones’ affidavit was entered into the record by agreement of
the parties. The trial court subsequently made several findings of fact and
conclusions of law and denied Richard’s RCr 11.42 motion for post-conviction
relief.
Analysis
Richard argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to
declare him eligible for the domestic violence exception contained in KRS
439.3401(5); (2) holding that he was provided with effective assistance of counsel
where defense counsel did not seek application of the domestic violence
exemption; and (3) denying his motion to have LeTonia Jones of the Kentucky
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Domestic Violence Association qualified as an expert witness in domestic
violence. We address each, respectively.
1. Eligibility for the Domestic Violence Exception
Richard first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
declare him eligible for classification under the domestic violence exception as
contained in KRS 439.3401(5). He argues that each of the necessary elements for
application of the domestic violence exception was argued by the Commonwealth
and is present in the trial record. Accordingly, he argues that the Commonwealth
is now estopped from arguing a contrary position. He further argues that it was
clearly erroneous for the trial court to deny his motion to declare him eligible for
the domestic violence exception.
KRS 439.3401(3) directs that violent offenders, as defined in the
statute, shall not be eligible for parole until they have served at least 85% of the
sentence imposed upon them. However, KRS 439.3401(5) exempts from the
statute any defendant who has been a victim of domestic violence under KRS
533.060. KRS 533.060(1) requires the exemption of a defendant who:
establishes that the person against whom the weapon was
used had previously or was then engaged in an act or acts
of domestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS
403.720 against either the person convicted or a family
member as defined in KRS 403.720 of the person
convicted.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, a criminal defendant who commits a felony while using a
weapon against someone who has previously (or is currently) engaging in act(s) of
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domestic violence against the defendant or a defendant’s family member is not
subject to the 85% mandate. As we have previously stated, there is no requirement
that “the domestic abuse [be] contemporaneous with the offense for which the
defendant was charged.” Holland v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 433, 438 (Ky.
App. 2006). However, there must be some “connection” between the domestic
violence and the offense. Commonwealth v. Vincent, 70 S.W.3d 422, 423-424 (Ky.
2002).
When this Court initially addressed this issue on Richard’s first RCr
11.42 motion for post-conviction relief, the panel found that there was not enough
information in the record to determine whether he was eligible for the exception
and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Although it was apparent that
Richard was Tammy’s family member, it was unclear whether Tammy and Brown
were “member[s] of an unmarried couple” as defined in KRS 403.720(3), and
whether any connection existed between the history of domestic violence and the
actions Richard took against Brown. Fuston, supra. On remand, the Whitley
Circuit Court held an evidentiary hearing to determine these issues.
After holding the evidentiary hearing (which was conducted in two
parts, several months apart), the Whitley Circuit Court held: (1) that domestic
violence or abuse never occurred; (2) that Brown was unarmed when he was killed
at a location where he previously lived and sometimes stayed; (3) that there was no
evidence Brown intentionally violated an EPO or DVO; (4) that it was trial
strategy to argue self-defense and not argue the domestic violence exception; (5)
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that domestic violence was “blatantly inconsistent” with the facts from trial; and
(6) that there was no connection between the allegations of domestic violence and
Brown’s death.
These findings are reviewed under the “clearly erroneous standard.”
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996). We regret to say
that, upon a review of the record and the evidentiary hearing, it is sufficiently clear
that the trial court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous. As there is enough
information present in the record for this Court to determine whether Richard is
eligible for the domestic violence exception to the violent offender statute, we now
do so.
To begin, four things must be shown in order for Richard to qualify
for the domestic violence exemption: (1) that he is a family member of the victim
(Tammy) as defined in KRS 403.720(2); (2) that Brown and Tammy were
members of an “unmarried couple” as defined in KRS 403.720(3); (3) that the
violence between Brown and Tammy satisfied the definition of domestic violence
under KRS 403.720(1); and (4) that a connection existed between the domestic
violence and Brown’s death. There is no dispute that Richard is Tammy’s brother,
and thus, a family member. The other requirements will be discussed in more
detail below.
We find substantial evidence in the record that Tammy and Brown
were members of an unmarried couple. Although the Commonwealth argues that
Brown and Tammy are not members of an unmarried couple, they made a contrary
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argument at trial. In fact, they introduced paid checks at trial showing that Brown
paid many of Tammy’s bills from his checking account in an attempt to prove that
Brown resided in her home and helped pay the bills. We agree with Richard that it
is inconsistent for the Commonwealth to now argue an opposite position. More
importantly, however, most of the testimony in the record shows that Brown
primarily resided with Tammy but would occasionally stay elsewhere when they
were in a fight or he had to be out of town for work. We also note that the Whitley
District Court previously found Brown and Tammy to be members of an unmarried
couple because it entered a DVO on April 16, 2001. KRS 403.725 clearly requires
that only a family member or member of an unmarried couple may obtain such an
order.
As we find that Brown and Tammy were members of an unmarried
couple, the physical injuries Brown inflicted upon Tammy qualify as domestic
violence. KRS 403.720. It is clear from the record that Brown caused physical
harm and injury to Tammy on July 14, 2001. It is also clear that this was not the
first time that domestic violence had occurred. Testimony at trial indicated that
Brown held a gun to Tammy’s head a few weeks prior to this incident and pulled
the trigger (however, unbeknownst to Tammy prior thereto, the gun was not
loaded). As aforestated, a DVO was previously entered on April 16, 2001 which
restricted Brown from having any further violent contact with Tammy.2
2
This DVO was amended from “no contact” to “no violent contact” at Tammy’s request.
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Finally, we find that there was a connection between the domestic
violence and the offense charged. It is clear from Richard’s testimony at trial and
at the hearing that Brown’s acts of domestic violence against his sister made him
fearful of Brown. Richard saw Tammy’s injuries on the evening that he shot
Brown and knew that she had gone to the hospital to receive treatment. Richard
was also aware of an incident which had occurred a few weeks prior where Brown
held a gun to Tammy’s head and pulled the trigger. He testified at trial to knowing
about prior incidences of violence between Brown and Tammy. As Richard was a
much shorter and smaller man than Brown, and as he knew of the history of
Brown’s violence toward Tammy and others, it was not unreasonable for him to
think he should take a weapon to Tammy’s apartment for protection (It was
established in the medical examiner’s report that Brown was 5’11” and 219
pounds). Further, the parties testified that, once Brown entered the apartment, they
were all afraid of him. As Brown approached Richard, and as Richard knew of
Brown’s violent tendencies through the violence committed upon his own sister
earlier that day and upon previous occasions, he feared that Brown intended to
cause him serious harm. Moreover, the whole reason Richard was at the apartment
was to fix a telephone that was broken during the domestic dispute occurring
earlier that day. We find this to be enough of a connection between the domestic
violence and the shooting to warrant application of the exemption to Richard in
this particular situation.
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This case is distinguishable from the seminal case of Commonwealth
v. Vincent, supra, where the Supreme Court found that the domestic violence
exception to the violent offender statute did not apply because there was no
connection between the offense charged and the history of domestic violence. In
Vincent, there appeared to be absolutely no connection between the prior acts of
domestic violence and the offense. Id. at 423-424. In Holland, we stated that
“Vincent makes no more requirement than that the evidence connect the crime and
the abuse.” Holland v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 433, 438 (Ky. App. 2005).
We take this opportunity to again warn against “over-technical reading of the
statutes and case law which do not promote the purpose of the legislative
enactment at issue.” Id. at 435.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
We may quickly dispense with Richard’s allegation of error that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. As we are holding that the
domestic violence exception applies to the facts of this case, questions as to the
effectiveness of assistance of counsel Richard received at trial are now moot. We
do note, however, contrary to trial counsel’s assertion, evidence of a claim of selfprotection during trial and a claim of an exemption under KRS 439.3401(5) during
sentencing before the trial judge are not mutually exclusive.
3. Failure to Qualify Expert in Domestic Violence
We may, again, dispense with this issue swiftly. As we are holding
that Richard is eligible for the domestic violence exception, questions as to the trial
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court’s failure to qualify the expert in domestic violence at the hearing are now
moot. While we find it curious that the Whitley Circuit Court had previously
qualified LeTonia Jones as an expert in domestic violence for other cases, but
refused to do so in this case, any further discussion of this issue is unnecessary.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand. As we find that
Richard is eligible for the domestic violence exception, we remand with
instructions for the trial court to apply the domestic violence exception, thus
exempting him from the minimum parole-eligibility of 85% to serve of the violent
offender statute.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Melanie A. Foote
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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