GLASSON (MISTY) VS. DR. MUHAMMAD RIZWAN AFZAL; URGENT CARE CENTER-NORTHERN KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000255-MR
MISTY GLASSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FRED A. STINE, V, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-00850
DR. MUHAMMAD RIZWAN AFZAL;
URGENT CARE CENTERNORTHERN KENTUCKY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER, MOORE, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Misty Glasson (Glasson) appeals from a judgment following a
defense verdict by a jury in favor of Dr. Muhammad Rizwan Afzal1
1
There was some dispute regarding Afzal’s licensing to practice medicine in the United States.
However, Afzal’s status as a physician is not an issue in this matter; therefore, we refer to him as
a physician.
(Afzal)2 and Urgent Care Center-Northern Kentucky (Urgent Care). Hereinafter,
we will refer to Afzal and Urgent Care jointly as the Appellees. On appeal,
Glasson argues the trial court allotted too many peremptory challenges to the
Appellees; wrongfully permitted the introduction of reputation and “other act”
evidence by Afzal; wrongfully permitted the introduction of certain medical
evidence while excluding the introduction of other medical evidence; and
permitted the Appellees to use that medical evidence during closing argument to
question her credibility. The Appellees argue to the contrary. For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm.
FACTS
Glasson alleged that, on March 22, 2006, Afzal inappropriately
touched her while performing a Selective Tissue Conductance Test (STC Test) and
that touching amounted to civil sexual battery. She also alleged Urgent Care
negligently supervised Afzal, and the actions of the Appellees caused her severe
emotional distress. The Appellees filed a joint answer to Glasson’s complaint,
denying all allegations of battery and negligence. We will set forth additional facts
as necessary when analyzing the issues.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
2
We note that, throughout the record, Afzal is referred to variously as “Rizwan” and “Dr. John
Doe.” Afzal testified that, in his country, his last name, Afzal, is his father’s name and that
Rizwan is the equivalent of a last name in the United States. To be consistent with this Court’s
practice, we will use the name Afzal throughout this opinion.
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Because the standards of review differ somewhat for each issue raised
by Azfal, we will set forth the appropriate standard as we analyze each issue.
ANALYSIS
1. Peremptory Challenges
Rule 47.03(1) of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
provides “each opposing side shall have three peremptory challenges, but coparties having antagonistic interests shall have three peremptory challenges each.”
The trial court granted Glasson three peremptory challenges and granted Urgent
Care and Afzal three peremptory challenges each, for a total of six peremptory
challenges for the Appellees. Glasson argues the Appellees’ were not antagonistic
to each other; therefore, they should have been treated as one for the purpose of
peremptory challenges.
In overruling Glasson’s objection to the number of peremptory
challenges granted to the Appellees, the trial court stated that it primarily relied on
Sommerkamp v. Linton, 114 S.W.3d 811 (Ky. 2003). The court noted Glasson
alleged battery, which is an intentional tort, against Afzal and negligent
supervision against Urgent Care. The court stated those separate and diverse
allegations, along with the fact the Appellees had separate counsel, were sufficient
to support a finding that the Appellees had antagonistic interests. Furthermore, the
court assumed, based on the allegations, there would be some evidence regarding
the negligent supervision claim.
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The determination of whether parties have antagonistic interests is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse
of that discretion. A reviewing court will only disturb the trial court’s
determination if the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Davis v. Fischer
Single Family Homes, Ltd., 231 S.W.3d 767, 773 (Ky. App. 2007), and
Sommerkamp v. Linton, 114 S.W.3d 811, 814 (Ky. 2003). A reviewing court must
analyze the trial court’s determination to allot peremptory challenges as of the time
that determination was made, not in hindsight following presentation of proof.
Sommerkamp at 816.
As the trial court noted, the principal case regarding peremptory
challenges is Sommerkamp v. Linton. In Sommerkamp, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky stated there are three primary factors a court should consider in deciding
if coparties have antagonistic interests: “1) whether the coparties are charged with
separate acts of negligence; 2) whether they share a common theory of the case;
and 3) whether they have filed cross-claims.” Sommerkamp 114 S.W.3d at 815
(Internal citations omitted). Additionally, the Court set forth other factors that may
be considered, including: “whether the defendants are represented by separate
counsel; whether the alleged acts of negligence occurred at different times;
whether the defendants have individual theories of defense; and whether fault will
be subject to apportionment.” Id. at 815.
Glasson argued before the trial court, as she does here, that the
Appellees’ interests were not antagonistic for two reasons: (1) they presented the
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same defense; and (2) they did not truly have separate counsel. In support of her
mutual defense argument, Glasson notes that, if the Appellees could prove the
event did not occur, neither Urgent Care nor Afzal would have liability. If the jury
found the event did occur, Afzal would not escape liability, but Urgent Care might,
if it could establish it reasonably supervised Afzal. To escape liability, Urgent
Care would not be required to assign blame to Afzal, it would only be required to
establish it reasonably supervised Afzal. Thus, Urgent Care could escape liability
without assigning blame to Afzal, which Glasson argues establishes that the
Appellees’ interests were not antagonistic.
Urgent Care agrees its primary defense, that the event did not take
place, was not antagonistic to Afzal’s interest. However, it argues its secondary
defense, that it acted reasonably in supervising Afzal, was antagonistic to Afzal
and, therefore, the peremptory challenges were properly allotted to the parties.
Having reviewed the record as it existed at the time the trial court
made its allotment of peremptory challenges, we discern no error. As noted above,
Glasson’s theory of recovery against Afzal sounded in intentional tort and her
theory of recovery against Urgent Care sounded in negligence. Generally, in a
case when both parties are charged with negligence arising from one event, an
increase in liability as to one party will result in a decrease as to the other party.
Antagonistic interests are inherent in such cases. However, as noted above, the
liability between Afzal and Urgent Care were not so proportionally related.
Therefore, the potential antagonism between the two is not so clear. However, that
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does not mean they did not have antagonistic interests. Urgent Care had to be
prepared to present evidence that Afzal was simply a bad actor and it could have
done nothing to anticipate or prevent him from improperly touching Glasson. That
defense is antagonistic to Afzal’s interests, and the trial court properly anticipated
that defense might be raised during the course of the trial.
We note Glasson’s argument that, “as it played out, nothing in closing
argument (or in the entire trial, for that matter) showed any antagonistic interest
whatsoever, a point tending to underline the error of awarding Defendants extra
preemptory [sic] challenges.” It is true the Appellees presented a united defense
throughout the trial. In hindsight, the trial court might have ruled differently on
Glasson’s objection to the allotment of peremptory challenges. However, the trial
court must analyze that issue prior to the presentation of proof; and, at that time,
the Appellees’ interests were antagonistic. Therefore, this argument by Glasson is
without merit.
In support of her mutual attorney argument, Glasson states that, while
Afzal and Urgent Care had separate counsel, the attorneys were with the same law
firm. Furthermore, Glasson notes, and the Appellees do not dispute, that, as a
general rule, only one of the attorneys for the Appellees practiced the case prior to
trial.
Having attorneys from one law firm defend Afzal and Urgent Care
may or may not have been the best choice; however, the fact remains the Appellees
did have separate counsel. Furthermore, whether the attorneys were from the same
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law firm does not necessarily mean the Appellees’ interests were not antagonistic.
Attorneys from the same firm can represent clients with diverse interests as long as
the clients are fully informed and give their consent. While there is little evidence
the attorneys practiced this case from truly adversarial positions, the same could
well have been true had the attorneys been from different law firms. Whether the
Appellees were represented by counsel from different law firms would not have
altered the fact that proving the event did not take place was the best defense for
both Appellees. Therefore, whether counsel were from the same law firm is not
dispositive of this issue.
Based on the above, we discern no error in the trial court’s allotment
of peremptory challenges.
2. Admission of Evidence that Glasson
Previously Received a Prescription for Zoloft
Glasson testified that, since this event, she has had difficulty sleeping,
has had nightmares, feels as if everyone knows what happened and is looking at
her, and, as a result, is reluctant to go out in public. During cross-examination,
counsel for Afzal questioned Glasson about a 2002 medical record that showed her
complaints of depression, sleeplessness, and difficulty socializing. That record
also revealed Glasson’s physician had prescribed Zoloft, which Glasson admitted
taking. However, Glasson explained her symptoms and treatment were related to
post-partum depression and lasted for only three weeks. Glasson objected to this
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line of questioning, arguing a lack of relevance. The trial court, noting Glasson’s
complaints during direct examination, permitted the questioning.
On appeal, Glasson questions the relevancy of her prior symptoms
and treatment and argues the Appellees put forth that evidence simply to prove her
“bad character.” The Appellees note that Glasson alleged and testified she
“suffered from symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome, including anxiety,
depression, nightmares, fearfulness, guilt, shame, embarrassment.” The Appellees
argue any prior evidence of similar symptoms or treatment of those symptoms is
relevant to show whether, and to what extent, Glasson’s current symptoms are
related to the event.
Under the Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE), evidence is relevant if
it has a “tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” KRE 401. Relevant evidence is admissible unless
otherwise provided by the Constitution, the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS),
other rules of evidence, or rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky. KRE 402.
This Court reviews rulings on relevancy by a trial court using the
abuse of discretion standard. Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Ky.
2001). A decision by the trial court regarding relevancy of evidence will only be
disturbed if that decision “was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by
sound legal principles.” Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 361-62 (Ky.
2004).
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Glasson put her mental condition at issue in her complaint and when
she testified her symptoms were related to the event. Whether her mental
condition was caused by the event was a fact of consequence for the jury.
Evidence of prior symptoms and/or treatment is relevant to a determination of the
issue of causation. Therefore, it was within the sound discretion of the trial court
to admit that evidence, and we will not disturb the court’s ruling on appeal.
3. Admission of Testimony by Afzal
Regarding His Credentials
On direct examination, Afzal, who is a graduate of a foreign medical
school, testified regarding the tests he had to take in order to be recognized as a
physician in the United States. In addition to describing the tests, Afzal testified as
to the scores he received on those tests. Glasson objected to this testimony arguing
that Afzal’s character had not been questioned; therefore, such testimony was
impermissible character evidence. Afzal argued that he was simply providing such
evidence to show that he was qualified to perform the STC test. The trial court
permitted Afzal to testify regarding his test scores and credentials.
On appeal, Glasson argues such character evidence, particularly when
coupled with the evidence of her previous use of Zoloft, impermissibly elevated
Afzal and diminished her in the eyes of the jurors. Glasson argues this disparity in
status put her at an unfair disadvantage before the jurors, who were being asked to
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weigh her credibility against Afzal’s. The Appellees argue the evidence was not
offered to prove Afzal’s character but for the purpose of rebutting Glasson’s claim
of negligent supervision. According to the Appellees, an understanding of Afzal’s
qualifications was necessary for the jury to determine the extent of supervision
Urgent Care should have provided.
KRE 404(a) provides “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion.” The rule gives certain exceptions, all of which
are related to criminal actions.
We agree with Glasson that admission of character evidence is not
appropriate. However, the limitation on character evidence applies when that
evidence is being offered to prove action in conformity with the evidence. For
example, testimony that a witness “always lies” would not be admissible to show
the witness was lying in court unless one of the exceptions to the rule applied. In
this case, the evidence of Afzal’s educational achievements was not offered to
prove he acted in conformity with that evidence, i.e. he acted intelligently. It was
offered to rebut the implication from Glasson that Afzal was not competent to
administer the STC test. Furthermore, as noted by the Appellees in their brief,
Glasson alleged Urgent Care did not sufficiently supervise Afzal. Proof of Afzal’s
educational achievements was relevant to the amount of supervision Urgent Care
was required to provide. Because Afzal’s testimony regarding his educational
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achievements was not offered as character evidence and was relevant to issues
before the jury, it was admissible.
4. Exclusion of Medical Evidence
At the end of trial, Afzal returned to testify, in pertinent part, that the
medical record from March 22, 2006, showed Glasson was menstruating at the
time of the STC test. Afzal then re-called Glasson to the stand to testify on recross examination. Afzal’s counsel questioned Glasson about the medical record,
and Glasson testified that she was not menstruating at the time of the test. She
stated that she knows she was not menstruating because she was wearing thong
panties, and she would not have been wearing thong panties if she were
menstruating. The trial court then dismissed Glasson and she left the stand.
Glasson’s counsel then re-called Glasson in rebuttal and attempted to question
Glasson about a medical record dated March 15, 2006. That record indicated
Glasson was menstruating at that time. Afzal objected on the grounds that such
examination was improper rebuttal. The trial court agreed and did not permit
Glasson’s counsel to ask any additional questions regarding the March 15, 2006,
medical record or Glasson’s memory regarding her menstrual cycle. Although we
might have ruled differently, we discern no error in the trial court’s ruling.
Glasson argues on appeal that Afzal attacked her credibility during
closing argument, in part based on the issue of whether she was or was not
menstruating on March 22, 2006. According to Glasson, the court’s ruling that she
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could not discuss the March 15, 2006, medical record put her at a significant
disadvantage with regard to the issue of her credibility.
CR 43.02 sets forth the order for proceeding in trial. In pertinent part,
the rule states the party with the burden of proof first produces evidence and
should “exhaust his evidence before the other begins. But the order of proof shall
be regulated by the court so as to expedite the trial and enable the tribunal to obtain
a clear view of the whole evidence.” CR 43.02(c). Once the parties have
presented their evidence, they “will then be confined to rebutting evidence, unless
the court, for good reasons in furtherance of justice, permits them to offer evidence
in chief.” CR 43.02(d).
Determining the order of presentation of proof during trial is within
the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v.
Ochsner, 392 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Ky. 1965); and Jenkins v. Louisville and Jefferson
County Planning and Zoning Commission, 357 S.W.2d 846 (Ky. 1962).
In support of her argument, Glasson cites us to Robinson v.
Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 147 (Ky. 1970). In Robinson, the defendant was
charged with raping his sister-in-law. Robinson testified that the victim was a
willing participant and that no rape took place. After Robinson rested, the
prosecution called the victim’s sister in rebuttal. The sister began to testify
regarding a confession Robinson made in her presence. Robinson objected and the
court sustained that objection. The Commonwealth then re-called Robinson and
asked if he had confessed in the sister’s presence. He denied doing so. The
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Commonwealth then re-called the sister and she testified regarding the confession.
The then-Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the matter for a
new trial. In doing so, the Court held the Commonwealth was not required to “lay
a foundation” prior to introducing the testimony of the victim’s sister. However,
the Court also held the Commonwealth could not hold back evidence that is purely
substantive in nature and present it in rebuttal, as doing so was prejudicial to
Robinson’s rights. Id.
Robinson is not instructive for two reasons. First, the trial court in
Robinson permitted the introduction of substantive evidence in rebuttal; it did not
exclude the introduction of evidence. Second, the complaining party in Robinson
was the party against whom the evidence was offered. In this case, the
complaining party is the party who sought to introduce the evidence. Robinson
had little to no control regarding the manner in which the Commonwealth
presented its evidence. However, Glasson had control over how and when she
presented her evidence. As noted by the trial court and the Appellees, Glasson
could have offered the March 15, 2006, medical record when the issue of her
menstrual cycle first arose. However, she chose to wait until rebuttal to attempt to
do so. Therefore, unlike Robinson, she, not her opponent, had control over when
she would attempt to present that proof, and she bears the responsibility for timely
presenting it.
Finally, we note Glasson testified at some length that she was not
menstruating at the time of the test, and explained why she knew she was not. The
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trial court’s ruling did not foreclose her from addressing the issue; it only
foreclosed her from introducing the medical record. Therefore, the trial court’s
ruling, even if error, was harmless and not reversible.
5. Closing Argument
Glasson argues that, in light of the March 15, 2006, medical record,
the trial court erred when it permitted counsel for Afzal to discuss the contents of
the March 22, 2006, medical record which contained a “known misstatement”
regarding her menstrual cycle.
“[C]ounsel in closing argument is given broad latitude to recite and
interpret the evidence.” Owensboro Mercy Health System v. Payne, 24 S.W.3d
675, 678 (Ky. App. 2000). “However, this does not license counsel to go outside
the record, since the argument must be confined to matters in issue and to facts
shown by competent evidence, with proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.”
Triplett v. Napier, 286 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Ky. 1955).
Based on the above, the court properly permitted counsel for Afzal to
argue during his closing the contents of the March 22, 2006, medical record. The
court had admitted that record into evidence and statements during closing
argument regarding what inferences the jury could draw from that record was
legitimate. Furthermore, Glasson’s argument that counsel for Afzal based his
closing argument on a “known misstatement” is not persuasive. While the March
15th and March 22nd medical records contain inconsistent information regarding
Glasson’s menstrual cycle, it is as likely that the March 15th record contains a
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misstatement as it is that the March 22nd record does. Therefore, we hold that the
trial court’s ruling was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
We discern no reversible error in the trial court’s allotment of
peremptory challenges, the admission and exclusion of evidence, or in its rulings
regarding counsel for Azfal’s closing argument. Therefore, we affirm.
MOORE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY AND FILES
SEPARATE OPINION.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: I
concur with the conclusion that the circuit court’s judgment should be affirmed but
differ with the analysis of the issue regarding the peremptory challenges allotted to
Afzal and Urgent Care.
The decision to award additional peremptory challenges must be
based on a finding that co-parties’ have antagonistic interests. CR 47.03(1). As
the majority correctly recites, the factors listed in Sommerkamp v. Linton, 114
S.W.3d 811 (Ky. 2003), are relevant to the trial court’s inquiry.
In this case, the trial court relied heavily on one factor, the possibility
that liability could be apportioned between Afzal and Urgent Care. I do not
disagree with the trial court that liability could be apportioned. See Roman
Catholic Diocese of Covington v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. App. 1998).
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However, when the comparative fault of co-parties is an issue, their interests are
not necessarily antagonistic.
My view is supported by the factors listed in Sommerkamp and the
Court’s unwillingness to hold that the potential apportionment of liability was
sufficient to award peremptory challenges to each party. Instead, it offered as
guidance numerous factors including: (1) whether they share a common theory of
the case; (2) whether they have filed cross-claims; (3) whether they are represented
by separate counsel; (4) whether the alleged negligent act occurred simultaneously;
and (5) whether the defendants have individual theories of defense. No one factor
is determinative.
In this case, the trial court overlooked key factors known to it at the
time of trial which demonstrated that Afzal’s and Urgent Care’s interests were not
antagonistic. A predominate fact is that there were no cross-claims filed between
the parties. Additionally, the trial court was aware that the parties had the same
insurance carrier and the same law firm represented both parties during the pretrial
and trial process. Thus, I do not believe that the co-parties’ interests were
antagonistic.
Despite my disagreement with the majority, I concur in the result
reached because I believe that any error was harmless. I realize that my conclusion
is contrary to our Supreme Court’s holding in Bowling Green Municipal Utilities
v. Atmos Energy Corp., 989 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Ky. 1999), where the Court held
that allowing excessive peremptory challenges constitutes reversible error without
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a showing of prejudice. Nevertheless, I join in Justice Keller’s well-reasoned
concurring opinion in Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483
(Ky. 2002), opinion vacated by Ford Motor Co. v. Smith, 538 U.S. 1028, 123 S.
Ct. 2072, 155 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2003), and likewise urge Kentucky courts to follow
the majority of jurisdictions that apply the harmless error rule to cases where
excessive peremptory challenges have been permitted.
No prejudice has been demonstrated by the exercise of additional
peremptory challenges by Afzal and Urgent Care. The evidence against Afzal was
based only on Glasson’s allegations. As to Urgent Care, there is no evidence it had
any reason to know that Afzal had a propensity to sexually assault a patient, thus
there was no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have imposed liability
for negligent supervision. I believe that despite the technical violation of CR
47.01, this jury was qualified and impartial and rendered a verdict based on the
evidence. I would affirm.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
Robert F. Croskery
Cincinnati, Ohio
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert A. Ott
Scott P. Whonsetler
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Robert A. Ott
Louisville, Kentucky
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