AKINS (DERRICK D'KEITH) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 16, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000286-MR
AND
NO. 2008-CA-001309-MR
DERRICK D'KEITH AKINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 07-CR-00307 AND 07-CR-00302
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING AS TO THE FIRST APPEAL AND
VACATING AND REMANDING AS TO THE SECOND APPEAL
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; THOMPSON, JUDGE; HARRIS,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE: This case involves two appeals that are being heard
together by motion of the Commonwealth. The outcome of the first dictates the
fate of the second.
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Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Derrick D’Keith Akins appeals from the final judgment of the Hardin
Circuit Court convicting him of carrying a concealed deadly weapon, possession of
marijuana, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon (Akins I). He was
sentenced as a persistent felony offender (PFO). In a second appeal (Akins II),
Akins challenges another conviction for possession of a handgun by a convicted
felon and a separate PFO conviction. Although the Commonwealth has vigorously
defended both appeals, it concedes that an affirmance of the first conviction would
preclude Akins’s subsequent conviction for possession of a handgun by a felon as a
violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. After carefully
studying the arguments of counsel, we affirm the initial appeal (Akins I); because
of the double jeopardy issue, we vacate and remand the conviction in Akins II.
Early on the morning of April 12, 2007, Detective Clinton Turner of
the Elizabethtown Police Department was driving in an unmarked vehicle when he
observed Akins travelling on foot alongside Valley Creek Road. Akins was
dressed in dark pants and was wearing a dark, hooded jacket; he appeared to be
hitchhiking. As Turner passed Akins, he noticed Sergeant Danny Kelly
approaching from the opposite direction in a marked car. Turner indicated that as
soon as Akins saw Kelly’s vehicle, Akins left the road side, stepped onto the front
lawn of a nearby residence, and picked up the resident’s newspaper. Next, Akins
climbed onto the front porch, opened the storm door, and began to knock
frantically at the inside door. Akins kept his eyes on the police vehicles as he
knocked.
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Turner and Kelly indicated that their suspicions were aroused by this
behavior. They turned into the driveway of the house and began to approach
Akins. He jumped off the porch and made an attempt to run. When Kelly told
Akins to stop, he did so. Akins immediately raised his arms and told Turner and
Kelly: “You got me.” As Kelly conducted a protective pat-down, he felt a
handgun in the left, front pocket of Akins’s jacket. Kelly alerted Turner, who
immediately drew his revolver. They placed Akins on the ground on the lawn and
handcuffed him. At that point, Turner recognized Akins and realized that he was
subject to an outstanding arrest warrant.
Akins was eventually indicted on numerous charges, including
carrying a concealed deadly weapon. Prior to trial, he moved the court to suppress
evidence of the handgun as the product of an illegal search and seizure. Following
a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
During the first phase of the trial, the jury found Akins guilty of
carrying a concealed deadly weapon and possession of marijuana. During the next
phase of the proceeding, the jury found him guilty of being a convicted felon in
possession of a firearm. During the final phase of the proceeding, the jury
recommended that Akins be sentenced to serve more than fifteen-years’
imprisonment.
In a separate proceeding, Akins was acquitted of charges of rape and
kidnapping but was convicted on another charge of possession of a handgun by a
convicted felon. These appeals followed.
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In his first appeal (Akins I), Akins presents two arguments. First, he
contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence
against him since police lacked an articulable, reasonable suspicion to stop him.
Next, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to order a mistrial based on
testimony from Sergeant Kelly that Detective Turner had recognized Akins as
being subject to an outstanding arrest warrant. We disagree with both contentions.
In his first argument, Akins complains that Detective Turner and
Sergeant Kelly lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop him when they encountered
him at Valley Creek Road. He contends that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress evidence of the handgun in his possession since it was
recovered only as a result of the illegal frisk initiated by Turner and Kelly. The
Commonwealth argues that Turner and Kelly had the right to stop Akins because
they reasonably believed that he was engaged in criminal activity and that the
detective and officer were entitled to frisk Akins since they thought he might be
armed.
Akins contends that he was not subject to an ordinary investigatory
stop on Valley Creek Road based on his behavior as observed by the police. We
do not agree. His conduct on the porch itself under the circumstances furnished an
articulable, reasonable suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed2d 889 (1968). His reactions to the police
– taking immediate, evasive flight upon seeing Kelly’s vehicle approach and then
leaping from the porch as the two vehicles approached – also furnished reasonable,
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articulable suspicion for the initial stop. The United States Supreme Court has
held that the fact of flight at the mere sight of the police constitutes the reasonable
suspicion required to justify a Terry stop:
Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive
behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion. Headlong flight – wherever it occurs – is the
consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily
indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of
such.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124; (citations omitted) 120 S.Ct. 673, 676;
145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).
In addition, the existence of the warrant for his arrest removed any
doubt as to the propriety of the arrest that followed. Since a court of the
Commonwealth had ordered that Akins be arrested pursuant to its warrant
wherever he was found, he lacks any basis to challenge the efforts of Turner and
Kelly to make that arrest. Birch v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 156 (Ky.App.
2006). Adkins had no liberty interest at stake and absolutely no reasonable
expectation of privacy that would entitle him to be free from search and seizure
once the police had been authorized by the courts to make his arrest. Hardy v.
Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 433 (Ky.App. 2004). Turner and Kelly did not
violate Akins’s constitutional rights when they stopped and frisked him on the
morning of April 12, 2007. Consequently, the court did not err by denying Akins’s
motion to suppress the evidence.
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In his second argument, Akins contends that he was deprived of a fair
trial when Sergeant Kelly testified before the jury that Detective Turner recognized
Akins and advised him (Akins) that he was wanted on warrants. Akins argues that
the trial court erred by denying his timely motion for a mistrial following the
testimony.
The Commonwealth contends that Akins was not entitled to the
extraordinary relief of a mistrial when a curative admonition would have been
sufficient. The Commonwealth notes that Akins specifically and emphatically
declined the trial court’s offer to admonish the jury following Kelly’s unsolicited
comments.
As alluded to above, a mistrial is an extraordinary remedy. Sherroan
v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 7 (Ky.2004). It should be used only when the
record reveals a manifest necessity. Greene v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 128
(Ky.App.2008). This standard relies on the presumption that a trial court’s
admonition will cure a defect in testimony. Sherroan, supra. However, that
presumption may be overcome where there is an overwhelming probability that the
jury would be unable to follow the admonition and where there is a strong
likelihood that the impermissible evidence would be devastating to the defendant.
Id. If an admonition is offered by the court in response to a timely objection but is
then rejected by the defendant as insufficient, the only question on appeal is
whether the admonition would have cured the alleged error. Graves v.
Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858 (Ky.2000).
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Sergeant Kelly’s comments before the jury were neither complicated
nor expansive. There is no indication that the jury would have been incapable of
following a simple admonition by the court not to consider his testimony on this
point during its deliberations. In addition in light of the totality of Akins’s
suspicious behavior giving rise to the investigatory stop, we are not persuaded that
allusion to an outstanding warrant for his arrest was “devastating” to his defense.
We conclude that the admonition offered by the court would have been sufficient
to have cured any alleged error in Kelly’s testimony. Therefore, there is no basis
for a reversal of the judgment of conviction on this issue. We affirm as to the first
appeal (Akins I).
With respect to the second appeal, Akins contends that his second
indictment for possession of a handgun violated the bar against double jeopardy as
his possession was not a new, separate offense but was rather part and parcel of an
ongoing, uninterrupted course of conduct. The Commonwealth is correctly
following the recent case of Henry v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 194, (Ky.2008),
and it has candidly acknowledged the binding impact of that precedent. In Henry
at 202, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reiterated and re-affirmed its reasoning in
Fulcher v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 363, 376 (Ky.2004), as follows:
…uninterrupted possession of the same contraband over
a period of time is but one offense constituting a
continuing course of conduct, precluding convictions of
multiple offenses for possession of the same contraband
on different dates.
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Therefore, we vacate the conviction in Akins II and remand to the Hardin Circuit
Court with directions that it dismiss the indictment for possession of a handgun by
a convicted felon and the PFO II resulting from that charge.
In his second appeal, Akins also challenges his conviction as a
violation of his right to a speedy disposition pursuant to Kentucky Revised
Statute(s) (KRS) 500.110. We decline to address that issue as it is moot based
upon the vacating and remanding dictated by Henry, supra.
In summary, we affirm in Akins I and vacate and remand in Akins II
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Linda Roberts Horsman
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Michael J. Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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