KING (JOHN D.) VS. ALLEN (JOHN R.)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: DECEMBER 4, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000540-MR
JOHN D. KING
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CI-04594
DR. JOHN R. ALLEN
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: STUMBO, THOMPSON, AND WINE, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: John King appeals several adverse evidentiary rulings by the
trial court during the course of a medical malpractice trial. Mr. King claims the
trial court erred in its rulings on expert testimony, the admission of medical
records, and the application of the collateral source rule. Dr. Allen argues that the
trial court made the proper rulings and would have us affirm. We affirm the
judgment in favor of Dr. Allen.
Mr. King was diagnosed with peripheral vascular disease of his right
foot on March 22, 1999, by Dr. Edwin Rogers. This disease causes blood vessels
and arteries to become blocked. In May of 1999, the skin on Mr. King’s leg had
become inflamed and the blocked blood vessels had not improved. Two days later,
Dr. Rogers performed a bypass on Mr. King’s leg. The bypass turned the
saphenous vein in his leg into an artery, allowing blood flow to return to the foot.
The surgery was successful and Mr. King’s foot developed a strong pulse. This
procedure is only a semi-permanent solution in that the bypass may only last ten
years.
Due to a delayed healing of the leg following the procedure, Mr. King
was referred to the Wound Care Center under the care of Dr. Allen. Dr. Allen
performed a debridement of the wound on an almost weekly basis. A debridement
consists of removing dead tissue surrounding the wound. One such debridement
occurred on December 29, 1999. During the course of this debridement, the
saphenous vein was damaged and began bleeding. Dr. Allen attempted to control
the bleeding while a vascular surgeon was summoned. The surgeon was able to
stitch the tear in the vein and stop the bleeding.
Mr. King was discharged and returned to the care of Dr. Rogers.
Upon examination, Dr. Rogers could no longer feel a pulse in Mr. King’s right
foot. Dr. Rogers concluded there was an obstruction preventing blood flow. Dr.
Rogers believed that he could do nothing more for the foot because there were no
more open vessels in the leg that could be used for another bypass.
2
Soon thereafter, Mr. King’s leg began to bleed once again at the site
of the debridement. Dr. Rogers was forced to tie off the saphenous vein to stop the
bleeding. Dr. Rogers concluded nothing more could be done and believed the leg
would ultimately have to be amputated.
In order to get a second opinion, Mr. King began treating with Dr.
Eric Endean in January of 2000. On January 17, Dr. Endean performed another
bypass surgery on Mr. King’s leg. This time, however, Dr. Endean used a vein
harvested from Mr. King’s arm. This bypass restored some blood flow, but after a
month, the vein became obstructed. Dr. Endean determined that nothing more
could be done to save Mr. King’s leg and foot. The leg was amputated on March
4, 2000.
Mr. King then brought suit against Dr. Allen for medical malpractice.
His theory was that Dr. Allen punctured the first bypass during the December 29,
1999 debridement causing the vein to fail and ultimately leading to the amputation
of his leg. A jury trial was held from January 28, 2008, to January 30, 2008. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Allen and this appeal followed.
As stated infra, Mr. King appeals the trial court’s ruling on
evidentiary issues. The proper standard for review of evidentiary rulings is abuse
of discretion. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575,
577 (Ky. 2000). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s
decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).
3
Mr. King first argues that the trial court erred when it limited the
testimony of Dr. Endean. Dr. Endean was disclosed as one of Mr. King’s expert
witnesses. He was deposed on November 26, 2003. During the deposition, Dr.
Endean was asked several questions regarding how he would have treated Mr.
King and made some criticisms of Dr. Allen’s treatment. Counsel for Dr. Allen
objected arguing that Dr. Endean’s testimony should be limited to his treatment of
Mr. King and that he was not to offer any opinions on Dr. Allen’s treatment. Dr.
Allen’s counsel argued that Dr. Endean’s opinion testimony was not disclosed
under Civil Rule (CR) 26.02.
Dr. Allen moved in limine to limit Dr. Endean’s testimony to his own
treatment of Mr. King ten months prior to trial. The trial court granted the motion
in part, limiting Dr. Endean’s testimony but only if he testified via deposition and
not at trial. Additionally, Mr. King was given time to supplement his CR 26.02
disclosure and re-depose Dr. Endean regarding his opinions of Dr. Allen’s
treatment. Mr. King did neither. Further, Dr. Endean did not testify live at trial
and his deposition testimony was therefore limited as the court had previously set
forth.
Concerning expert testimony, CR 26.02 states in relevant part:
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts,
otherwise discoverable under the provisions of paragraph
(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation
of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(a) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any
other party to identify each person whom the other party
4
expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the
subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify,
and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to
which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of
the grounds for each opinion. (ii) After a party has
identified an expert witness in accordance with paragraph
(4)(a)(i) of this rule or otherwise, any other party may
obtain further discovery of the expert witness by
deposition upon oral examination or written questions
pursuant to Rules 30 and 31. . . .
CR 26.02(4).
Mr. King’s CR 26.02 expert disclosure states that Dr. Endean would testify
concerning his treatment of John King, during the year
2000 and as the medical records from the University of
Kentucky indicate, his subsequent surgery and
amputation of Mr. King’s leg. Dr. Endean will further
testify that the cause of the amputation of Mr. King’s leg
was the ligation of the saphenous vein in Mr. King’s leg,
which resulted from the bleeding around the wound
caused by Dr. Allen’s scalpel. Dr. Endean will further
testify that after the saphenous vein was ligated and the
leg could not ultimately be saved, because there was not
another suitable vein in Mr. King’s body to reconstruct
the in situ graft, and this ultimately caused the leg to be
amputated. Dr. Endean’s records are attached, but have
been previously obtained by all counsel pursuant to
written releases signed by John King.
(R. at 113).
While this disclosure states that Dr. Endean will testify regarding the
cause of the amputation, it does not state that he will be discussing the standard of
care or any shortcomings in Dr. Allen’s treatment of Mr. King. This is in contrast
to the disclosure relating to Dr. Mark Gladstein, another expert for Mr. King,
5
which states that he would testify regarding Dr. Allen’s failure to satisfy the
standard of care in this situation and what Dr. Allen should have done.
“Pretrial discovery simplifies and clarifies the issues in a case;
eliminates or significantly reduces the element of surprise; helps to achieve a
balanced search for the truth, which in turn helps to ensure that trials are fair; and it
encourages the settlement of cases.” LaFleur v. Shoney’s, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 474,
478 (Ky. 2002). “The discovery of the substance of an expert witness’s expected
testimony is essential to trial preparation.” Clephas v. Garlock, Inc., 168 S.W.3d
389, 394 (Ky. App. 2004). We cannot say that the decision to limit Dr. Endean’s
testimony was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Without proper disclosure, the
parties’ counsel could not have fully prepared for the deposition. The inability to
properly prepare is particularly important in this case since the deposition was the
only testimony submitted by Dr. Endean. The trial court gave Mr. King avenues
that would have permitted Dr. Endean’s full testimony to be heard at trial. The
court would not have limited the testimony if Dr. Endean had testified live at trial.
Alternatively, the court gave Mr. King time to supplement his disclosure and
redepose the physician. This was not an abuse of discretion.
Mr. King next argues that the collateral source rule was erroneously
applied when he was prohibited from introducing evidence of $80,000 in medical
bills paid by his insurance company. The collateral source rule holds that:
a tortfeasor is not entitled to any credit against what he
owes for payments of medical expenses or disability
benefits paid by a collateral source to the tort victim
6
pursuant to a contractual obligation owed to the victim
from the collateral source, whether it be first party
insurance coverage, employment benefits, or otherwise.
See Hellmueller Baking Co. v. Risen, 295 Ky. 273, 174
S.W.2d 134 (1943), and cases cited therein. Nor is the
tortfeasor entitled to introduce evidence at trial of such
payments, except to corroborate other evidence, if there
is any, that establishes malingering. Hellmueller Baking
Co. v. Risen, supra, 174 S.W.2d at 136.
Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 700 S.W.2d 789, 796 (Ky. 1985). In essence,
no evidence of a victim’s collateral source payments (i.e. insurance payments) can
be introduced at trial. The issue of applicability of the collateral source rule is
reviewed de novo. Schwartz v. Hasty, 175 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Ky. App. 2005).
Mr. King attempted to introduce the extent of his medical bills and the
fact that his own insurance company paid $80,000 in medical bills. Counsel for
Dr. Allen objected citing the collateral source rule. The trial court sustained the
objection. Mr. King argues that he should have been allowed to introduce this
evidence for two reasons. First, Mr. King sought to introduce this testimony as
corroboration that he suffered an injury and the extent of the treatment he received.
Second, the testimony was to speak to his credibility because he had testified he
was on a fixed income of $20,000 a year and that $80,000 in medical bills had
been paid. Mr. King contends that without testimony as to the source of the
payments, the truthfulness of his testimony about his financial situation could be
called into question by the jury.
This case is unusual in that usually it is the plaintiff who objects to the
defendant or tortfeasor’s attempt to introduce this type of evidence. We find that
7
the trial court did err in excluding evidence of Mr. King’s insurance payments.
The collateral source rule is applied to protect the plaintiff from the possibility that
a jury may consider the payments when setting the amount of damages to be
awarded. Collateral source payments are considered irrelevant and immaterial
because they have no place in the calculation of the award. McCormack Baron &
Associates v. Trudeax, 885 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. App. 1994). However, collateral
source payments have been admitted when found to be relevant and admissible for
a purpose other than the calculation of an award of damages. In Burke
Enterprises, Inc v. Mitchell, 700 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1985), the tortfeasor was
permitted to introduce evidence of collateral source payments for purpose of
showing malingering. If Mr. King wished to waive this protection, he should have
been allowed to do so.
However, we also find that this error was harmless.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or
in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting
aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.
CR 61.01. We do not believe that the outcome of the trial would have been
different had this information been introduced. The primary issues were the cause
8
of injury and the medical standard of care. It is very unlikely that the extent and
source of insurance payments would affect the jury’s decision on those issues.
Mr. King also argues that the medical records of Dr. John Meek
should not have been admitted into evidence because they were never subject to
cross-examination as Dr. Meek was not deposed and did not testify during trial.
Further, he asserts that a record of Dr. Meek’s was improperly displayed to the jury
during opening statements.
Mr. King alleges that the introduction of Dr. Meek’s medical records
was improper because they had never been subject to cross-examination. He
claims that without supporting testimony, the records might be subject to
“distortion, confusion, or misunderstanding.” Young v. J.B. Hunt Transportation,
Inc., 781 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1989). We disagree. The records at issue contain 10
pages of medical facts and observations, two which are a patient history and the
others which discuss follow-ups Mr. King had with Dr. Meek from June 9, 1999,
to October 4, 1999. They were relevant to show the history of Mr. King’s leg
issues, they were properly authenticated, they are excluded from the rule against
hearsay evidence, Baylis v. Lourdes Hospital, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Ky.
1991), and thus testimony is not required for these records to be introduced, Id.
Even assuming, arguendo, that this was in error, it would be harmless
error. The records predate the debridement at issue and show that Mr. King’s leg
was healing properly, albeit slowly. These records could be found to bolster Mr.
9
King’s case in that his leg was on the mend prior to the debridement injury. It was
not an abuse of discretion to admit these records into evidence.
During opening statements, counsel for Dr. Allen used an enlarged
version of a medical record, showing it to the jury. Counsel for Mr. King objected.
During the bench conference, the demonstrative exhibit was not taken down and
was in view for the jury. The part of the record at issue is an opinion by Dr. Meek
that amputation of the leg at issue was inevitable prior to the performance of the
procedure by Dr. Allen. The trial court ruled that Dr. Meek’s records could not be
discussed during opening statements, but their overall admissibility would be ruled
on later. Defense counsel then removed the record from the jury’s view.
Mr. Allen now claims that it was prejudicial error to allow the record
to stay in view of the jury during the bench conference. We find this issue was not
preserved. Mr. King’s counsel objected to the use of the record during opening
statements and the court ordered the record removed, which it was. No request
was made for the record to be removed during the bench conference. Further,
there was no request for an admonition or a mistrial. Mr. King received the
remedy he requested. See Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 29 (Ky.
2005).
Mr. King’s final argument is that Dr. Allen failed to disclose
information concerning a potential bias of his expert witness, Dr. Jacob Robison,
and that the admission of his testimony was improper. Tuttle v. Perry, 82 S.W.3d
920 (Ky. 2002), explains
10
[e]xposure of potential bias based on self-interest is often
attempted through cross-examination directed at how
much the witness is being paid for his or her services in
the case at bar, the frequency with which the witness
testifies in similar kinds of cases, whether the witness
customarily appears for a particular type of party (usually
plaintiff or defendant), whether the witness is frequently
employed by a particular party or attorney and, if so, how
much income the witness derives from that employment,
and . . . the amount or the percentage of the witness’s
total income that is derived from lawyer referrals or
testimony in lawsuits. Some forms of inquiry seek to
uncover a specific and enduring relationship between the
witness and the party or attorney, from which a direct
bias may be inferred. Others are directed at exposing the
more subtle problem of the professional “hired gun,” who
earns a significant portion of his or her livelihood from
testifying and, rather than having a tie to a specific party
or attorney, may have a general economic interest in
producing favorable results for the employer of the
moment.
Id. at 923-924 (quoting Wrobleski v. de Lara, 727 A.2d 930 (Md. 1999)).
In May, October, and December of 2006, Mr. King requested
information and documents regarding Dr. Robison’s fees and history. Dr. Allen
responded by stating that he was attempting to obtain this information. Then, on
January 16, 2007, Mr. King filed a motion to compel Dr. Allen to produce the
information requested. No hearing was held or order entered concerning this
motion that we can find in the record.
The week before trial, Dr. Allen had not provided the information
requested. Mr. King therefore filed a motion to prohibit introduction of Dr.
Robison’s testimony. At a pretrial conference on January 25, 2008, the trial court
denied the motion and directed that the information being sought be furnished to
11
Mr. King. Also, according to an Agreed Narrative Statement contained in the
record, Mr. King declined an offered continuance at this pretrial conference.
Some of the information sought was provided on January 28, 2008,
and the rest on January 29, 2008. Additionally, the trial court directed that counsel
for Mr. King be allowed to speak with Dr. Robison the night before he was to
testify. Dr. Robison was to testify the morning of January 31, 2008. Mr. King
argues that by not producing the information in a timely manner, his counsel did
not have enough time to prepare for Dr. Robison’s testimony. While this is a
strong argument, we must still affirm the trial court’s decision to allow Dr.
Robison to testify.
Mr. King properly filed a motion to compel in order to gain the
information concerning Dr. Robison’s potential bias. CR 37.01; M.P.S. v. Cabinet
for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Ky. App. 1998); Poe v. Rice, 706
S.W.2d 5 (Ky. App. 1986). However, nothing came of the motion and it was
apparently never pursued by Mr. King.
Mr. King’s only argument to support the reversal of this decision of
the lower court is that he did not have enough time to prepare for Dr. Robison’s
testimony. As stated above, Mr. King was offered a continuance during a pretrial
conference, but declined it. Also, he was eventually provided with all the
information he requested and permitted to interview Dr. Robison the night before
he testified. During trial, counsel for Mr. King questioned Dr. Robison about his
potential bias. Counsel established through testimony that Dr. Robison had never
12
testified for a plaintiff and that he had not yet sent a bill for his involvement in this
case. Counsel for Mr. King was also able to prepare an exhibit regarding the
amount of time Dr. Robison had spent reviewing the materials for this case.
As previously stated, evidentiary issues are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Further, the “[i]mposition of sanctions for failure to comply with a
discovery request is within the trial court’s discretion.” M.P.S., supra, (citing
Greathouse v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 796 S.W.2d 868 (Ky. App.
1990)). Mr. King was offered a continuance, but declined it. Also, he was able to
acquire the information he requested, albeit only the day before Dr. Robison’s
testimony. Finally, Mr. King does not indicate what other potential evidence of
bias or credibility he was seeking that would have required more time. We find
this was not an abuse of discretion.
For the above reasons we agree with the decisions of the trial court
and affirm the judgment in favor of Dr. Allen.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Fred E. Peters
Rhey Mills
Lexington, Kentucky
James P. Grohmann
Andie Brent Camden
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPPELLANT:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Fred E. Peters
Lexington, Kentucky
James P. Grohmann
Louisville, Kentucky
13
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.