JONES (HARLON) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2009; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2008-CA-000093-MR
HARLON JONES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00168
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: Harlon Jones appeals the Butler Circuit Court’s order denying
his RCr2 11.42 motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. After a careful
review of the record, we affirm because Jones has failed to show that he received
the ineffective assistance of counsel.
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
2
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
Jones was charged with two counts of first-degree sodomy against a
victim under twelve years of age. He entered a guilty plea to both counts, and he
was sentenced to serve twenty years on each count, to be served concurrently for a
total sentence of twenty years of imprisonment.
Jones subsequently moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to RCr
11.42, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. He requested
an evidentiary hearing as part of his RCr 11.42 motion. An evidentiary hearing
was held, but the circuit court nevertheless denied Jones’s RCr 11.42 motion.
Jones now appeals, contending that he received the ineffective
assistance of counsel when: (a) counsel failed to perform an adequate pre-trial
investigation and failed to prepare a defense to the charges; and (b) counsel failed
to properly familiarize himself with the law of the case and failed to make Jones
aware of the special parole requirements involved in his guilty plea.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a motion brought under RCr 11.42, “[t]he movant has the burden of
establishing convincingly that he or she was deprived of some substantial right
which would justify the extraordinary relief provided by [a] post-conviction
proceeding. . . . A reviewing court must always defer to the determination of facts
and witness credibility made by the circuit judge.” Simmons v. Commonwealth,
191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006).
II. ANALYSIS
-2-
A. CLAIM REGARDING COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND
PREPARE A DEFENSE
Jones first contends that he received the ineffective assistance of
counsel when counsel failed to perform an adequate pre-trial investigation and
failed to prepare a defense to the charges.
A showing that counsel’s assistance was ineffective in
enabling a defendant to intelligently weigh his legal
alternatives in deciding to plead guilty has two
components: (1) that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel’s performance fell outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the
deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome
of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would
not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going
to trial.
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Jones alleges that he told defense counsel to investigate whether the
victim made a false allegation of sexual assault. Jones contends that he and the
victim’s mother and the mother’s boyfriend were at the victim’s house on the night
in question drinking alcohol and discussing whether they should enter the illegal
drug trade. They agreed that Jones would give the victim’s mother and her
boyfriend a total of $600.00 to help finance the purchase of methamphetamine for
resale. The victim’s mother and her boyfriend then went out to try to buy the drugs
while Jones stayed at their house to babysit the victim, a seven-year-old girl. The
mother and her boyfriend returned approximately two hours later and told Jones
-3-
that they had made arrangements, but would be unable to complete the drug
purchase until later. Therefore, they refused to return Jones’s money to him. The
mother, her boyfriend, and Jones continued to drink more alcohol, Jones allegedly
passed out, and he was awakened sometime later by the victim’s mother, who
accused Jones of having sexually assaulted her daughter. Jones allegedly told his
counsel that the victim’s mother and her boyfriend “manufactured the ‘sexual
assault’ accusation as a subterfuge to keep the $600.00 he had provided to finance
the drug sale enterprise.” Jones contends in his appellate brief that
he had not mentioned the drug deal during his interview
[with] the police because he was afraid of being charged
with attempted drug trafficking. [Jones] asked appointed
counsel to investigate [the victim’s mother and the
mother’s boyfriend] to ascertain their drug use and to
establish their purchase or attempted purchase of a
substantial quantity of methamphetamine on the night in
question and/or shortly thereafter.
Jones’s trial counsel testified during the evidentiary hearing that Jones
would not provide him with any details concerning where the victim’s mother and
her boyfriend were supposed to go to buy the drugs on the night in question, or
from whom they were going to purchase the drugs. Thus, trial counsel attested that
he was unable to go and question the person from whom they were supposed to
buy the drugs in order to substantiate Jones’s claim.
Thus, because Jones refused to provide trial counsel with the
information that counsel needed to further investigate the alleged drug use and
attempted purchase of drugs by the victim’s mother and the mother’s boyfriend, he
-4-
cannot now show that counsel performed deficiently by failing to so investigate.
Accordingly, his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to
counsel’s failure to investigate lacks merit.
Regarding Jones’s allegation that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to prepare a defense to the charges, we first note that Jones
entered a guilty plea, so there was no reason for his counsel to prepare a defense
for trial. Second, we note that in his written motion to enter a guilty plea, Jones
stated that he and his defense counsel had discussed his case and that Jones
understood the charges against him “and any possible defenses to them.” Thus, it
is reasonable for a court reviewing this claim in an RCr 11.42 proceeding to find
that Jones and his counsel came to the conclusion that there was no good defense
to the charges. Third, Jones fails to specify what defenses would have applied to
his case.
Finally, even if we were to assume that Jones is contending that his
defense should have been that the mother and her boyfriend fabricated the charges
so that they could keep Jones’s $600.00, this claim lacks merit. Trial counsel
testified during the evidentiary hearing that he informed Jones of his reluctance to
raise the issue of the planned methamphetamine purchase because juries tended to
be sympathetic to victims in sexual offense cases and because methamphetamine
use and trafficking was a big problem in that area of Kentucky at that time. Such
would have been sound trial strategy, if the case had proceeded to trial, and we will
not find that counsel rendered ineffective assistance if counsel’s motivations were
-5-
sound trial strategy. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Moreover, the seven-year-old victim
apparently told authorities that Jones committed the sexual acts against her and
Jones’s DNA and saliva were found on the victim’s underwear. Therefore, Jones
cannot show that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to prepare a
defense to the charges because he cannot establish that he was prejudiced by this
alleged failure.
B. CLAIM REGARDING COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO INFORM JONES
ABOUT PAROLE REQUIREMENTS
Jones next contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
when counsel failed to properly familiarize himself with the law of the case and
failed to make Jones aware of the special parole requirements involved in his guilty
plea. Specifically, Jones asserts that trial counsel failed to inform him that he
would be ineligible for probation and that he would have to serve 85% of his
sentence before being eligible for parole.
During Jones’s plea hearing, the court informed Jones that the
Commonwealth recommended he serve concurrent terms of imprisonment of
twenty years on each of the two counts, and that the Commonwealth was opposed
to granting him probation. The court also informed Jones that he may not be
entitled to probation. Jones then told the trial court that no one had promised him
that the court would grant him probation. Jones, therefore, pleaded guilty with the
understanding that he may not get probation, and he cannot now show that counsel
-6-
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to inform him about his ineligibility for
probation.
At Jones’s sentencing hearing, his trial counsel told the court that
counsel believed the crimes Jones committed required Jones to serve 85% of his
prison term before being eligible for parole, and counsel told the court that he had
informed Jones of this. Thus, Jones was aware of the 85% requirement prior to his
sentencing hearing.
Further, even if trial counsel failed to inform Jones of the 85%
requirement prior to entering his guilty plea, this does not render Jones’s guilty
plea involuntary. “[P]arole is not a constitutional right.” Turner v.
Commonwealth, 647 S.W.2d 500 (Ky. App. 1982). Defendants are not required to
“be informed of the range of sentences which may be imposed.” Jewell v.
Commonwealth, 725 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Ky. 1987). Kentucky’s Supreme Court has
noted that the United States Supreme Court, in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), stated that, for a guilty plea to be valid,
there must be
a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of all
important constitutional rights. However, a knowing,
voluntary and intelligent waiver does not necessarily
include a requirement that the defendant be informed of
every possible consequence and aspect of the guilty plea.
A guilty plea that is brought about by a person’s own free
will is not less valid because he did not know all possible
consequences of the plea and all possible alternative
courses of action.
Turner, 647 S.W.2d at 500-01.
-7-
Thus, even if counsel failed to inform Jones of the 85% requirement
before Jones entered his guilty plea, Jones cannot show that this rendered his guilty
plea invalid.
Accordingly, the order of the Butler Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Harlon Jones
Pro se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joshua D. Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.