HILL (JACKIE LEE) VS. HILL (CYNTHIA FAITH)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 6, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000423-MR
&
NO. 2008-CA-000739-MR
JACKIE HILL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT DAN MATTINGLY JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00123
CYNTHIA HILL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, LAMBERT, AND WINE, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Jackie Lee Hill, petitioner is action below, appeals from two
orders entered by the Marshall Family Court. He first appeals from an order
entered February 15, 2008, in which the court ordered Jackie to pay his ex-wife,
Cynthia Faith Hill, respondent in action below, one-half of his disability benefits
and held him in contempt for failing to pay Cynthia this amount after originally
being ordered to do so in November 2007. He additionally appeals from an order
entered April 3, 2008, in which the court awarded Cynthia 100% of Jackie’s
“divisible” railroad retirement benefits. After careful review, we affirm both
orders of the Marshall Family Court.
Jackie and Cynthia were married on November 4, 1978, separated on
September 30, 2006, and their marriage was dissolved on November 27, 2007. On
November 12, 2007, against the legal advice of his then attorney, Jackie signed a
settlement agreement, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
3. Marital Property
3.2 Petitioner shall receive and be the sole owner
of the following items, free of any claim of Respondent:
½ of any proceeds from lawsuits, actions, or claims made
pursuant to his employment, dismissal from work, or
related claims, if any.
3.3 Respondent shall receive and be sole owner of
the following items, free of any claim by petitioner:
½ of any proceeds from any lawsuits, actions, or claims
made pursuant to his employment, dismissal from work,
or related claims, if any.
6. Maintenance
The parties recognize Respondent’s need for
maintenance, but also recognize Petitioner’s current
inability to pay maintenance (due to his dismissal from
employment). The parties agree that Respondent’s
maintenance claim shall remain pending and can be reopened at any time prior to Petitioner’s 65th birthday on a
showing of substantially changed circumstances (e.g. Reemployment, new employment, etc.).
Also contained in the settlement agreement was a clause stating that the agreement
may not be modified by any court, unless in writing and executed by both parties.
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At the time the settlement agreement was being negotiated by the
parties, Jackie had a pending claim against his former employer for occupational
disability. Jackie was subsequently awarded occupational disability based on posttraumatic stress disorder. He received his first check on November 1, 2007, and
signed the settlement agreement on November 12, 2007, against the advice of
counsel and knowing that he had been awarded his disability.
The settlement agreement was presented to the court for adoption on
November 21, 2007. At that same time, Jackie’s counsel requested an order
allowing him to withdraw. The court granted the motion to withdraw, giving
Jackie twenty days to find substitute counsel and setting the matter for hearing on
January 15, 2008. Despite having set the matter for hearing in January, on
November 27, 2007, the court entered an order dissolving the parties’ marriage and
adopting the settlement agreement of the parties.
The parties appeared before the court on January 15, 2008, at which
time the court acknowledged that the settlement agreement had previously been
adopted on November 27, 2007. Jackie appeared at the hearing without counsel,
had not attempted to retain counsel, and did not object to the settlement agreement
being entered. Jackie did object, however, to paying Cynthia half of his disability
pension, therefore the court set a contempt hearing for future proceedings. Cynthia
followed the court’s motion for contempt with her own motion, and a hearing was
set for February 1, 2008.
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A full and complete hearing was held on February 1, 2008. Jackie,
with new counsel, responded to the motion for contempt with a motion to modify
the settlement agreement. The court addressed the motions of both parties,
denying Jackie’s motion to modify and holding him in contempt for failure to pay
Cynthia half of his disability benefits in November and December of 2007 and
January and February of 2008.
By motion filed March 12, 2008, Cynthia sought post-judgment relief
by seeking an order to enforce the property settlement agreement by directing the
Railroad Retirement Board to pay the tier II divisible portion of Jackie’s railroad
retirement benefits to Cynthia. On April 3, 2008, the Marshall Family Court
entered an order dividing Jackie’s railroad retirement benefits. The court found
that the Railroad Retirement Act prohibits any allocation of Jackie’s tier I benefits
but that the tier II benefits are marital/community property under the Railroad
Retirement Act and may be allocated by the court. Therefore, the court ordered
that Cynthia be awarded an amount equal to one hundred percent of Jackie’s tier II
monthly disability benefit. Jackie now brings this consolidated appeal of the
February 15, 2008, order and the April 3, 2008, order.
Jackie first argues that the court erred as a matter of law when it
ordered that one hundred percent of his tier II railroad retirement benefits be paid
to Cynthia.
Jackie argues that the instant case is on point with Holman v. Holman,
84 S.W.3d 903 (Ky. 2002), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court said that
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disability retirement benefits were properly classified as marital and nonmarital
property according to the character of the property they replaced. He would have
this Court conduct an analysis to determine the character of the property replaced
by his railroad retirement benefits in order to determine if they are marital or
nonmarital. However, Jackie ignores the fact that unlike Holman, there is a federal
statute directly on point to deal with the classification of railroad retirement
benefits in the instant case. We find that the trial court did not err in its finding
that the Railroad Retirement Act states that tier II benefits are marital property
subject to division by the courts.
Jackie then argues that the trial court abused its discretion in holding
him in contempt and then in refusing to recuse. We find these allegations without
merit.
First, Jackie contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to
enter an order adopting the settlement agreement on November 27, 2007, when he
had been given twenty days from November 21, 2007, to obtain new counsel.
Although we and the lower court agree that it mistakenly entered the order on that
date, there was no motion to alter, amend, or vacate the November 27 decree, nor
was there an appeal or 60.02 motion for relief even as late as the January 15, 2008,
hearing. In fact, on February 1, 2008, Jackie testified he was willing to live by the
intent of the settlement agreement. More to the point, Jackie was held in contempt
because he told the court on multiple occasions that he was not going to pay
Cynthia half of his retirement benefits. At no point did he seek a stay of
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proceedings or attempt to post a supersedeas bond, even after he obtained new
counsel and was put on notice of a contempt hearing. Therefore, we do not find
the trial court abused its discretion in holding Jackie in contempt.
As to his contention that the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to recuse, we find it equally meritless. He essentially asserts that because
the court found him in contempt that it was biased and should have recused from
all further proceedings. Since we do not agree that it erred in holding him in
contempt, we in turn do not find that it abused its discretion by refusing to recuse.
Finally, Jackie argues that the trial court erred in failing to modify the
settlement agreement based upon changed circumstances. First, Jackie is seeking
to modify the agreement as it pertains to property disposition. But once a property
settlement agreement is incorporated into a decree, it becomes part of the judgment
and may not be modified “unless the court finds the existence of conditions that
justify the reopening of a judgment....” KRS 403.250(1). The conditions for
reopening a judgment are found in CR 60.02, which states that an order may be set
aside for:
(a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(b) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59.02;
(c) perjury or falsified evidence;
(d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or
falsified evidence;
(e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
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equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or
(f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying
relief.
Jackie did not file his motion to modify pursuant to any section of CR 60.02.
Consequently, there was no proper motion to reopen the decree before the trial
court, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackie’s motion to
modify based on changed circumstances.
We accordingly affirm both the order awarding one-half of Jackie’s
disability benefits to Cynthia and holding him in contempt for failure to pay and
the order awarding Cynthia one hundred percent of his tier II railroad retirement
benefits.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa A. DeRenard
Benton, Kentucky
Charles W. Brien
Benton, Kentucky
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