BAKER (AUBREY WAYNARD) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 4, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000506-MR
AUBREY WAYNARD BAKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WEBSTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. RENE’ WILLIAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00074
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2008-CA-001632-MR
AUBREY BAKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WEBSTER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. RENE’ WILLIAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00109
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEE
BEFORE: NICKELL, STUMBO, AND WINE, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: In this consolidated proceeding, Aubrey Waynard Baker
appeals from two criminal judgments of the Webster Circuit Court each reflecting
a jury verdict of guilty on one count of flagrant nonsupport. Baker argues that he
was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of each trial, and
maintains that the second indictment constituted a violation of his constitutional
right to be free from double jeopardy. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the
judgments on appeal.
On December 16, 2004, Baker was indicted by the Webster County
grand jury on one count of flagrant nonsupport. It was alleged that Baker failed to
pay court-ordered child support to his former wife in violation of KRS 530.050 for
the period beginning on January 30, 2003, and ending November 30, 2004. The
matter proceeded to a jury trial on December 1, 2005, which resulted in Baker’s
conviction. Baker appealed to this Court, which reversed the conviction and
remanded the matter to Webster Circuit Court. Baker was re-tried on January 31,
2008, and again convicted on one count of flagrant nonsupport. He was sentenced
to one year in prison.
On November 14, 2007, Baker was charged under a second
indictment with another count of flagrant nonsupport. This indictment alleged that
Baker’s flagrant nonsupport occurred during the period beginning on December 1,
2004, and ending October 31, 2007. Trial on the indictment was conducted on July
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28, 2008, resulting in a guilty verdict and sentence of four years in prison. This
appeal followed.
Baker prosecuted an appeal from each of the criminal judgments; said
appeals having now been consolidated by order of this Court. Baker argues that at
the conclusion of each trial, the circuit court improperly failed to sustain his
motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Relying on the same argument in each
case, Baker notes that the burden rested with the Commonwealth to offer evidence
that he was reasonably able to pay child support for the benefit of his minor
children, and that the Commonwealth failed to meet that burden. While
acknowledging that testimony was adduced from his former wife Patricia, as well
as from Peggy Hedges of the Child Support Office, that they knew of no reason
why Baker could not work and pay child support, he contends that this testimony
was not sufficient to meet the Commonwealth’s burden and that it had an
affirmative duty to demonstrate his ability to work. Baker also points out that he
testified that he had several medical conditions from having been shot, that he had
lost several jobs due to incarceration, that his truck did not run and that he had to
live with his father for lack of income. In sum, he maintains that the
Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving that he had the ability to work
and pay child support, and that as such he was entitled to directed verdicts at the
close of each of the two trials.
KRS 530.050(2) states that,
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A person is guilty of flagrant nonsupport when he
persistently fails to provide support which he can
reasonably provide and which he knows he has a duty to
provide by virtue of a court or administrative order to a
minor or to a child adjudged mentally disabled, indigent
spouse or indigent parent and the failure results in:
(a) An arrearage of not less than one thousand dollars
($1,000); or
(b) Six (6) consecutive months without payment of
support . . . (emphasis added).
Thus, the primary elements of flagrant nonsupport are 1) the persistent failure to
pay, 2) despite reasonable ability to do so and 3) notice of the duty to pay. Id.
The Commonwealth argues that a jury may reasonably infer from the
totality of the evidence and from all of the facts adduced at trial that Baker had the
ability to engage in employment and to pay child support. We find this argument
persuasive. The Commonwealth notes that Baker was in his early to mid-40s
during the time periods in question, and maintains that there is no evidence of
record establishing that he had any physical limitations or disabilities rendering
him incapable of gainful employment. The Commonwealth points out that the
evidence at trial revealed Baker’s work history, which included 18 years as a coal
miner, followed by employment at Dana Corporation, MBC Meredith, Town and
Country Ford, and two temporary employment agencies. It relies on this
employment history spanning over two decades as a basis for what it maintains
was the jury’s reasonable inference that Baker was able to engage in employment
and pay the court-ordered child support.
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Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991), sets forth the
standard for reviewing motions for a directed verdict. It states that,
On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw
all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in
favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on
the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
such testimony.
Id. at 187. On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only
then is the defendant entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. Id. In the matter at
bar under the evidence as a whole, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to
conclude that Baker was capable of engaging in employment and paying courtordered child support, and the circuit court properly so found.1
Baker also argues that he was subjected to double jeopardy when he
was retried on remand under the first indictment, and then subjected to an
additional prosecution when the second indictment was handed down. He
maintains that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Section 13
of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 505.020 operate to protect him from
multiple prosecutions for the same offense. This argument is based on his
contention that his failure to pay child support over a period of several years is a
1
Inexplicably, in addressing the double jeopardy argument on page 15 of Baker’s appellate brief
(Case No. 2008-CA-001632), Baker’s counsel states at Footnote 13 that, “Mr. Baker does not
offer the defense of inability to pay.”
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single act which was not properly subject to more than one indictment and
prosecution. He maintains that if multiple prosecutions are allowed in flagrant
nonsupport actions, it will create an endless cycle of nonsupport resulting in
incarceration, which itself would cause additional nonsupport and more
incarceration.
KRS 505.020(1)(c) states that,
When a single course of conduct of a defendant may
establish the commission of more than one (1) offense,
he may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not,
however, be convicted of more than one (1) offense
when: . . . The offense is designed to prohibit a
continuing course of conduct and the defendant’s course
of conduct was uninterrupted by legal process, unless the
law expressly provides that specific periods of such
conduct constitute separate offenses.
The commentary to KRS 505.020(1)(c) supports the claim that flagrant nonsupport
is a single course of conduct rather than a series of separate offenses occurring
each time a child support payment was not made. As such, it is not subject to
multiple prosecutions unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. The
commentary states that,
Subsection (1)(c) provides for the third exception to the
general proposition. This exception applies to offenses
which seek to proscribe a continuing course of conduct.
An example would be the offense of nonsupport of a
dependant, which is committed when a parent
intentionally fails to provide support for his child when
able to so provide. With this type of offense, subsection
(c) limits the number of convictions of an offender to one
unless it can be shown that: the offender’s conduct was
interrupted by legal process . . . (emphasis added).
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The determinative question then is whether Baker’s course of conduct was
“interrupted by legal process,” thus allowing for the issuance of the second
indictment and resultant prosecution and conviction. This question must be
answered in the affirmative. As the Webster Circuit Court and the Commonwealth
properly note, “legal process” may include an “arrest warrant, an indictment, or an
arraignment.” Fulcher v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 363, 377 (Ky. 2004).
Baker’s course of conduct was interrupted by the first indictment and resultant
prosecution, successful appeal, remand and retrial. Were it not for these legal
processes, Baker would have a strong argument that KRS 505.020(1)(c) and the
constitutional provisions from which it is derived would operate to bar multiple
prosecutions for the same course of conduct. In the matter at bar, however,
Baker’s course of conduct was terminated by the first indictment, prosecution and
conviction, and a separate course of conduct ensued thereafter. To find otherwise,
would give Baker and others similarly situated a “free pass” not to pay child
support after being convicted for flagrant nonsupport. Because KRS 505.020(1)(c)
expressly provides for serial prosecutions when an unlawful course of conduct is
interrupted by legal process, and as a matter of public policy preventing a
defendant from having a “free pass” not to pay child support after a conviction for
flagrant nonsupport, we must conclude that the Webster Circuit Court properly
denied Baker’s motion to dismiss the second indictment.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the Webster Circuit
Court denying Baker’s motions for directed verdicts and seeking to dismiss the
second indictment on the grounds of double jeopardy.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
Steven J. Buck
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Daniel Sherman
Greenville, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Criminal Appeals
Office of the Attorney General
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
David W. Barr
Frankfort, Kentucky
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