GOSSETT (ALAN R.) VS. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. , ET AL.
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RENDERED: MARCH 27, 2009; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000261-MR
ALAN R. GOSSETT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00027
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
AND WAYNE HORN
AND
2008-CA-000324-MR
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY
AND WAYNE HORN
v.
APPELLEES
CROSS-APPELLANTS
CROSS-APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DAVID H. JERNIGAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00027
ALAN R. GOSSETT
CROSS-APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: STUMBO AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Alan R. Gossett appeals from an order of summary judgment
of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court in favor of Allstate Insurance Company and
Wayne Horn. Gossett argues that the circuit court erred in failing to render
findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the order, and that genuine
issues of fact remain for adjudication. Allstate and Horn respond that the court
may look to the face of the insurance policy at issue to ascertain the terms of the
agreement between the parties. On cross-appeal they contend that Gossett’s appeal
was not timely filed. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the order on appeal.
On July 8, 2003, Gossett completed an application for homeowner’s
insurance issued through Allstate. The policy for which Gossett applied covered
loss on Gossett’s home in Muhlenberg County, Kentucky, and provided for
“dwelling protection” up to a limit of $67,000. Also included was
“OPTIONAL/INCREASED COVERAGES SELECTED” to include “Building
Structure Reimbursement Extended Limits.” The policy became effective on the
date of the application. Sometime thereafter, the dwelling protection limit was
increased to $71,000.
On January 16, 2005, Gossett’s home was heavily damaged or
destroyed by fire. Gossett filed a claim for benefits with Allstate, whereupon
Allstate paid the balance of Gossett’s $17,819.09 mortgage and sent him a check
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Senior Judge John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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for the balance of $57,730.91, representing the $71,000.00 policy limit. Gossett
later sought reimbursement from Allstate for the full replacement cost of the
dwelling, based on policy language which he contended provided for such
coverage. When Allstate denied the claim for replacement cost coverage, Gossett
filed the instant action on January 13, 2006, against Allstate and its agent, Wayne
Horn, who assisted Gossett in filling out the policy application.
Gossett alleged in the complaint entitlement to the full replacement
cost of the dwelling. He further alleged that Horn knew or should have known that
the policy failed to provide full replacement cost coverage of the dwelling and that
Horn’s conduct in inducing Gossett to submit the application constituted fraud.
The matter proceeded in Muhlenberg Circuit Court, whereupon
Allstate and Horn filed an answer, and discovery was conducted. Citing an
inability to effectively communicate with Gossett, his trial counsel moved to
withdraw his representation on September 19, 2006. The motion was granted, and
Gossett continued pro se.
On December 27, 2007, Allstate and Horn filed a joint motion for
summary judgment as to all claims made by Gossett. In support of the motion,
they relied on Gossett’s deposition and answers to interrogatories which they
maintained demonstrated the existence of no genuine issue of material fact. Upon
considering the motion and Gossett’s pro se response thereto, the circuit court
rendered an order on January 7, 2008, granting the motion for summary judgment.
This appeal followed.
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Gossett now argues through appellate counsel that the trial court erred
in granting the motion of Allstate and Horn for summary judgment. He maintains
that the trial court erred in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law
in support of its order, and claims that genuine issues of material fact exist which
preclude the entry of summary judgment. In support of this latter argument, he
notes that while Gossett’s deposition appears in the record, no testimony or
evidence has been presented by Allstate or Horn. Gossett maintains that his
uncontroverted testimony must be taken as true and that “there are many issues of
genuine fact which have not been revealed and which must be revealed before the
Complaint can be dismissed.” The apparent focus of Gossett’s argument is that he
must be availed of the opportunity to depose Allstate and Horn for the purpose of
revealing additional issues of fact.
In their cross-appeal, Allstate and Horn maintain that Gossett’s appeal
is untimely. They note that Gossett filed his notice of appeal on February 7, 2008,
or 31 days after the January 7, 2008 order granting summary judgment became
final. On February 29, 2008, this Court rendered a show cause order as to why the
appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. Gossett responded that the courthouse
in Greenville, Kentucky, was unexpectedly closed on February 6, 2008 due to a
tornado, and he tendered the affidavit of a paralegal in support thereof.
On May 14, 2008, this Court rendered an order allowing Gossett’s
appeal to proceed. The motion of Allstate and Horn to reconsider was denied.
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They now maintain that Gossett’s appeal should be dismissed because the timely
filing of a notice of appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
We have closely examined Gossett’s argument seeking reversal of the
order granting summary judgment, and find no error. Summary judgment “shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Kentucky Civil Rule 56.03. “The
record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion
for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest,
Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). “Even
though a trial court may believe the party opposing the motion may not succeed at
trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of material
fact.” Id. Finally, “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is
whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).
When viewing the record in a light most favorable to Gossett and
resolving all doubts in his favor, we cannot conclude that the circuit court erred in
granting the motion of Allstate and Horn for summary judgment. In order to
prevail on his claim of error, the burden rests with Gossett to demonstrate the
existence of at least one genuine issue of material fact requiring adjudication.
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Steelvest, supra. By stating that “there are many issues of genuine fact which have
not been revealed” and directing this Court to none in particular, Gossett has failed
to meet that burden. This conclusion is true even when resolving all doubts in his
favor.
Gossett’s action centers on the interpretation of an insurance contract.
The case law amply demonstrates that the parties to such a contract are bound by
the terms appearing on the face of the contract, and the court may not look to parol
evidence to render those terms ineffectual. See Midwest Mutual Insurance
Company v. Wireman, 54 S.W.3d 177 (Ky. App. 2001). The insurance contract at
issue was made part of the record, and was expressly relied upon by the circuit
court in its determination that Gossett was entitled to a cash value benefit rather
than replacement cost. Nothing in the record or the law demonstrates that Gossett
is now entitled to additional time to search for genuine issues of material fact
arising outside of the insurance contract and which he cannot now articulate. He
was availed of the opportunity to depose Allstate representatives and Horn, or to
tender interrogatories, but did not do so. Ultimately, since Gossett cannot now
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact requiring remand, we
have no basis for reversing the order on appeal.
Similarly, Gossett may not rely on the circuit court’s failure to render
findings of fact and conclusions of law as a basis for reversal of the order on
appeal. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required on decisions of
motions for summary judgment. See CR 52.01, stating that, “[F]indings of fact
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and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or
56 [summary judgments] or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41.02.”
Furthermore,
A final judgment shall not be reversed or remanded
because of the failure of the trial court to make a finding
of fact on an issue essential to the judgment unless such
failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a
written request for a finding on that issue or by a motion
pursuant to Rule 52.02.
CR 52.04. Gossett did not make a written request for findings of fact.
Accordingly, we find no error on this issue.
In support of his claim that he is entitled to remand for the purpose of
uncovering additional issues of fact, Gossett also addresses in passing the fraud in
the inducement claim which was set out in his complaint. On January 3, 2008,
however, Gossett filed a pro se motion seeking to dismiss the fraud claim. His
motion stated that, “I AM REQUESTING THE COURT TO DROP JUST THE
CHARGE OF FRAUDULENT [sic]. AGAINST ALLSTATE INSURANCE AND
WAYNE HORN.” The motion was to be heard on “01-07-20008 [sic],” which is
the same hearing date referenced in the order on appeal. Though the order did not
specifically address this motion, we may reasonably assume that the adjudication
of this motion was subsumed in the order on appeal. In any event, the burden rests
with Gossett to demonstrate error arising from the order of summary judgment, and
he has not met that burden.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of summary judgment
of the Muhlenberg Circuit Court. This affirmation renders moot the cross-appeal
of Allstate and Horn on the issue of the timeliness of Gossett’s appeal.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT AND
CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES AND
CROSS-APPELLANTS:
P. Stephen Gordinier
Louisville, Kentucky
Max S. Hartz
Owensboro, Kentucky
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