WEITER (SHARON) VS. WEITER (ANTHONY)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000788-ME
SHARON WEITER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE DOLLY WISMAN BERRY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-504182
ANTHONY WEITER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Sharon Weiter appeals from an order of the Jefferson
Family Court reducing Anthony Weiter’s child support obligation from $1,000.00
per month to $700.00 per month. She argues that there had been no material
change since the prior child support order, and thus a modification was contrary to
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
the requirements of KRS2 403.213. She also argues that the trial court erred by
implementing the reduction retroactive to the date that Anthony filed his motion
for modification. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part, vacate in part,
and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married on May 18, 1985. They have two children,
Casey, born May 6, 1994, and Jordan, born March 2, 1997. On November 12,
2003, Sharon filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.
In connection with the proceedings the parties entered into an agreed
order3 substantially resolving issues relevant to the care and custody of the
children. Among other things, the agreement provided that the parties would share
joint custody of the children, with Sharon’s “home being designated as the
children’s primary residence.” As relevant to the present proceedings the agreed
order contained the following terms:
2. The Respondent [Anthony] shall exercise
parenting time with the children as follows:
a. Every other weekend from Friday after
school until Monday morning, when he shall take
them to school, or to their mothers [sic] at 3:00 if
there is no school on that Monday;
b. On the Mondays following Petitioner’s
[Sharon] weekend the children will be with the
Respondent from the time they are released from
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
The order was entered January 13, 2006.
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school until the following morning when he
returns them to school;
c. On the Wednesdays following
Respondent’s weekend, Respondent shall have the
children in his possession from the time they are
out of school on Wednesday until he returns them
to school the following morning. If there is no
school in session on those days, Respondent shall
have the children from 8:00 a.m. (on the Monday
or Wednesday) until either he returns them to
school the next morning, or if there is no school to
their mother’s home at 3:00 p.m.
....
17. During the summer vacation, each of the
parties will have a seven (7) day uninterrupted vacation,
and each of the parties would advise the other by the
April preceding the summer of their scheduled vacations.
Other than the seven (7) day period for each parent, the
rest of the summer will be as follows:
The children will always be with the Petitioner on
Mondays and Tuesdays and with the Respondent on
Wednesdays and Thursdays. When the Petitioner has the
children for the weekend the Respondent will return the
children on Friday morning at 10:00 a.m. When the
Respondent has the weekend he will return the children
on Thursday evening at 9:00 p.m. and pick them up on
Friday evening at 5:00 p.m. At the end of Respondent’s
weekend he will return the children to the Petitioner by
10:00 a.m. on the Monday morning following his
weekend.
....
19. The Respondent will continue to pay child
support of $1,000 monthly and maintain the childrens’
[sic] medical insurance as long as provided by employer
at no cost to Respondent. . . .
....
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22. The holiday schedule, Paragraph 4 of the
Court’s Order of June 14, 2004 shall be incorporated
herein by reference with new summer schedule unless
modified by agreement of the parties or further Order of
the Court.
Eventually all matters surrounding the dissolution were resolved and a
final decree was entered. On August 8, 2007, Anthony filed a motion seeking to
reduce his child support obligation pursuant to KRS 403.213. In support of his
motion, Anthony alleged: (1) that he had incurred a reduction in income from
$40,000.00 to $18,000.00; (2) a belief that Sharon’s income for 2006 was in excess
of $42,000.00; (3) “voluntary” payments for the children’s school expenses; and
(4) “joint and shared custody in that [Anthony] has the children in excess of 42%
of the time and circumstances have changed to cause the present child support
award to be unconscionable.”
As further discussed below, on March 11, 2008, the family court
entered an order reducing Anthony’s child support obligation from $1,000.00 per
month to $700.00 per month. The child support schedule applied to the parties’
new incomes reflected that the 15% threshold contained in KRS 402.213(2), which
creates a presumption that there has been a material change, was not met in this
case (the incomes produced a child support obligation of $855.00 per month under
the guideline tables contained in KRS 403.212.) However, the trial court applied
the deviation provisions contained in KRS 403.211(2) and (3), and modified child
support based upon its written findings that a deviation from the child support
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guidelines would be appropriate. The order further provided that the modification
was to be effective from the date that Anthony filed his motion for modification
and provided a mechanism for recoupment of the overpayments.
Sharon filed a timely motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
modification order, which was denied by order entered April 3, 2008. This appeal
followed.
MODIFICATION
Sharon contends that the family court erred by reducing Anthony’s
child support obligation because the evidence failed to demonstrate that there had
been a “material change in circumstances that is substantial and continuing” as
required by KRS 403.213(1) as a threshold requirement for a child support
modification. As previously noted, application of the child support schedule to the
parties’ current incomes does not produce a 15% change under the child support
schedule, and, accordingly, pursuant to 402.213(2), there is a rebuttable
presumption that there has not been a material change. The family court’s order
acknowledged this, but nevertheless concluded that modification was proper
pursuant to the deviation provisions contained in KRS 403.211(2) and (3).
We begin our review by setting forth the relevant statutory provisions.
KRS 403.313 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) The Kentucky child support guidelines may be used
by the parent, custodian, or agency substantially
contributing to the support of the child as the basis for
periodic updates of child support obligations and for
modification of child support orders for health care. The
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provisions of any decree respecting child support may be
modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to
the filing of the motion for modification and only upon a
showing of a material change in circumstances that is
substantial and continuing.
(2) Application of the Kentucky child support guidelines
to the circumstances of the parties at the time of the filing
of a motion or petition for modification of the child
support order which results in equal to or greater than a
fifteen percent (15%) change in the amount of support
due per month shall be rebuttably presumed to be a
material change in circumstances. Application which
results in less than a fifteen percent (15%) change in the
amount of support due per month shall be rebuttably
presumed not to be a material change in circumstances.
For the one (1) year period immediately following
enactment of this statute, the presumption of material
change shall be a twenty-five percent (25%) change in
the amount of child support due rather than the fifteen
percent (15%) stated above.
KRS 403.211 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
....
(2) . . . [I]n any proceeding to modify a support order,
the child support guidelines in KRS 403.212 shall serve
as a rebuttable presumption for the establishment or
modification of the amount of child support. Courts may
deviate from the guidelines where their application would
be unjust or inappropriate. Any deviation shall be
accompanied by a written finding or specific finding on
the record by the court, specifying the reason for the
deviation.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record
that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or
inappropriate in a particular case shall be sufficient to
rebut the presumption and allow for an appropriate
adjustment of the guideline award if based upon one (1)
or more of the following criteria:
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(a) A child’s extraordinary medical or dental
needs;
(b) A child’s extraordinary educational, job
training, or special needs;
(c) Either parent’s own extraordinary needs, such
as medical expenses;
(d) The independent financial resources, if any, of
the child or children;
(e) Combined monthly adjusted parental gross
income in excess of the Kentucky child support
guidelines;
(f) The parents of the child, having demonstrated
knowledge of the amount of child support
established by the Kentucky child support
guidelines, have agreed to child support different
from the guideline amount. However, no such
agreement shall be the basis of any deviation if
public assistance is being paid on behalf of a child
under the provisions of Part D of Title IV of the
Federal Social Security Act [footnote omitted];
and
(g) Any similar factor of an extraordinary nature
specifically identified by the court which would
make application of the guidelines inappropriate.
(4) “Extraordinary” as used in this section shall be
determined by the court in its discretion.
Thus, KRS 403.211 “provides that a court may deviate from the [child
support guidelines set forth in KRS 403.212] where their application would be
unjust or inappropriate and where the court makes a written finding or specific
finding on the record specifying the deviation.” Smith v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 25, 26
(Ky. App. 1992). “A decision on whether to deviate from the guidelines is within
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the trial court’s discretion.” Rainwater v. Williams, 930 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Ky.
App. 1996). However, in order for deviation from the guidelines to be permitted
on grounds that applying them would be unjust or inappropriate, the decision must
be based upon one of the criteria set forth in KRS 403.211(3). See Wiegand v.
Wiegand, 862 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Ky. App. 1993).
In its modification order, the family court invoked the “extraordinary
nature” provisions of KRS 403.211(3)(g) in justification of its deviation from the
child support guidelines. More specifically, the family court made the following
findings in support of a deviation:
In this matter, both parties stipulated that Mr.
Weiter spends considerable time with the girls, and he
testified that he pays all their expenses during that time in
addition to the child support. (He also pays for the girls’
private schooling; however, the Court cannot give him
“credit” for voluntarily assuming expenses that could not
have been ordered.) Having reviewed the parenting
schedule submitted by each party, the Court finds that
Mr. Weiter has the children in his possession 38% of the
time. The Court also specifically finds that this amount
of parenting time (and the expenses which necessarily
follow) is an “extraordinary circumstance” entitling Mr.
Weiter to a deviation from the Kentucky child support
guidelines.
“Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.” CR4 52.01. Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous
if supported by substantial evidence. Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d
843, 852 (Ky. App. 1999). The test for substantiality of evidence is whether when
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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taken alone, or in the light of all the evidence, it has sufficient probative value to
induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men. Id.
Sharon does not challenge the 38% parenting time figure, and, indeed,
that appears to be her calculation of Anthony’s parenting time. It is elementary
that the child support guideline amounts contained in KRS 402.212 take into
consideration a typical parenting time schedule for the noncustodial parent and
foresees that he will pay for the children’s expenses during their time spent
together. What is a standard time-sharing arrangement? We believe the following
approaches the standard: (1) every other weekend; (2) an evening weekday of
parenting time between weekend parenting time; (3) additional and rotating threeday weekend parenting time; (4) alternating spring break parenting time; (5)
additional and rotating holiday parenting time; and (6) four weeks of summer
parenting time.5 It is self-evident that the foregoing produces a percentage of
parenting time considerably less than the 38% applicable to Anthony. Hence the
trial court’s determination that Anthony’s parenting time vis-à-vis the average for a
noncustodial parent is extraordinary is not clearly erroneous.
As previously noted, “a decision on whether to deviate from the
guidelines is within the trial court’s discretion.” Rainwater, 930 S.W.2d at 407.
5
We take judicial notice that the above comports with the Jefferson Family Court’s informal
(not officially adopted) standard parenting time schedule. For a formally adopted illustrative
standard time sharing schedule see McCracken Family Court Rules of Court, Rule 7, Appendix
D, which is similar to the above. But see Drury v. Drury, 32 S.W.2d 521 (Ky. App. 2000) (What
constitutes reasonable visitation with children at divorce is a matter which must be decided based
upon the circumstances of each parent and the children, rather than any set formula, and, when
the trial court decides to award joint custody, an individualized determination of reasonable
visitation is even more important.)
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“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000). In light of the
additional parenting-time undertaken by Anthony (and the consequent additional
expenses associated therewith) we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in deviating from the guidelines and establishing Anthony’s child
support obligation at $700.00 per month.
Sharon argues, however, that Anthony was entitled to parenting time
with the children for 38% of the time pursuant to their original agreement and,
accordingly, there has been no change at all in this aspect of their arrangement, and
thus a finding of extraordinary circumstances is unfounded. In support of her
argument she cites us to Downey v. Rogers, 847 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Ky. App. 1993).
In Downey the parties had agreed that the parents would have equal parenting time
and that the father would pay $760.00 per month in child support. The father later
sought a reduction in support, in part based upon their equal parenting time. In
upholding the trial court’s denial of a modification based upon equal time-sharing,6
this Court stated as follows:
While the Family Support Act does not address or
contemplate the arrangement agreed to by these parties,
we believe the statute provides sufficient flexibility to
allow our trial courts to fashion appropriate orders.
Redmon v. Redmon, Ky.App., 823 S.W.2d 463 (1992).
KRS 403.211(2) specifically provides, “Courts may
6
The trial court granted a modification based upon a change in the parties’ incomes. Upon the
mother’s cross-appeal this Court reversed the reduction because of the father’s failure to show a
material change.
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deviate from the guidelines where their application would
be unjust or inappropriate.” Subsection (3)(g) of the
same statute allows the court, with appropriate findings,
to deviate from the guidelines for any circumstance of an
“extraordinary nature.” Thus, we think it is clear that the
trial court could take into consideration the period of
time the children reside with each parent in fixing
support, and could deviate from the guidelines for
reasons advanced by the appellant, if convinced their
application would be unjust.
The trial court in the instant case was not unaware of its
discretion in this regard. In its order it recognized the
custody arrangement as one creating a “unique situation
for the payment of child support.” It considered various
alternatives but decided to utilize the guidelines without
deviating therefrom. We find no abuse of discretion in
this regard, particularly in light of the evidence showing
appellant’s greater ability to pay, and the fact that all
expenses are not equally shared by the parties.
Moreover, the parties negotiated the sum of $760 per
month as child support at the same time they agreed to
share equal possession of the children. In other words,
nothing changed since the original agreement
concerning custody that would make the payment of
support unconscionable or unjust and mandate deviation
from the guidelines. (Emphasis added).
Thus, Downey demonstrates that a trial court may deviate from the
guidelines based upon extraordinary parenting time (as in the present case), but if
child support was originally set based upon the extraordinary time (as claimed by
Sharon), then, as would be expected, the extraordinary time may not later serve as
an extraordinary circumstance in support of a modification of child support.
At pages 2 - 4, supra, we set forth the provisions of the parties’
agreement addressing time-sharing of the children. From our review of the
provisions it appears that under paragraph 2(a), Anthony has the children 2.5 days
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every other weekend for a total of 65 days (2.5 x 26); that under paragraph 2(b)
and 2(c), during the 40 nonsummer weeks he has the children for an additional .5
days per week for a total of 20 days (40 x .5); that under paragraph 17, he has the
children for an uninterrupted period of 7 days during the summer; that under
paragraph 17, during the 12 summer weeks he has the children for an extra 2 days
per week for a total of 24 days; and that under paragraph 22, he has the children for
approximately 5 days under the holiday schedule. Thus under the agreed schedule
he has the children for approximately 121 days, which is 33% of the time
(121/365).7
Thus it appears that while the parties contemplated a parenting
schedule for Anthony in excess of the average schedule for a noncustodial parent,
contrary to Sharon’s claim, their agreement is for less that the 38% found by the
trial court. While this does make for a closer case in comparison with the average
visitation schedule as set forth above, we nevertheless remain unpersuaded that the
trial court abused its discretion in deviating from the guidelines.
RETROACTIVE RECOUPMENT
The family court’s March 11, 2008, order provided that the child
support reduction was to be retroactive to the date Anthony filed his motion for
modification, August 8, 2007. The recoupment was to be effected “by reducing
[Anthony’s] obligation $200 monthly until the parties are even.” Sharon contends
that this is contrary to established case law on the issue.
7
We note that Sharon does not provide us with calculations contrary to the foregoing. We also
note that there may be overlap in our calculations (which would make the percentage less).
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It is well established that modifications increasing child support may
be applied retroactively to the date of the filing of the motion. Pecoraro v.
Pecoraro, 148 S.W.3d 813 (Ky. App. 2004); Pretot v. Pretot, 905 S.W.2d 868 (Ky.
App. 1995). Of course the modification at issue here involves a decrease, and so
those cases are distinguishable.
We note that KRS 403.213(1) provides that “[t]he provisions of any
decree respecting child support may be modified only as to installments accruing
subsequent to the filing of the motion for modification[.]” (Emphasis added).
Thus it would appear that the statute contemplates that any modification may be
retroactive to the day of the filing of the motion - including decreases. We further
note that Anthony specifically moved for any modification to be retroactive to the
date of his motion.
In a decidedly different context it has been held that “[p]ast due
payments for child support and maintenance become vested when due. Each
payment is a fixed and liquidated debt which a court has no power to modify.”
Pursley v. Pursley, 144 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Ky. 2004).
. . . In accord with a majority of the jurisdictions, we hold
that unpaid periodical payments for maintenance of
children, like that for alimony, become vested when due.
The accrued sum of delinquencies is a fixed and
liquidated debt, and the court has no power to modify the
judgment as to it. . . .
Stewart v. Raikes, 627 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Ky. 1982). See also Dalton v. Dalton,
367 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Ky. 1963); Heisley v. Heisley, 676 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. App.
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1984); Whitby v. Whitby, 306 Ky. 355, 208 S.W.2d 68, 69 (1948) (“We perceive
that no distinction can be made between a judgment based upon a claim for
alimony or maintenance and a judgment based upon any other legal right. After
the judgment is entered, although it may be subject to modification at a subsequent
date, it is binding and final until modified; and any payments which may have
become due previous to such modification constitute a fixed and liquidated debt in
favor of the judgment creditor against the judgment debtor.”) However, the
foregoing authorities apply to situations where the child support obligor has failed
to pay child support and the issue involved whether an arrearage may be avoided
or retroactively modified – even for an apparently good reason. Thus we believe
this line of cases is distinguishable and not dispositive of the issue as presented
herein.
Clay v. Clay, 707 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. App. 1986), presents a situation
which is somewhat analogous to the present. In Clay, in June 2003 the trial court
originally set the father’s child support at $500.00. On appeal, the judgment of the
trial court was vacated and remanded for the trial court to enter a new judgment.
On remand, and upon applying the appellate court’s mandate, the trial judge
ordered the father to pay $300.00 per month in support, but refused to give him a
credit (restitution or recoupment) of $200.00 per month for the amount he overpaid
since the order of June, 1983. The issue addressed in Clay was whether the father
was entitled to the recoupment of amounts which were paid under, in effect, an
erroneous judgment subsequently corrected by the appellate court.
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Quoting the Maryland case, Rand v. Rand, 40 Md.App. 550, 392 A.2d
1149, 1151-53 (1978), Clay addressed the issue as follows:
It does not appear that the appellate courts of Maryland
have yet addressed the question posed here directly. We
find persuasive, however, and therefore adopt, the view
expressed on several occasions by the New York courts
that a party making child support payments pursuant to a
court order has no right to restitution or recoupment
following a reversal or modification of the award on
appeal. The rationale for this rule is that the right to
support arises out of the policy of the law and not by
contract. [Citations omitted.]
The obligation of a parent to support his (or her) minor
child is required by public policy and is expressly
imposed by statute. Md.Annot.Code, art. 72A,§ 1. The
determination of the amount of support to be paid by a
parent, and the fixing of such amount as part of an order
of a court having proper jurisdiction, authorized by
Md.Annot.Code, art. 16, § 66(a), is an implementation of
that public policy, and therefore rests upon a different
footing than ordinary judgments representing the
adjudication of private claims. Some evidence of this
difference is provided in Article III, § 38 of the Maryland
Constitution, exempting a valid decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction for the support of dependent
children from the general prohibition against
imprisonment for debt. [Citations omitted.]
The fixing of child support derives from the obligation of
the parent to the child, not from one parent to another. It
presumably represents the considered judgment of the
court as to what the needs of the child are and what the
parent subject to the order ought, and can afford, to pay.
This, in turn, is necessarily premised upon the
assumption that the amounts paid, or to be paid, under
the order are not excessive, and will, in fact, be applied
exclusively to the ascertained needs of the child, whether
directly or indirectly, and not to any extraneous purposes.
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At least in the situation where the court entering such an
order had jurisdiction to do so, and the order is therefore
not void ab initio, recognition of a right of total
recoupment because an appellate court disagrees as to the
amount of support ordered, and directs the lower court to
revise its decree by reducing the support allowance,
would run the substantial risk of thwarting the clearly
expressed public policy.
Where is the recoupment to come from? If the direct
recipient--the custodial parent, usually--has not, in fact,
expended the “overpayment” for the support of the child
and has it, or its equivalent (in whole or in part),
available for repayment, it is only fair and just that the
paying parent be able to recover it. Thus, the power of a
court to order or permit recoupment should not be
denied. But to the extent that such overpayments have
been properly expended for the child’s support in
reliance on the court order, and neither they nor their
equivalent are available for repayment, the entitlement to
recoupment would, of necessity, entail a reduction in the
amount of future support below even that which the
appellate court itself, or the trial court in the
implementation of the appellate court’s mandate, has
found necessary. In other words, in such a situation, the
onus of the remedy would fall upon the child, not the
receiving parent. The existence of a right of recoupment,
in that instance, would be entirely inconsistent with the
obligation imposed upon the parent by law, because it
would require that, during the recoupment period--the
interval of time during which the paying parent reduces
the periodic payment below the amount last ordered--the
child would be receiving less than that found necessary
for his or her support; and thus, the recouping parent
would not be fulfilling his or her statutory obligation.
Whether, and to what extent, the receiving parent in fact
used the “overpayment” for the support of the child and
has the funds from which to permit a proper recoupment
without depriving the child, is a determination that must
necessarily be made by the trial court, exercising its
discretion upon the relevant evidence before it. The
scope of discretion, and the principles applicable to its
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exercise, with respect to allowing recoupment must be
substantially the same as pertain to the fixing of child
support in the first instance; and thus, the determination
of the court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
found to be clearly erroneous. (Emphasis in original.)
Id. at 353-54. The Clay Court continued as follows:
In our view, the Rand decision clearly demonstrates that
restitution or recoupment of excess child support is
inappropriate unless there exists an accumulation of
benefits not consumed for support. We recognize it
would be an exceptional case, indeed, where support
payments exceed the requisite amount necessary for
support as mandated by the statute. KRS 403.210.
Nevertheless, this is a finding addressed to the trial court.
Here there was no such finding.
Id. at 354.
We believe the principles concerning recoupment discussed in Clay
are applicable in the present case. That is, in order for recoupment to be had for
previously paid child support, there must be unexpended child support funds from
which recoupment can be made. If between the dates that Anthony filed his
motion and the issuing of the modification order Sharon expended the $1,000.00
per month she continued to receive in child support on legitimate purposes for the
benefit of the children, then where is the recoupment money to come from?
According to the order it will come from the $700.00 modified support payment at
the rate of $200.00 per month. But what if the full $700.00 is needed to provide
for the legitimate needs of the children? Under the family court’s order, the
recoupment money would be diverted from expenditures for their legitimate needs
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to fund Anthony’s recoupment. We believe that this is precisely what Clay
condemns.
There is no finding by the family court concerning whether there are
unexpended child support funds from which recoupment may be made without
interfering with the children’s ongoing needs. We accordingly vacate the family
court’s order insofar as it awards recoupment, and remand for additional findings
upon the issue of whether there are available unexpended child support funds
which have been previously made from which recoupment may be made. If so,
recoupment should be permitted up to the amount of the unexpended funds. If,
however, no such funds are available, no recoupment may be had.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Jefferson Family Court
is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for additional proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Katie Marie Brophy
Louisville, Kentucky
Anthony G. Weiter, pro se
Louisville, Kentucky
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